Early Civil Rights Lawyers Fought For Justice Without The Benefit Of The Civil Rights Attorney's
Fees Award Act Of 1976
Not exact matches
The scheme provided SILVER with two different streams of unlawful income: (i) approximately $ 700,000 in kickbacks SILVER received by steering two real estate developers with business before the state legislature to a law firm with which he was associated, and (ii) more than $ 3 million in asbestos client referral
fees SILVER received by, among other official
acts,
awarding $ 500,000 in state grants to a university research center of a physician who referred patients made ill by asbestos to SILVER at Weitz & Luxenberg.
Authorities said more than $ 3 million of that was obtained in «asbestos client referral
fees Silver received by, among other official
acts,
awarding $ 500,000 in state grants to a university research center of a physician who referred patients made ill by asbestos to Silver at Weitz & Luxenberg.»
Airlines» balancing
act Still, airlines have a careful balancing
act when it comes to
award - ticket
fees.
A related state code, the Disabled Persons
Act, allows a plaintiff to recover three times the actual damages, or a minimum of $ 1,000, with attorneys»
fees awarded to the prevailing party at the judge's discretion.
The District Court denied Kirtsaeng's motion, giving» «substantial weight» to the «objective reasonableness» of Wiley's infringement claim,» and stating that» «the imposition of a
fee award against a copyright holder with an objectively reasonable» - although unsuccessful - «litigation position will generally not promote the purposes of the Copyright
Act,»» and that no other factors «outweighed» that objective reasonableness to warrant
fee - shifting.
Both Wiley and Kirtsaeng proposed that the Court provide guidance to district courts in order to direct their discretion in determining whether to
award attorney's
fees to a prevailing party «towar [d] the purposes of the Copyright
Act,» which the Court articulates as «enriching the general public through access to creative works» and «enhancing the probability that both creators and users... will enjoy the substantive rights» provided by the Copyright
Act.
In Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., the Supreme Court clarified the test for
awarding attorney's
fees when applying the Copyright
Act's discretionary
fee - shifting provision, 17 U.S.C. § 505.
This case provides long - awaited guidance on the test for
awarding fees in copyright cases, articulating an analysis similar to the discretionary totality - of - circumstances test adopted in the Court's Octane Fitness decision on the
fee - shifting provision in the Patent
Act.
The Supreme Court has previously noted that the
fee - shifting provision of the Patent
Act, which permits district courts to
award attorney's
fees to prevailing parties in «exceptional cases,» is «similar» to Section 505 of the Copyright
Act, which merely permits a court to
award reasonable attorney's
fees at its discretion.
Defendant successfully defeated trademark claims in what should have been characterized as an «exceptional case» under Octane Fitness LLC v. Icon Health and Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014); therefore, Defendant was entitled to remand for reconsideration of
awarding legal
fees under the Lanham
Act.
-- authored by Circuit Judge Hurwitz [majority decision] and concurring opinion by Circuit Judge Reinhardt; discussed in our Oct. 10, 2015 post: District court in Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform
Act case which substantially reduced
fee request was reversed based upon its reliance on inapt practice area hourly rates, upon its discounts for plaintiff's attorneys not delegating tasks to associates given that only small firms prosecuted these type of cases, and upon its use of stale prior
fee awards involving
fee claimant's attorneys.
1979 (2016): SCOTUS sets forth flexible factors to be weighed for purposes of district judges
awarding fees to a prevailing party under the Copyright
Act's
fee - shifting provision, 17 U.S.C. § 505.
And because the Prison Litigation Reform
Act caps
fee awards at 150 percent of damages, her attorneys were entitled to only $ 1.50, rather than the $ 140,000 they had requested.
Answer: The Prison Litigation Reform
Act of 1997 limits attorney
fees to 150 percent of a jury
award, so by my calculations your
fee award should be $ 1.50.
As the article reports, a federal judge
awarded $ 957,710 in attorney
fees, plus costs and prejudgment interest, to Skadden Arps for its pro bono representation of a group of waiters, busboys and captains who sued their restaurant - employer for unlawfully witholding tips in violation of the Fair Labor Standards
Act and the New York Labor Law.
Dealing first with the issue of the nature of costs that I can properly
award, I find that as a result of section 148.2 (2) and section 148.2 (3) of the Regulation, I am constrained to only
awarding party and party costs and I am not permitted to
award actual reasonable legal
fees as specified in section 11 (2)(a) of the Commercial Arbitration
Act.
U.S. District Court Judge
Awards Over $ 2.5 Million In
Fees And Costs To Lawyers Representing Two Plaintiffs In U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act Case Main In The News....
The Illinois Supreme Court was asked to consider whether under Section 10 of the
act, a lien by a health - care professional or provider must be calculated, as the hospital contends, based upon a plaintiff's total recovery, or whether, as plaintiff contends, attorney
fees and costs are deducted from the
award prior to calculating the hospital's lien.
For all consumer attorneys, the next case should be of interest as far as what attorney's
fees can be
awarded under the Song - Beverly
Act where confidential settlements are involved and what standard governs the
award of
fees to the statutory «prevailing party.»
Ct. 411 (2007)(leading case on the anti-SLAPP
Act in the business and political lobbying context; upholding dismissal of claims and $ 80,000
award of attorneys
fee in client's favor).
Compensation payments from NVICP have averaged $ 782,136 per successful claim through 2011, with an additional $ 113 million dispersed to pay attorney
fees and legal costs (the
act awards attorney
fees and costs for unsuccessful claims provided that the litigants bring their claims in good faith and upon a reasonable basis, as well as for successful claims).
Nemeth v Abonmarche Development, Inc 457 Mich 16; 576 NW2d 641 (2000)(Amicus Curiae Michigan Environmental Council)(determining inter alia that Michigan Environmental Protection
Act did not authorize attorney
fees to be
awarded as litigation costs)
Aug. 10, 2017)(published)(Hughes, J.), a district judge
awarded a prevailing defendant over $ 3.9 million in attorney's
fees under Section 285 of the Patent
Act (35 U.S.C. § 285).
Obtained judgment and
award of attorneys»
fees in favor of national supplier of hotel and hospitality products in Lanham
Act false advertising and unfair competition case.
The Wage
Act was amended in 2011 to allow a winning plaintiff to add to his unpaid damage
award (a) attorneys»
fees and costs, plus (b) 2 % monthly interest on unpaid amounts.
Affirming the trial court's judgment, the appeals court provides a useful summary of the type of proof needed to sustain constructive fraud and slander of title claims in the construction lien setting and when attorneys»
fees can be
awarded to prevailing parties under Illinois» mechanics lien statute, 770 ILCS 60/1 (the
Act).
The Court heard oral argument this morning in Astrue v. Ratliff, a case challenging the Eighth Circuit's determination that
fees awarded to a prevailing party under the Equal Access to Justice
Act belong to the attorney, not the client.
S209376 (unpublished appellate decision): is a trial court
award of statutorily - mandated
fees and costs incurred on appeal subject to the Enforcement of Judgments Statutes if the statutory authority underlying the
award is the Elder Abuse
Act?
Dec. 22, 2017)(published), the Commissioner recommended that Mr. Grimm be
awarded $ 52,340 for successful appellate work and subsequent «
fees on
fees» work in a Longshore and Harbor Workers» Compensation
Act (LHWCA) case.
On Tuesday, May 29, 2012, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari from the Tenth Circuit's decision in Marx v. General Revenue Corp., U.S. No. 11 - 1175, to determine whether a prevailing defendant can be
awarded routine costs (not attorney's
fees) against a losing plaintiff in a Fair Debt Collection Practice
Act (FDCPA) case where the plaintiff was found to have brought the suit in good faith.
The council's
award is restored: it was reasonable for the council to conclude that, under the Framework Agreement, the Protocol and the
Act, Dr. Guérin's proceeding did not raise an arbitrable dispute, because the Fédération and the Ministère had reserved for themselves the full discretion to designate the medical imaging laboratories that would be eligible to receive the digitization
fee; and also reasonable for them to conclude that, in any event, Dr. Guérin did not have standing.
Given the massive nature of the litigation hitting the council at the time, the fact that there was very little chance of settlement (particularly in the light of the conditional
fee arrangements agreed with the solicitor, which drew some adverse comment) and the possible effects on council business of arranging so many meetings, the tribunal had operated the Employment
Act 2002, s 31 (4) to
award only a 5 % uplift, but the court agreed with the EAT that the sheer pointlessness of grievance meetings in these circumstances meant that even 5 % was an error of law and so the zero uplift in the EAT was approved.
The California Public Records
Act (CPFA) has a
fees / costs shifting provision in Government Code section 6259 (d) which provides that the court shall
award court costs and reasonable
fees to the «plaintiff» should the plaintiff prevail in CPRA litigation and shall
award court costs and reasonable
fees to the public agency if the court find that the «plaintiff's» case is clearly frivolous.
The PATENT
Act has a provision intended to give defendants more leverage to ask the court for a
fees award in cases where the plaintiff was clearly in the wrong.
As the Federal Circuit explained, Judge Payne's decision conflated Rule 11 (which gives parties the chance to withdraw) with Section 285 of the Patent
Act (which allows for
fee awards in exceptional cases).
The court said the trial court, in
awarding the attorney's
fees to the MLS, was
acting within its authority, because the trial court intended to deter copyright holders from filing lawsuits without first trying to resolve the dispute out of court, which is what had happened in the photographer's case.
The court also stated that it would consider
awarding attorney's
fees and costs to the Association and Buyer's Representative for receiving an order confirming the
award, pursuant to the
Act.
Additionally, the trial court assessed punitive damages against the Broker and
awarded the Buyer attorney
fees, as permitted for violations of the
Act which the jury found the Broker had violated.
Additionally, the trial court assessed punitive damages against the Broker and
awarded the Buyer attorney
fees, as permitted for violations of the Consumer Protection
Act.
The court also remanded the matter back to the trial court for further proceedings to determine the proper amount of attorney
fees to be
awarded under the
Act, and the court also
awarded the Seller attorney
fees for the appeals process.
Finally, a new federal law, The Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection
Act, provides courts with new powers to cancel and transfer domain names, impose stiff statutory and other damages, and
award attorneys»
fees.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the jury
award for fraudulent concealment, but reversed the punitive damage
award and attorney
fees award, ruling that the Broker could not be liable for violations of the
Act because of the property disclosure law.
However, in a later motion filed by the Buyers seeking attorneys»
fees pursuant to the
act, the court declined to
award the Buyers these
fees under the
act because the Buyers had failed to submit sufficient evidence to the court to allow to make an
award.