Sentences with phrase «fair comment moncs»

Fair comment — we do also collect data on the number of agents and offices per firm; although those figures aren't in this article it is in the report itself.

At trial, the appellant relied to varying degrees on the defences of justification, fair comment, and qualified privilege.

The Court of Appeal judges used their judgment on two preliminary issues (in particular, whether Dr Singh could use the defence of «fair comment») to mount a robust and somewhat lyrical defence (quoting Milton, amongst other things) of the right to scientific freedom of expression.

His main defence was fair comment on a matter of public interest.

The Divisional court allowed Walsh's appeal concluding that the «D - «grade was defamatory and ordered a new trial on the issues of fair comment, malice and damages.

The court saw no basis for this court to interfere with the trial judge's conclusion.Although the trial judge erred in her characterization of the appellant's blog statement that the respondent was an anti-Semite as a statement of fact rather than opinion, the defence of fair comment could not apply if the statement was made, as the trial judge found, with malice.

The fair comment defence was established.

The court has now ruled that the jury in the original trial had been misdirected on whether the opinions were defensible as fair comment.

Did the trial judge err in law by finding that the appellant was actuated by malice against Dr. Elmasry and that that malice vitiated the fair comment defence?

This was sufficient to satisfy, in the general terms required, the fourth branch of the fair comment test.

He concluded that «fair comment» might be more accurately described as «honest opinion», as has been recognised by a number of common law countries.

The Court of Appeal has found unanimously in favour of science writer Simon Singh in a high - profile libel ruling on the right to plead «fair comment».

It found that Singh's criticisms were expressions of opinion and that he could therefore use the defence of «fair comment».

The court has taken a sensible line on «fair comment» and this is a very pro-science decision.

But would the fact that this is «in line» with other scuttlebutt make it «fair comment,» thereby providing a defense against «defamation?»

While it's context - dependent, that could very well be fair comment.

But in the US, with a politician, you'd never go for the fair comment defense, because you have a much stronger defense — a politician can only win the suit if they show that not only is the statement false, but the speaker actually knew or strongly suspected that it was false.

In Lowe v Associated Newspapers (2007) QB 580 he extended the defence of fair comment, and he was also the draftsman of the provisions of the Defamation Act 1996, ss 2 - 4 which allow newspapers to make offers of amends and thereby pay discounted damages assessed by a judge, rather than the higher level that a jury might have awarded in the old days.

If the politician wasn't a politician, and was actually a private figure, then fair comment could enter into it.

Once we've established that an express or implied statement of fact is at issue, fair comment asks whether the fact is true or false and whether it's an issue of public concern.

This follows the comments of Lord Judge in British Chiropractic Association v Singh [2010] EWCA Civ 350, that «fair comment» might be more accurately described as «honest opinion».

Fair comment is a defense against defamation claims where the statement at issue is an expression of opinion, reasonably based on (preferably disclosed or well - known) true facts, which is on a matter of public concern, and which is the honest opinion of the speaker which was not made specifically to cause harm.

In your example, there are questions that have to be reached before fair comment even enters into it.

It would also clarify the defences of justification and fair comment, which would be renamed as «truth» and «honest opinion».

Neither by proffer of evidence, requests for instructions, nor motion before or after verdict did the defendant seek to justify his utterance as «fair comment» or as privileged.

Granted their comments were not «nice» but they fell well short of defamation and were in the realm of fair comment and fair complaint.

British science writer Simon Sing is free and clear of libel claims brought by the British Chiropractic Association (BCA), reports Mark Henderson of The Times of London, after the BCA dropped all charges just weeks after a landmark ruling from the Court of Appeal allowing the fair comment defense.

While the analysis of the fair comment defence in this context is still questionable (but one the trial judge is entitled to deference over), this can not be a proper analysis of malice, especially in light of the Court of Appeal's decision in Awan and previous jurisprudence, which properly includes recklessness disregard for the truth.

The successful use of the defence of fair comment in Baglow v. Smith in the type of discourse described by the court as «rude, aggressive, sarcastic, hyperbolic, insulting, caustic and / or vulgar» would give substance to these concerns.

Perhaps a better balance could be struck by continuing to bolster defences to defamation (see for example the defence of fair comment in British Chiropractic Association v Singh) or (whisper it) by reducing the costs of bringing and defending a defamation action.

Yet even here, the defence of fair comment could not work given the presence of malice.

He ruled that no reasonable jury could fail to uphold Matusevitch's plea of fair comment.

Given this context, the trial judge did find the statements made by the defendant to be defamatory, but found that the defence of fair comment applied, and malice did not defeat this defence as it was not the dominant purpose [para 245],

However, the context in this case it was open to the trial judge to conclude that the statement was not recognizable as comment, and even then, the defence of fair comment would fail,

In WIC Radio Ltd. v. Simpson, the court recognized that... Continue reading Case clarifies tests for «fair comment»

[32] The affirmative defences to defamation are found in the plea of justification, or of fair comment, or of qualified privilege.

[1] A defamation case, by its nature, requires the court to consider the values of acceptable social behaviour founded on respect for individual dignity and reputation, together with that of free speech, a cornerstone of which is fair comment.

Rogers and his colleagues were already monitoring defamation cases in other common law countries, such as the US and Britain, looking for effective defences beyond truth and fair comment.

Truth is an argument to any defamation case and in this context we could also extend to the defence of fair comment where as long as honestly held views are being expressed but there no issue of defamation.

When the case came to trial in 2006, the jury was asked to pick through a list of statements in Quan's story to determine whether they were true or fair comment — but proving opinions true is enormously difficult.

[39] Each of the defences of justification and fair comment require proof that the impugned statements, or the facts upon which they are based, are true.

[12] The defendant relies as well on the defences of fair comment and qualified privilege.

Provided the basis for any utterance is capable of being supported in the evidence, truth and fair comment is ever a defence.

Annis J. continued further to discuss the defence of fair comment test as applied in WIC and the more recent Supreme Court of Canada case in Grant v. Torstar Corp., despite already finding that the statement was not defamatory:

At its best, the system ensured that the best interests of the children remained at the forefront while allowing fair comment and fresh evidence from all sides.

The decision is also of interest for Judge Peter Annis» discussion on how to «remove the sting» of internet postings, and the application of the fair comment defence.

Mr. Ford could also argue the defence of fair comment, but in doing so would have to present underlying facts — a pattern of erratic behaviour, for example — that would reasonably lead to his opinion.

Fair comment does not apply if there is malice.

To date, modifications made by Canadian courts have been entirely in the area of defences (i.e., introducing a «responsible communication on matters of public interest» defence7 and expanding the availability of the fair comment defence8).

[189] As a result, to the extent that I concluded above that cet1ain of the words complained of were properly the subject of a fair comment defence, that defence is defeated by malice.