Sentences with phrase «c omnipotence»

It is Griffin's contention, on the other hand, that «any actual world would contain self - determining entities» and that «extending the doctrine of C omnipotence to any world has important advantages» (GPE 271).

The real complaint, we finally learn, is that «Plantinga evidently affirms the logic of I omnipotence in general, and applies the doctrine of C omnipotence only in relation to human beings» (GPE 271).

Not exact matches

On the other hand, the proponent of «C» omnipotence maintains that it is not logically possible for God to unilaterally control the activities of self determining beings, even if such activities are intrinsically possible, and, accordingly, can acknowledge that genuine evil is possible (GPE 269f).

It is exceedingly confusing to say that «Plantinga holds to I omnipotence in general» while applying «C» omnipotence in a selective manner.

The classical response to nonmoral evil we have been discussing begins by affirming «C» omnipotence in relation to humans and then argues that there do exist good reasons to believe that such a moral world would include instances of genuine nonmoral evil and plausible reasons for assuming that such a world would have the types and amount of genuine nonmoral evil we presently experience.

What has been shown thus far is that Plantinga, working within the premises of classical theism, is able to develop a notion of «C» omnipotence and hence affirm the genuineness of evil.

With this basic distinction between «I» and «C» omnipotence in mind, let us analyze what Griffin has to say about Plantinga's position.

It is Griffin's contention that only a theism that entails «C» omnipotence is able to reconcile divine power and goodness with the genuineness of evil.

The classical theist can (and must) develop a notion of «C» omnipotence in regard to divine power in nature.

To do this, they begin by noting David Griffin's discussion in GPE between «I» omnipotence and «C» omnipotence.

On the other hand, the proponent of «C» omnipotence maintains that it is not logically possible for God to unilaterally control the activities of self - determining beings, even if such activities are intrinsically possible.

Having shown that the classical theist must adopt «C» omnipotence, they conclude that the classical theist «must affirm a notion of omnipotence practically identical to that of the process theist» (PS 11:23).

They then argue that only «C» omnipotence is defensible even by a classical theist.