Sentences with phrase «ms exclusive competence»

According to the AG, moreover, a single provision obliging the member states to terminate their bilateral investment treaties with Singapore upon entry into force made for an MS exclusive competence.

The Greek Conseil d'Etat considered that a refusal to recognise a law degree was not contrary to EU law because education was an exclusive competence of the Member States.

Trade and customs policy are an exclusive competence of the EU, so unless the EU negotiates an agreement with the UK, the kind of exit you propose, denouncing the Treaties, will oblige to treat the UK as a completly foreign country, imposing customs duties, trade defense instruments, etc..

Not exact matches

Secondly, to streamline its diplomatic action so to encompass the various areas of shared and exclusive competence (e.g. trade, energy, climate change), and thirdly, to aim at reinforcing the legalisation of those international agreements and institutions that are deemed as capable to protect the EU's strategic endowment and interests.

Specifically, Article 20 of the Agreement provides that «all questions concerning the validity of decisions of the institutions of the Community taken on the basis of their competences under this Agreement shall be of the exclusive competence of the Court of Justice of the European Communities.»

Since the first paragraph of Article 3 (explicit exclusive competences) does not refer to the withdrawal agreement, it is arguable that the second paragraph (implicit exclusive competences) is relevant.

Similarly, the Polish Senate criticizes the EPPO's exclusive competence for not being in compliance with the principle of proportionality.

The CCP is exclusive EU competence, so the broader it is construed the less Member States can act themselves.

More in particular, the EPPO's exclusive competence appears to be a sore point (e.g. the Polish Senate, Romanian Chamber of Deputies, Dutch Senate, Hungarian National Assembly, German Bundesrat and the British House of Lords).

The Court first stated that Opinion 1/94 was no longer relevant in this case (para 48) and proceeded with a fresh start on whether the TRIPS agreement fell within exclusive competence.

The problem is that there is no compelling evidence that the competence to conclude the withdrawal agreement should necessarily be exclusive.

60) If the Community were to be recognized as having exclusive competence to enter into agreements with non-member countries to harmonize the protection of intellectual property and, at the same time, to achieve harmonization at Community level, the Community institutions would be able to escape the internal constraints to which they are subject in relation to procedures and to rules as to voting.

Furthermore, since foreign direct investment (FDI) falls under exclusive EU competence (Article 207 (1) TFEU), the CJEU has the power to decide on the domestic effects of the investment protection provisions of EU international agreements (Slovak Brown Bear, paras. 30 - 32; but we need to wait also for Opinion 2/15, EU - Singapore), even if a case is brought against a Member State measure before a Member State court.

The discussion on facultative mixity revolves around a seemingly simple question: to what extent does the nature of the EU's competence (exclusive or shared) over an international agreement (or part of it) determine whether the agreement is supposed to be concluded by the EU alone or together with the Member States as a «mixed» agreement?

Next, the Court had to determine whether the amendment was confined to Part Three of the Treaty and thus had to establish whether it improperly encroached upon other EU policies outside of Part Three, namely the EU's exclusive competence over monetary policy and the power to coordinate economic policy, enshrined in Part One TFEU.

Consequently, the Court held, the amendment was not capable of affecting exclusive EU competence in monetary policy.

I wonder if this is because Art 114 is in this case not the legal basis giving the EU the largest competence, because 207 falls under the EU's exclusive competence.

The reasons are quite simple: the Common Commercial Policy is an important foreign policy tool and exclusive EU competence.

The Court rejected the Commission's argument that the agreement was covered by the EU's exclusive competence to conduct a common commercial policy, but did follow the Commission in its argument that the agreement is covered by an ERTA effect.

So while it might be a good idea to remove ISDS (perhaps drop the idea altogether), you might need to add some provisions of shared competence or exclusive Member State competence, to ensure that Member States involvement.

This dynamic was at play also in the context of the Marrakesh Treaty, where the discussion revolves around the question of whether the EU is endowed with an exclusive or a shared competence to conclude the agreement.

In such an event, no ERTA effect will be triggered, and the EU does not acquire an exclusive competence to conclude the proposed agreement.

If we take away the afore - mentioned exclusive EU policy fields what we are left with is investment protection and ISDS, parts of which still fall under shared competences, and those parts of the objectives of the agreement and the final chapters that relate to areas of shared competence.

If the EU's competence is exclusive, the agreement would be concluded by the EU alone; if it is shared, the Member States would opt for a mixed agreement.

The «minimum harmonisation» exception was reaffirmed in Opinion 1/03 on the Lugano Convention, where a full court summarised the exception's rationale by stating that «the Court did not find [in Opinion 2/91] that the Community had exclusive competence where, because both the Community provisions and those of an international convention laid down minimum standards, there was nothing to prevent the full application of Community law by the Member States» (para. 123).

These provisions conflict with EU law on the exclusive competence of the EU court [s] for claims which involve EU law, even for claims where EU law would only partially be affected.

Secondly, even if enhanced cooperation was permissible, it argued that the authorizing decision violated the treaty requirements for its use viz: the authorization was not a «last resort» and was in an area of exclusive EU competence (Article 20 TEU); the authorization violated the principle of non-discrimination and undermined the single market by creating discrimination in trade and distortions to competition within the single market (Article 326 TFEU); and, did not respect the rights of the non-participating states (Article 327 TFEU).

This was exactly the case here, as exclusive competence would mean that Member States can no longer act on their own.

The Council was perfectly happy with Member States deciding on accession on their own, and rejected the view that a decision to accept accession fell within EU exclusive competence.

The Opinion here is especially noteworthy because it is the first time the Court had to interpret the last part of article 3 (2) TFEU which is commonly understood as a codification of the ERTA case - law on exclusive EU external competence.

«The Union shall also have exclusive competence for the conclusion of an international agreement when its conclusion is provided for in a legislative act of the Union [Opinion 1 / 94 - type exclusivity] or is necessary to enable the Union to exercise its internal competence [Opinion 1 / 76 - type exclusivity], or in so far as its conclusion may affect common rules or alter their scope [ERTA - type exclusivity].»

On the well - established doctrine of enforcement - follows - substance, that would have been enough to deny the EU exclusive competence for the chapter's dispute settlement provisions as well.

It should be noted that while the new provisions with regard to investment liberalisation are an extension of existing practice pre-Lisbon, the EU is venturing into uncharted waters with its new exclusive competence in the field of investment protection.

Obligatory mixity arises where a mixed agreement is required because the EU has exclusive competence over one area of an agreement, but no competence at all over another area.

There was never much doubt that large parts of the EUSFTA fell within EU exclusive competence, but one area that was the source of considerable legal contention was that of investment.

After all, the Union's exclusive competence in the area of monetary policy for the Eurozone Member States entails parallel exclusive competence in external relations, as is confirmed by the wording of Article 219 (3) TFEU.

However, there is no indication for this competence to interfere with any of the exclusive competences named in Article 3 TFEU.

In fact, fiscal policy is the counterpart to monetary policy, which is enumerated in the list of exclusive competences in Article 3 (1)-RRB- TFEU — the fact that competence for monetary policy does not entail fiscal policy is the reason for the existence of the Fiscal Compact in the first place.

The ECJ rightly dispatched with the rather outlandish argument that since Treaty provisions on free movement of capital would be affected by the EUSFTA, the EU enjoyed exclusive competence pursuant article 3 (2) TFEU (see paras. 229 - 238).

Be that as it may, in so far as Eurozone Member States are no longer able to fulfil their obligations under the IMF Articles of Agreement without encroaching upon the Union's exclusive competence, it can be argued that they have a duty to take «all appropriate steps to eliminate the incompatibilities» between the Union Treaties and the Articles of Agreement (see Article 351 TFEUBe that as it may, in so far as Eurozone Member States are no longer able to fulfil their obligations under the IMF Articles of Agreement without encroaching upon the Union's exclusive competence, it can be argued that they have a duty to take «all appropriate steps to eliminate the incompatibilities» between the Union Treaties and the Articles of Agreement (see Article 351 TFEUbe argued that they have a duty to take «all appropriate steps to eliminate the incompatibilities» between the Union Treaties and the Articles of Agreement (see Article 351 TFEU).

Unless an agreement is covered entirely by the EU's exclusive competences, it will most likely be concluded in the form of a mixed agreement, i.e. an agreement to which not only the EU, but also the Member States are parties.

The regulation of products stemming from third countries through means other than border measures is thus outside EU exclusive competence.

Scotland and Northern Ireland can enact legislation — including laws overriding those enacted by the UK Parliament in relation to Scotland and Northern Ireland respectively — on all matters save those that are reserved to the exclusive competence of the UK Parliament in Westminster.

«This form of international arbitration is incompatible with the exclusive competence of EU courts to rule on the rights and obligations of Member States under EU law.»

In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action can not be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community.

The statement went on to say the «definition of the right to strike is an exclusive national competence.»

The question that the Court had to grapple with was whether the European Union had exclusive competence to enter into such agreements, or whether this competence was shared between the EU and the Member States (or even fell within the exclusive competence of the Member States), at least with respect to certain issues.

At the time when the EEA was agreed, the EEC / EC only had exclusive competence relating to trade in goods, and limited aspects of trade in services, according to Opinion 1/94.

ABIF recently responded to the statement claiming that it is not responsible for resolving the problem between banks and crypto exchanges, stating that it is an «exclusive competence of each institution,» and that the problem «must be addressed and resolved in the context of the individual relationship of each bank with its customers.»

Feelings of apprehension and competence aren't mutually exclusive.