Sentences with phrase «constitutional recognition by»

Shorten also called for the Commonwealth to take the lead on reparation for the Stolen Generations and to map out a proper pathway and recommended wording for Constitutional Recognition by the end of this year.

Not exact matches

The platform planks for «32 embodied a number of Century concerns: U.S. adherence to the World Court protocol; U.S. entry into the League of Nations, provided that its covenant be amended to eliminate military sanctions; U.S. recognition of the Soviet Union (which was granted a year later); the safeguarding of the rights of conscientious objectors (including those denied citizenship, such as Canadian - born theologian D. C. Macintosh of Yale Divinity School); the abolition of compulsory military training in state - supported educational institutions other than military and naval academies; emergency measures for relief and public - works employment; the securing of constitutional rights for minorities; the reduction of gross inequality of income by steeply progressive rates of taxation on large incomes; «progressive socialization of the ownership and control of natural resources, public utilities and basic industries»; «the nationalization of our entire banking system»; and so on (June 8, 1932).

The reasons for this shift are to be found in Catalonia's political evolution over the past decade, especially in the shortcomings with regard to constitutional recognition and political and economic accommodation displayed by the Spanish political system.

No good purpose would be served by denying it its constitutional recognition.

But now the law has been federally enshrined by the Securing the Protection of our Enduring and Established Constitutional Heritage Act, otherwise known as the Speech Act and Rory's help is getting serious recognition in the new book, «You Can't Read This Book: Censorship in an Age of Freedom.»

The breadth and depth of Falana's work contributes substantially to answering the myriad of questions raised and left unanswered by the absence of constitutional recognition of socio - economic rights in Nigeria.

However, it runs into a difficulty identified by Iacobucci J. in Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice): «it hardly seems appropriate to entrust the Customs bureaucracy, in its administration of the Customs legislation, to deal with the matter through proper recognition of the constitutional values in play».

We say this because the division of powers part of the judgement (commencing at para 98) is full of all sorts of references to two levels of government (see e.g. para 141) and similar comments about «interlocking federal and provincial schemes» that make it abundantly clear that this Court has given no thought to the space within which indigenous laws may operate within the modern constitutional order (for recognition that the law making authority of aboriginal peoples pre-dated the Crown's acquisition of sovereignty, was not extinguished by that acquisition of sovereignty and was not impaired by the division of legislative powers between the federal and provincial governments in 1982 see Campbell v British Columbia (2000), 189 DLR (4th) 333 (BCSC) and Justice Deschamps in Beckman v Little Salmon / Carmacks First Nation, [2010] 3 SCR 103 at para 97).

Therefore, through the recognition of the primacy of EU law norms, but with the crucial qualification that such primacy is conditional on the constitutional authorisation of the domestic legal order in accordance with Parliamentary Sovereignty, the majority of the Supreme Court justices justify their claim that «we would not accept that the so - called fundamental rule of recognition (ie the fundamental rule by reference to which all other rules are validated) underlying UK laws has been varied by the 1972 Act or would be varied by its repeal» [Paragraph 60].

And it goes to the very limits of its logic, by questioning whether even an appropriate amendment of the Treaty would make it possible to overcome the arguments which prevent regulatory powers from being conferred on agencies or whether there are, in other words, underlying principles in Community law that are not susceptible of constitutional amendment, which can not be reconciled with recognition of regulatory powers in the hands of bodies other than the three institutions.

450 BCE Traditional date for the establishment of the Torah 624 CE Constitution of Medina (described by some as the world's first written constitution) 633 Quran 1087 Irnerius starts the first law school at Bologna 1190 — Enactment by Eleonore d'Aquitaine of the Laws of Oleron in maritime law 1259 The Provisions of Westminster 1274 Second Council of Lyons 1300 The Statute of Forestallers (printed in Statutes of the Realm) 1474 The Treaty of Utrecht with the Hanseatic League Printed in English Historical Documents 1327 - 1485 (by A.R. Myers and David Douglas) 1474 — Venetian patent statute, first recognition of patents 1506 the Statute of Jan Laski, the first Continental European constitutional statement of the rule of law.

From R. v. Powley in 2003 (which recognized that Métis communities have pre-existing aboriginal rights protected by s. 35) to Cunningham v. Alberta in 2011 (wherein Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin urged that «the time has finally come for recognition of the Métis as a unique and distinct people») to Manitoba Métis Federation v. Canada in 2013 (which recognized the outstanding constitutional grievance of the Manitoba Métis flowing from land grant provisions set out in s. 31 of the Manitoba Act, 1870), the Supreme Court of Canada has been consistent and unequivocal: s. 35 demands good faith and meaningful negotiations and reconciliation with the Métis people as well.

This is why our efforts to close the gap, and build momentum for constitutional recognition, must always be informed by the voices of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples and their community - controlled, representative organisations.

That's to be seen, he said, in the concession from the Expert Panel on Constitutional Recognition to put aside demands for greater Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander sovereignty because they would be highly contested by many other Australians and could put Recognition at risk.

«It is also critical that constitutional recognition does not prevent or make void any efforts by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people to assert their rights as sovereign peoples or to pursue a treaty.

The Expert Panel will report to the Government on possible options for constitutional change to give effect to Indigenous constitutional recognition, including advice as to the level of support from Indigenous people and the broader community for each option by December 2011.

raise awareness about the importance of Indigenous constitutional recognition including by identifying and supporting ambassadors who will generate broad public awareness and discussion.

Four principles were set by the Panel to guide its assessment of proposals for constitutional recognition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples:

The Panel terms of reference (see Appendix 4) required it to «lead a broad national consultation and community engagement program to seek the views of a wide spectrum of the community» [51] and report to Government on «possible options for constitutional change to give effect to Indigenous constitutional recognition, including advice as to the level of support from Indigenous people and the broader community for each option by December 2011».

The Expert Panel will report to the Australian Government on potential options for constitutional recognition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, and will advise on the level of support for these options by December 2011.

This does not obviate the possibility of acknowledging formal knowledge of the existence of Indigenous legal and political systems at a constitutional level or at the common law, as in the case of Mabo The functional approach advocated by the ALRC enables both the recognition of the continuing existence of Aboriginal law and custom and sufficient flexibility for Aboriginal people to be self - determining in the definition of customary law.

It is recognized that Constitutional Recognition is only part of the solution to ensuring that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples are treated equally in Australia, and that it must be accompanied by other measures to address the historic and ongoing disadvantage that has resulted from our past mistreatment.

Request that the Government and the Opposition identify the parameters of what they will support in relation to constitutional recognition, based on the issues identified by the various review processes to date, as well as their willingness to consider further measures to address the specific circumstances faced by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples.

We note the guiding principles laid out by the Expert Panel that constitutional recognition must: