Sentences with phrase «as an actual occasion»

As every actual occasion perishes, it is preserved everlastingly in the consequent nature of God and it is immortalized as part of the kingdom.

Vast as the actual world is, and insistent as actual occasions are upon realizing novelty, the potential variety contained in the actual situation is finite.

When the event concresces as an actual occasion, it contributes to the actualization of future events.

They are contrasts because there is a shift of meaning in referring to God's primordial nature and his consequent nature and in referring to the world as an actual occasion and the world as included in God.

Consequently, just as an actual occasion in the immediate past influences a newly concrescing occasion through its aim at fulfillment for it, God likewise influences individual persons through the particular propositions or aims at fulfillment which he entertains for them in each moment of experience (PPCT 386f.).

God is seen as envisaging all the eternal objects as well as all actual occasions, but Whitehead does not see this envisagement as fundamentally different in kind from that possible to other occasions.

This ongoing activity of occasions — which have subjectively perished — in other occasions is designated by Whitehead as the actual occasions» acquisition of «objective immortality» (PR xiii / ix, 32/47, 347ff.

Not exact matches

A field, therefore, composed simply of inanimate actual occasions is not a subject of experience; but, in and through the interrelated agencies of its constituent occasions, it does exercise the collective agency necessary to preserve its own identity as this particular field, e.g., an atom or molecule of a peculiar shape or consistency.

But this is to interpret «the occasion as a whole» to mean the complete set of phases in the occasion, not the occasion as a singular actual entity whose phases are abstractly, that is, analytically, contained in it.

Yet what is that raison d'être for a society precisely as a society and not just an assembly of similarly constituted actual occasions?

If we think of the occasion as a whole, we may distinguish between the totality of causal influences inherited from the past actual world and its causa sui which is finally expressed in the way it has completely integrated these causal influences (by inclusion and / or exclusion) in the satisfaction.

The answer, in my judgment, lies in looking more carefully at Whitehead's relatively sparse remarks about societies as stable, structured environments for the emergence of successive generations of actual occasions.

Nobo, to be sure, distinguishes the extensive continuum which in itself is eternal and unchanging, from the spatio - temporal continuum which is the extensive continuum as progressively modified by actual occasions occurring in our cosmic epoch (52f).

All the decisions of the consequent nature flow from the primordial nature, and though the former does not fit the present actual occasions into a ready - made pattern of the temporal past (as Ford carefully points out: IPQ 13:356), yet «the weaving of Cod's physical feelings upon his primordial concepts (PR 524) amounts to the emergence into time, as predicates of God's propositional feelings, of the very valuations of his nontemporal decision.

In any event, the notion of a field as the place wherein actual occasions first arise and then assume their proper «place» is not foreign to Whitehead's thought.

Now this is Leibnizian, and the source of the trouble is that no provision has been made for a dimension of divine freedom directed toward concrete individuals as such, a dimension of freedom which lies within the «weaving» itself of God's feelings for actual occasions.

To sum up, then, Wolf's article is important because it represents a «halfway house» between the traditional conception of a society as an aggregate of actual occasions with the dominant occasion providing the unity for the group and my own contention that every society, whether it contains a presiding occasion or not, possesses an objective unity in virtue of the dynamic interrelatedness of its constituent occasions from moment to moment.

There is a deep cleavage between those who agree with Whitehead in describing God as a single actual entity, nontemporal in his primordial nature and everlasting in his consequent nature (the «entitative» view), and those who prefer with Charles Hartshorne to regard God as a personally ordered temporal society of successive occasions (the «societal» view).

In any case, in the following paragraphs I will first analyze Whitehead's remarks in Process and Reality on societies as the necessary environment for the ongoing emergence of actual occasions and then show how this analysis throws unexpected light on Whitehead's further explanation of the hierarchy of societies within the current world order, in particular, the difference between inorganic and organic societies, and, among organic societies, those with a «soul» or «living person» and those without such a central organ of control.

On the contrary, given the presumption of a collective agency for the cell as a unified field of activity, it makes excellent sense to account for the stability of the field in terms of societies of inanimate actual occasions with their ongoing transmission of fixed patterns and for the vitality of the field in terms of the nexus of living occasions with their higher degree of novelty and originality.

In both cases, therefore, the field acts as the medium for the transmission of physical feelings and conceptual patterns from one set of actual occasions to another.

Later Whitehead defines a duration as «a complete set of actual occasions, such that all the members are mutually contemporary one with the other» (PR 491).

For that matter, the more consistent use of the term actual entity as opposed to actual occasion seems to betray a residual entitative image in Whitehead's mind.

Hence, if one draws a close parallel between the interplay of Leibnizian monads and the interrelatedness of Whiteheadian actual occasions, as does Griffin (and by implication Hartshorne) in the article just cited, then it is not surprising that one thinks of Whiteheadian societies as aggregates of mini-things rather than as fields for successive generations of occasions.

In microgenesis, change is perceived as a comparison across the successive occasions of an actual object.

Primitively time has the character of process, which has «creativity» as its essence and reveals itself in the becoming of actual occasions (PR 31f).

Whereas Leclerc argued that the ultimate constituents of material reality are mini-substances which act on each other reciprocally and by their interaction co-constitute the new reality of a compound substance (NPE, 309 - 10), Ford argues that such natural compounds are instead to be understood as «single strands of personally ordered actual occasions, potentially divisible into structured societies but not actually so divided» (109).

This adventure embraces all particular occasions but as an actual fact stands beyond any one of them... [It] includes among its components all individual realities, each with the importance of the personal or social fact to which it belongs.

Thus, even though actual occasions are «the final real things of which the world is made up» (PR 18/27), societies as the progressive «layers of social order» into which they are organized are clearly of equal importance for the self - constitution of the universe from moment to moment.

Furthermore, and even more importantly for the purpose of this essay, it would likewise allow Whiteheadians to talk about actual occasions as indeed occasions, i.e., events, taking place within a pregiven environment or structured field of activity.

«His tenderness is directed towards each actual occasion, as it arises.

Granted that the primordial nature constitutes God's «free» (though unconscious), nontemporal decision, yet as an actual entity he is completed by the conscious, temporal, self - creative propositional feelings he bears toward particular occasions.

One group holds that, in view of the marked differences between God and all other actual entities, there are reasons to see the divine satisfaction as also functioning differently from the satisfactions of actual occasions.

Another group follows Charles Hartshorne in viewing God as a personally ordered society of actual occasions rather than as a single, everlasting actual entity.

We diverge from Descartes by holding that what he has described as primary attributes of physical bodies are really the forms of internal relationship between actual occasions, and within actual occasions.

Hence, we must attribute to God not only the conceptual ordering of the eternal objects by virtue of which he lures the occasions of the world toward order and value; we must attribute to him as to all other actual entities physical feelings as well.

If we recall his definition of an enduring object as «a genetic character inherited through a historic route of actual occasions» (FR 166), we realize the extreme generality of this expression.

It may be argued that if human occasions of experience prehend God, and they do, they must prehend him as a contemporary, since God as actual entity is contemporary with all other occasions.

On the other hand, the universal as such is merely pure possibility, completely indefinite and unrealized apart from the concrescence of actual occasions and implications with prehended data.

God, as an actual entity, or a society of actual entities, would be limited by the power in all occasions.

In Religion in the Making, temporal occasions and God were identified as both being actual entities sharing a common ontological status.

God's ordering of the eternal objects has particularized efficacy that takes account of every detail of the actual situation, but this does not mean that God successively produces a new ordering as each new occasion arises.

The consideration of these general limitations at the base of actual things, as distinct from the limitations peculiar to each actual occasion will be more fully resumed in the chapter on «God.»»

But, in fact, the actual occasions that constitute our bodies are constantly aiming at satisfactions directed to the healthy functioning of our bodies as a whole.

That is, each actual occasion of the nexus must prehend positively that characteristic which identifies the society as a whole.

In Whitehead's view, actual occasions are best understood as syntheses of their relations to other events.

This is appropriate, because Whitehead finds the conceptual as well as the physical in every actual occasion and thus assigns an element of spirit and self - determination to each of them.

Every actual occasion has value in and for itself as well.

We have already defined a nexus as a set of actual occasions related to each other in time and space.

(PR 271) Actual entities or actual occasions are subjects insofar as they are present and objects only insofar as they areActual entities or actual occasions are subjects insofar as they are present and objects only insofar as they areactual occasions are subjects insofar as they are present and objects only insofar as they are past.