Sentences with phrase «chinese gdp growth»

That may be happening now but will likely require that Chinese GDP growth slows further.

Rio Tinto expects China's stimulus packages to take effect progressively after the Chinese leadership change and has therefore lowered its estimates for Chinese GDP growth this year to just below eight per cent.

Chinese GDP growth fell from 6.8 % in March 2015 to 6.7 % in 2015.

Chinese GDP growth is well below the double - digit rates the country achieved a decade ago, but with the Chinese economy now considerably bigger than it was then, we remain confident that even with a moderate deceleration in annual growth, the country will continue to contribute significantly to the global economy.

Not exact matches

Chinese economic growth met expectations during the September quarter, maintaining the familiar pattern seen in each of the past ten GDP reports.

Chinese Premier Li Keqiang said China 2017 GDP growth was expected to be about 6.9 percent, with foreign exchange reserves rising.

Contrary to expectations that Beijing would finally embrace painful restructuring and financial deleveraging to reduce the risks of a financial crisis and make growth sustainable, Li proclaimed that China would achieve GDP growth of between 6.5 % and 7 % for 2016, similar to the 6.9 % GDP growth the Chinese government reported in 2015.

As long as low domestic consumption (currently in the range of 40 - 50 % of GDP, based on varying estimates) continues to constrain demand, Chinese growth is unlikely to pick up speed anytime soon.

The 100 richest people in China were worth $ 450 billion, Forbes said, up nearly 20 percent in a year — far faster than current GDP growth of 6.9 percent and despite a rout on Chinese stock markets.

The Chinese government says that GDP growth there has slowed to 6.9 % in 2015, and that it will grow by 6.8 % next year after averaging more than 10 % for the past decade.

Michael's post seems to have three suppositions: Chinese companies price capital incorrectly; Chinese companies invest in value destroying projects; There is no correcting accounting mechanism in China for these projects as exist in other countries, thusly Chinese GDP inflates «real» growth and debt servicing ability.

Growth in the Chinese economy has collapsed, but growth in economic activity has not collapsed (let us assume, with Grenville, that somehow the reduction in GDP growth from over 10 percent to 6.5 percent does not represent a slowdown in economic actiGrowth in the Chinese economy has collapsed, but growth in economic activity has not collapsed (let us assume, with Grenville, that somehow the reduction in GDP growth from over 10 percent to 6.5 percent does not represent a slowdown in economic actigrowth in economic activity has not collapsed (let us assume, with Grenville, that somehow the reduction in GDP growth from over 10 percent to 6.5 percent does not represent a slowdown in economic actigrowth from over 10 percent to 6.5 percent does not represent a slowdown in economic activity).

If this is true, it should cause GDP growth to pick up, and so should widen the growth differential between China and the United States, but unfortunately this does not mean that there should be a corresponding drop in the rate at which we discount Chinese growth.

First, because they represented a transfer from net savers to net borrowers, they helped to exacerbate the split between the growth in household income (households are net savers) and the growth in GDP (which is generated by net borrowers), and so led directly to the extraordinary imbalance in the Chinese economy in which consumption, as a share of GDP, has declined to perhaps the lowest level ever recorded in history.

If you multiply China's GDP growth by its share of global GDP, you will find that Chinese growth over the last few years has comprised a larger share of global GDP growth than that of any other country.

This new growth model requires that household income comprises a much greater share of GDP than it currently does, and one way or another this new model will be imposed upon the Chinese economy.

For much of the past decade there has been a growing recognition that Chinese growth has been seriously unbalanced, as Premier Wen put it, and that at the heart of the imbalance has been the very low consumption share of GDP.

In the case of China, for example, whatever GDP growth turns out to be, and again this is just arithmetic, Chinese household income growth will be higher and investment growth lower — after nearly thirty years of the reverse relationship — so that the impact of slower growth will be disproportionately smaller on consumption growth and larger on investment growth.

It is not a perfect analogy but — except, of course, for the part in which analyses that use the number of bookshops as a proxy for literacy are widely ridiculed — it is nonetheless similar to what happens when the health of the Chinese economy is measured by the reported GDP data, or when second - order measures, such as the dependence of Chinese growth on debt, is estimated by looking at credit growth in relation to GDP growth.

It can be maddening to read an article that quotes Chinese GDP numbers as if they were a real measure of long term economic growth.

In 2005, when consumption hit the then - astonishing level of 40 % of GDP, there was a widespread conviction in policy - making circles that this was an unacceptably low level and that it left Chinese growth much too dependent on the trade surplus and on increases in domestic investment.

Three decades of policies that have subsidized rapid growth with transfers from the household sector have left Chinese households with an extremely low share of GDP.

Cele adds that, although China, the largest steel producer and iron - ore consumer, has experienced hiccups, Chinese steel consumption is still expected to grow in the current decade given the rate and levels of urbanisation and GDP per capita growth.

The differential in real GDP growth between emerging and developed markets narrowed from ~ 7.5 % at its 2009 peak to ~ 2.5 % in 2015 as Chinese growth moderated and the commodity rally, which spanned most of the last decade, lost steam.

Thus it appears Chinese gold demand remains very strong indeed despite the sharp fall in the country's GDP growth over the past year.

They are a bit disturbed over authenticity of Chinese data especially on the annual GDP growth figures.

The stronger data increased the likelihood China would achieve its 2016 gross domestic product (GDP) growth target of 6.5 % — 7.0 % and underlined the impact of policy measures implemented earlier in the year, aimed at stimulating the Chinese economy.

For example, since 2008 China's total debt has surged from 147 % of GDP to 251 %, as the Chinese government turned to debt to stimulate economic growth through its many state - owned banking institutions.

The expertise and technology services will be crucial to the Chinese economy, says Buckingham, because as China relies more on domestic consumption it needs more innovation to sustain GDP growth.

China's GDP growth is slowing, and a rebalancing is necessary so that domestic consumption can fuel the Chinese economy.

Additionally, it is also reported that the Chinese inflation rate has begun to decline, reiterating the prospect of slower GDP growth.

Target 3: Cut the Carbon - Intensity of GDP by 17 %: Slower energy demand growth combined with increased non-fossil energy supply curbed Chinese emissions growth in 2012.

The Chinese figures could be seen as partial confirmation of this new normal for oil, with the 5.9 per cent increase in oil demand in 2014 over 2013 well below GDP growth of 7.4 per cent.