Sentences with phrase «as the trial judge accepted»

Not exact matches

The trial judge had accepted that (para 239) the geographic dimension of any market for the wholesale supply of packaged groceries would be New South Wales and the Australian Capital Territory» but «did not accept that the product dimension of the market should be delineated by reference to packaged groceries» as argued by the Commission.

The presiding judge, Valerie E. Caproni of Federal District Court, told jurors at the outset of the trial that the government must prove that Mr. Silver knowingly participated in a scheme to defraud and «received things of value in the form of bribes or kickbacks, and that he knew when he accepted those things he was expected, in exchange, to take official action as the opportunity arose.»

The objects of the Club shall be: (a) to encourage and promote quality in the breeding of purebred Great Danes and to do all possible to bring their natural qualities to perfection; (b) to urge members and breeders to accept the standard of the breed as approved by the American Kennel Club as the only standard of excellence by which Great Danes shall be judged; (c) to do all in its power to protect and advance the interests of the breed by encouraging sportsmanlike competition at dog shows and obedience trials; (d) to conduct sanctioned and licensed specialty shows and obedience trials under the rules and Regulations of the American Kennel Club.

Our goals are to encourage and promote the breeding of pure - bred Golden Retrievers and to do all possible to bring their natural qualities to perfection; to urge members and breeders to accept the standard of the breed as approved by The American Kennel Club as the only standard of excellence by which Golden Retrievers shall be judged; to do all in our power to protect and advance the interests of the breed by encouraging sportsmanlike competition at dog shows, obedience trials, agility trials, hunt tests and field trials; and to conduct sanctioned and licensed specialty shows, obedience trials, agility trials, and field trials under the rules of The American Kennel Club.

(a) To encourage and promote quality in the breeding of apricot and red poodles and to do all possible to bring their natural qualities to perfection; (b) To urge members and breeders to accept the standard of the breed as approved by The American Kennel Club as the only standard of excellence by which they shall be judged; (c) To do all in its power to protect and advance the interests of the breed by encouraging sportsmanlike competition at dog shows and obedience trials;

Objectives of the Club To encourage and promote quality in the breeding of purebred Havanese and to do all possible to bring their natural qualities to perfection; To encourage the organization of independent local Havanese Specialty Clubs in those localities where there are sufficient fanciers of the breed to meet the requirements of The American Kennel Club; To urge members and breeders to accept the standard of the breed approved by The American Kennel Club as the only standard of excellence by which Havanese shall be judged; To do all in its power to protect and advance the interests of the breed and to encourage sportsmanlike competition at dog shows, obedience trials and agility events; To conduct sanctioned matches, specialty shows, obedience trials and agility trials under the rules of The American Kennel Club.

Accused went to cottage of JC with whom she previously cohabited — Accused found JC with victim, another lady, in sauna — Angry words were exchanged between accused and JC — Victim testified that accused pushed her following verbal exchange, as a result victim lost balance and ended up against stove, thereby sustaining serious burns to body — Trial judge accepted victim's evidence that there was some kind of pushing — Accused convicted on one count of assault causing bodily harm, and sentenced to two - year term of probation and $ 1,000.00 fine, and accused was also ordered to provide DNA sample pursuant to s. 487.04 of Criminal Code — Accused appealed — Appeal against conviction dismissed — Although trial judge did not address analytical steps in order, he properly analyzed evidence and concluded that injuries sustained by victim were not accidental and could not have occurred in any other fashion than as stated by victim — Having provided reasons for accepting victim's evidence, trial judge was entitled to reject accused's evidence — Trial judge's reasoning, though skeletal, permitted accused and appellate court to determine how and why finding resuTrial judge accepted victim's evidence that there was some kind of pushing — Accused convicted on one count of assault causing bodily harm, and sentenced to two - year term of probation and $ 1,000.00 fine, and accused was also ordered to provide DNA sample pursuant to s. 487.04 of Criminal Code — Accused appealed — Appeal against conviction dismissed — Although trial judge did not address analytical steps in order, he properly analyzed evidence and concluded that injuries sustained by victim were not accidental and could not have occurred in any other fashion than as stated by victim — Having provided reasons for accepting victim's evidence, trial judge was entitled to reject accused's evidence — Trial judge's reasoning, though skeletal, permitted accused and appellate court to determine how and why finding resutrial judge did not address analytical steps in order, he properly analyzed evidence and concluded that injuries sustained by victim were not accidental and could not have occurred in any other fashion than as stated by victim — Having provided reasons for accepting victim's evidence, trial judge was entitled to reject accused's evidence — Trial judge's reasoning, though skeletal, permitted accused and appellate court to determine how and why finding resutrial judge was entitled to reject accused's evidence — Trial judge's reasoning, though skeletal, permitted accused and appellate court to determine how and why finding resuTrial judge's reasoning, though skeletal, permitted accused and appellate court to determine how and why finding resulted.

Accused went to cottage of JC with whom she previously cohabited — Accused found JC with victim, another lady, in sauna — Angry words were exchanged between accused and JC — Victim testified that accused pushed her following verbal exchange, as a result victim lost balance and ended up against stove, thereby sustaining serious burns to body — Trial judge accepted victim's evidence that there was some kind of pushing — Accused convicted on one count of assault causing bodily harm, and sentenced to two - year term of probation and $ 1,000.00 fine, accused was also ordered to provide DNA sample pursuant to s. 487.04 of Criminal Code — Accused appealed — Appeal against sentence was allowed — Trial judge erred in concluding that discharge was not appropriate in circumstances, especially given conclusion that accused did not deliberately attempt to injure victim — Trial judge found that there was no need for either specific deterrence or general deterrence; prime concern was need for denunciation of her conduct — Section 730 of Criminal Code permits discharge in cases of this nature, provided that it was in best interest of accused and not contrary to public interest — Accused was responsible individual with no record whatsoever, she held position as counsellor and social worker for 25 years — Trial judge did not find that conviction would definitely affect her employment, but possibility existed, and such conviction would necessarily result in criminal record — There was no likelihood of re-offending — Conditional discharge would not be contrary to public interest.

Accused went to cottage of JC with whom she previously cohabited — Accused found JC with victim, another lady, in sauna — Angry words were exchanged between accused and JC — Victim testified that accused pushed her following verbal exchange, as a result victim lost balance and ended up against stove, thereby sustaining serious burns to body — Trial judge accepted victim's evidence that there was some kind of pushing — Accused convicted on one count of assault causing bodily harm, and sentenced to two - year term of probation and $ 1,000.00 fine, accused was also ordered to provide DNA sample pursuant to s. 487.04 of Criminal Code — Accused appealed against order to provide DNA sample — Appeal allowed — Order was issued to destroy DNA sample that was taken — Trial judge erred in failing to exercise discretion not to order DNA sample — Accused was first time offender, in circumstances that resulted in serious injuries, but with no intention of causing those injuries — Accused had otherwise been exemplary citizen, and likelihood of re-offending was remote.

15 I agree with the position of the Crown that the trial judge refused to accept the evidence of Ms. M., as was his right.

The trial judge made no findings as to which version he accepted.

[62] Although the trial judge essentially treated this as a situation of repudiation or anticipatory breach, she did not consider whether the appellants elected to accept or reject the repudiation.

In these circumstances, it was incumbent on the trial judge to explain that difference to Mr. Watterson [emphasis mine], to explain that the court could not treat the Defence as evidence, and that if he did not call a witness, or testify himself, the court would have no basis upon which to accept, as proven, the facts which the defendants had set out in their Defence.

That means for the data to be valuable, the database would have to include information on what kind of sentences a judge accepts from a plea bargain, as well as the sentences imposed after trial.

This struck me at the time as an odd conclusion: in a way, the trial judge accepted the GP should have done something, but because a bunch of colleagues wouldn't have done it either (and therefore, not surprisingly, thought she had acted reasonably), excused her..

[133] The reasoning accepted by the trial judge is essentially as follows.

With respect to (2), the ONCA accepted the trial judges» determination of the parties» incomes but engaged in a thorough review of the case history, concluding that spousal support should terminate as of January 2012 (not 2006) and child support for the son should cease as of December 2010 when he began receiving ODSP payments.

The Town led evidence suggested several applications of sand / salt mixture was applied to Rankins Corners but the trial judge was clearly reluctant to accept that evidence, as the Town's key witnesses had little or no independent recollection of their actions on the relevant day.16

With respect to (1), the ONCA noted that it was open to the trial judge to accept the wife's evidence that the property was not ordinarily occupied as the family residence at the time of the parties» separation.

There was certainly nothing unreasonable about trial counsel's alleged failure to call corroborating evidence on these issues when the proposed evidence did not relate to material issues but only to facts the trial judge accepted... In the result, we did not find any error in the reasoning of the trial judge and also find that trial counsel did not act unreasonably by deciding not to call corroborating evidence on the issues of his relationship with Ms. Peters and physical condition as the evidence on these matters had already been accepted by the trial judge (at paras. 11 - 12).

Contrary to the submission of the Appellant, the Court of Appeal found the Trial Judge was entitled to accept witness evidence (including from those not trained as veterinarians); it was ``... unreasonable to suggest that a device that is designed to deliver a meaningful shock to an animal many times larger than the dogs in question would not cause unnecessary pain or suffering...» (See para. 16).

Ultimately, the Court of Appeal could not accept granting a stay was in the best interests of B.A.S. as to do so would set aside the Trial Judge's detailed access plan and was likely to interrupt or «cut off» (as had occurred previously) the relationship between B.A.S. and his paternal grandparents.

In short, the trial judge's reasons fail to satisfy the second purpose articulated in F.H. v. McDougall: that is, they fail to explain why the trial judge accepted Sagl's evidence as to her loss in the light of the myriad problems with her credibility and reliability.

The Virginia Court of Appeals recognized that the trial court judge, as fact finder, properly ascertained wife's credibility, determined the weight to be given to her testimony, and had the discretion to accept or reject any of the wife's testimony.

As per Vetrovec v The Queen, [1982] 1 SCR 811 [Vetrovec], when an unsavoury or untrustworthy witness gives testimony, the trial judge must warn the trier of fact of the risks inherent in accepting such evidence.

The trial judge did not accept the argument that the Licences contained an implied warranty from the Province as to rights of access.

Perhaps this means that what is needed is for some inventive counsel to convince an appellate court to misuse an SCC decision, as plaintiff's counsel did with Walker Estate in Resurfice; or, for a trial judge or appellate court to accept, as I point out in the paper, that the SCC jurisprudence requires the conclusion that, in Canadian negligence law, events may occur without having causes (and not just in Stoner, B.C.).