Sentences with phrase «lord atkin»

In Donoughue v. Stevenson (1932), Lord Atkin introduced the negligence principle that a person could be held liable for reasonably foreseeable harm.

Lord Atkin, siding with Donoghue, summed up the case in a much - quoted judgment.

«The neighbour principle derived by Lord Atkin from the 10 Commandments and the parable of the Good Samaritan has been applied in a multitude of other situations involving foreseeable damage negligently caused to the person, property or pocket of another,» he says.

Lord Atkin warned that «in a practical world» fault must not be «treated so as to give a right to every person injured by them to demand relief».

Another way of gauging the different approach is to recall the seminal way in which Lord Atkin justified the law of negligence.

Lord Atkin stated in Donoghue (or McAlister) v Stevenson, [1932] All ER Rep 1; [1932] AC 562,

As Lord Atkin put it when referring to the Good Samaritan situation in Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, [1932] All ER Rep 1, «an omission which was likely to have as its reasonable and probable consequence damage to the health of the victim of thieves, but for which the priest and the Levite would have incurred no civil liability in English law».

«In this country, amid the clash of arms, the laws are not silent» — Lord Atkin, Liversidge v Anderson [1941] UKHL 1

In the case, an elderly Lord Atkin, of Donoghue v Stevenson fame, gave a powerful dissenting judgment arguing that the regulation required the Home Secretary to have an objective reason to detain a person under the power.

For all that the wartime case is remembered for the stirring rhetoric of Lord Atkin («amid the clash of arms, the laws are not silent»), the majority of his colleagues thought that there should be no judicial check on the exercise of the home secretary's power to consign someone to internment.

Separation agreements in form and effect are similar to other contracts, as Lord Atkin said in Hyman v. Hyman, [1929] A.C. 601 at 625 - 6:

Lord Atkin's famous opinion in Ambard v. Attorney - General for Trinidad and Tobago [1936] AC 322, is apposite: «But whether the authority and position of an individual judge, or the due administration of justice, is concerned, No wrong is committed by any member of the public who exercises the ordinary right of criticising, in good faith, in private or public, the public act done in the seat of justice.