Sentences with phrase «appeal erred»

For reasons that follow, I am respectfully of the view that the trial judge and the majority of the Court of Appeal erred.

On appeal from: [2016] EWCA Civ 177 This appeal considered whether the Court of Appeal erred in upholding the judgment...

Labour Law: Supplemental Employment Benefits Re Maternity / Parental Leave British Columbia Teachers» Federation v. British Columbia Public School Employers» Association, 2014 SCC 70 (35623) Nov. 14, 2014 Karakatsanis J. — «The Court of Appeal erred in failing to give deference to the Arbitrator's interpretation of the collective agreement and in failing to recognize the different purposes of pregnancy benefits and parental benefits.

The appellants have not persuaded us that the Court of Appeal erred in interpreting s. 98 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

Administrative law — Judicial review — Municipal law — Taxation — Real property tax — Payments made by Federal Crown in lieu of real property tax — Assessed value of Halifax Citadel — Whether the Federal Court of Appeal erred in holding that the Minister is unconstrained by the assessed value of the property determined by the assessment authority in determining the property value of a federal property for purposes of the PILT Act — Whether the Federal Court of Appeal erred in holding that the Minister acted reasonably in determining the property value of the Halifax Citadel lands (adopting the determination of the Dispute Advisory Panel appointed under the Act), and in particular in valuing the portion of the lands upon which are located improvements which are exempt from payments in lieu of taxes, representing 47 of 49 acres of the site, at $ 10 — Whether the Court should consider the present case as it raises similar issues as Montréal (City) v. Montréal Port Authority 2010 SCC 14, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 427, but from the perspective of assessed value — Payments in Lieu of Taxes Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. M - 13.

It also considered whether the Court of Appeal erred in its approach to the maintenance standard under 1975 Act, was wrong to structure an award under the 1975 Act in a way which allowed the Respondent the preserve her entitlement to state benefits, and erred in its application of the balancing exercise required under the 1975 Act.

This appeal considered whether the Court of Appeal erred in law in holding that a lender could recover damages from its negligent adviser representing loans that had been repaid by the borrower, on the basis that the borrower's repayments were collateral to (or res inter alios acta) the adviser's breach of contract.

The SCC will review whether the majority at the court of appeal erred in ordering a new trial.

The SCC will review whether the court of appeal erred in its determination that the Kahkewistahaw Election Act was discriminatory.

The French Supreme Courtdecided that the Paris Court of Appeal erred in law, by accepting the argument that there was no other EU - operator active or willing to be active on the relevant market and thereby there was no effect on inter-state trade.

In the decision, Justice Morris J. Fish wrote, «In my respectful view, the Court of Appeal erred in reviewing the arbitrator's decision for correctness: reasonableness is the applicable standard.»

«Where the Court of Appeal erred is extending the blanket of privilege over transactions and over the names of people who are not in the solicitor - client relationship.

Such an exercise raises a question of mixed fact and law, and therefore, the Court of Appeal erred in granting leave to appeal.

Upon further reflection, and after rereading the opinion, I think the Court of Appeals erred.

We hold that, under Booker, the cocaine Guidelines, like all other Guidelines, are advisory only, and that the Court of Appeals erred in holding the crack / powder disparity effectively mandatory.

Not exact matches

This Author feels that the judge in question erred in his statements justifying his decision and the plaintiff is almost certain to obtain a new trial at the least on appeal.

In its appeal to the Full Court, Prysmian argued that the trial judge erred in finding that it had engaged in cartel conduct in circumstances where the ACCC's case against Nexans SA, another alleged participant in the conduct, had been dismissed.

An appeal on the merits is not available for Tribunal merger authorisation decisions, but the ACCC is seeking judicial review, alleging three reviewable errors, including that the Tribunal erred in its reasoning that «it could only conclude that the proposed acquisition was likely to result in a detriment if the Tribunal concluded that there would be a substantial lessening of competition».

Considering the state's grounds of appeal which stated, among other things, that the trial judge erred in law when he stated that the prosecution woefully failed to establish a prima facie case against Woyome, Mr Justice Ofoe said that position was flawed.

But the state appealed on the grounds that the trial judge erred in law in not considering the evidence adduced by the prosecution.

Their lawyer, Mr. Eyitayo Fatogun, who filed the notice of appeal on behalf of the appellants, stated in one of the grounds of appeal that Justice Kolawole erred in declaring that the SJIP was unknown to the constitution and the extant Acts of the National Assembly.

The Democrats appealed, and the Appellate Division found that the Supreme Court had erred in finding that the petition had sufficiently described the office Mr. Larsen sought.

But Oluyede argued in the first grounds of appeal that the ruling amounted to miscarriage of justice, adding that the CCT erred in law by allowing Umar «to single - handedly decide that the application for recusal (disqualification) lacks absolute merit».

If the defense claims a judge erred in admitting certain evidence, rearguing that point in a post-trial motion gives the judge a chance to clarify the earlier ruling, which could make it harder for the defense to win the point on appeal.

In place of what felt like driver - lashed - to - drivetrain contact in the old car is a much more fluid driveline that at first seems almost too isolated and out of touch, as though Dr. Evo may have erred too far on the side of mass appeal.

ECMC appealed, arguing that the bankruptcy judge erred when he took tax consequences into account when he granted the Murrays a partial discharge of their student loans.

The debtors appealed, arguing in part that the bankruptcy court erred in applying this standard.

The task for the chambers judge, from whom this appeal is taken, was to decide whether the Registrar had erred in failing to consider or to give sufficient weight to all relevant factors...

For example, in the recent Liden v Burton [2016] EWCA Civ 275, [2016] Fam Law 687 (proprietary estoppel: see next article) Hamblen LJ characterised the issues on appeal as: «(i) whether the judge wrongly applied the law to the facts as found; (ii) whether the judge erred in the exercise of his discretion in giving effect to the equity» in the particular case.

In a 69 - page opinion in O'Grady v. Superior Court, the California Court of Appeal said that the trial court erred in refusing to grant an order protecting against disclosure of their identities.

(Legal journalists, in fairness, sometimes fare no better: an Australian reporter recently achieved the rare feat of creating a quintuple negative to explain a court judgment: «The grounds of appeal announced on Monday state Justice Sifris erred in not finding Mr Goldberg was wrong in failing to set aside the summonses.»

The Supreme Court of Canada will hear five appeals this week, including three criminal cases involving driving «over 80» and production of evidence; an unjust enrichment claim; and an appeal in a sexual assault case in which the Court of Appeal of Alberta had found that a trial judge had erred by relying on a stereotype about the behaviour of sexual assault viappeal in a sexual assault case in which the Court of Appeal of Alberta had found that a trial judge had erred by relying on a stereotype about the behaviour of sexual assault viAppeal of Alberta had found that a trial judge had erred by relying on a stereotype about the behaviour of sexual assault victims.

On appeal, the Superior Court reversed the trial court, holding that the lower court erred in admitting the photographs and the accompanying declaration over the Khaled's hearsay and confrontation clause objections.

In response to the argument that the trial judge had erred in declining to declare a mistrial the Court of Appeal found, oddly, that to allow a trial judge to ignore the juries findings would come perilously close to setting aside an award on the basis that it was inordinately high, which power is only reserved for the Court of Appeal.

On appeal, Downey's counsel argued that the trial judge had erred in his application of the doctrine of wilful blindness.

On appeal the Cains argued that the trial court erred by giving Instruction 10 which included language that noted «punitive damages are generally not favored and should be awarded only in cases involving egregious conduct.»

On appeal, Affinia argued that the motion judge erred by failing to consider the case of Sharma v. Affinia Canada ULC («Sharma»), an unreported case which the appellant alleged had nearly identical facts.

Accused went to cottage of JC with whom she previously cohabited — Accused found JC with victim, another lady, in sauna — Angry words were exchanged between accused and JC — Victim testified that accused pushed her following verbal exchange, as a result victim lost balance and ended up against stove, thereby sustaining serious burns to body — Trial judge accepted victim's evidence that there was some kind of pushing — Accused convicted on one count of assault causing bodily harm, and sentenced to two - year term of probation and $ 1,000.00 fine, accused was also ordered to provide DNA sample pursuant to s. 487.04 of Criminal Code — Accused appealed — Appeal against sentence was allowed — Trial judge erred in concluding that discharge was not appropriate in circumstances, especially given conclusion that accused did not deliberately attempt to injure victim — Trial judge found that there was no need for either specific deterrence or general deterrence; prime concern was need for denunciation of her conduct — Section 730 of Criminal Code permits discharge in cases of this nature, provided that it was in best interest of accused and not contrary to public interest — Accused was responsible individual with no record whatsoever, she held position as counsellor and social worker for 25 years — Trial judge did not find that conviction would definitely affect her employment, but possibility existed, and such conviction would necessarily result in criminal record — There was no likelihood of re-offending — Conditional discharge would not be contrary to public interest.

Accused went to cottage of JC with whom she previously cohabited — Accused found JC with victim, another lady, in sauna — Angry words were exchanged between accused and JC — Victim testified that accused pushed her following verbal exchange, as a result victim lost balance and ended up against stove, thereby sustaining serious burns to body — Trial judge accepted victim's evidence that there was some kind of pushing — Accused convicted on one count of assault causing bodily harm, and sentenced to two - year term of probation and $ 1,000.00 fine, accused was also ordered to provide DNA sample pursuant to s. 487.04 of Criminal Code — Accused appealed against order to provide DNA sample — Appeal allowed — Order was issued to destroy DNA sample that was taken — Trial judge erred in failing to exercise discretion not to order DNA sample — Accused was first time offender, in circumstances that resulted in serious injuries, but with no intention of causing those injuries — Accused had otherwise been exemplary citizen, and likelihood of re-offending was remote.

On appeal, Madam Justice Allan found the Council and the Committee had erred in holding they had no jurisdiction to consider institutional bias.

The court of appeals reversed summary judgment for defendant, holding that 1) the district court erred in its analysis of whether a witness's statement was made in reaction to a truly startling event, and whether the statement was made under the stress of excitement caused by that event; and 2) there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendant's failure to remove the stump was a proximate cause of plaintiff's accident.

This appeal considered whether the High Court erred in holding that the provisions of the Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009, which prevent the defendant from relying on the «reasonable belief» defence, specifically s 39 (2)(a)(i), are compatible with ECHR, arts 6, 8 and 14.

The appeal is limited to the following submission: did the application judge err in concluding the «purpose test» contained in Amos is met in the circumstances (was the incident in question really an «accident»)?

The defendant employer appealed the award of aggravated damages given by the deputy judge, arguing that she erred in law when she awarded aggravated damages when there was no finding by the deputy judge that the employer had conducted itself in a manner that was unfair or in bad faith when it terminated Mr. Walker such as to justify an award of aggravated damages; and furthermore, there was no evidence, in any form, to show that the Respondent suffered any actual damages as a result of his termination.

The Court of Appeal held that Warkentin, J., in granting summary judgment to the second lawyer, erred in failing to consider whether he had owed the plaintiffs a duty to advise them about the limitation period for suing the first lawyer, even though the written retainer between the plaintiffs and the second lawyer was restricted to an assessment of the first lawyer's account.

The Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court erred as a matter of law in determining the issue in this case as one of school choice.

This appeal considered whether the Respondent erred in law in refusing to refer the Appellant's rape conviction case to the High Court.

The Virginia Court of Appeals ruled that husband had waived his argument that the circuit court erred in ruling that Husband's adultery was the primary cause of the dissolution of the marriage because Husband failed to cite legal authority in support of his argument in his appellate opening brief as required by Rule 5A: 20 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia.

On appeal to the Court of Appeal, the appellants argued that the motion judge had erred in several ways, namely by concluding that a broader claim was necessarily advantageous, and in turn assuming that the Rochon Group were better prepared and resoappeal to the Court of Appeal, the appellants argued that the motion judge had erred in several ways, namely by concluding that a broader claim was necessarily advantageous, and in turn assuming that the Rochon Group were better prepared and resoAppeal, the appellants argued that the motion judge had erred in several ways, namely by concluding that a broader claim was necessarily advantageous, and in turn assuming that the Rochon Group were better prepared and resourced.

The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeal, finding that the Respondent had not erred in law in any of the ways submitted by the Appellant.