I also point out that
nonlawyer ownership of law firms is totally unnecessary to set up a broken, second - hand fridge dispute resolution system.
««Ethics 20/20 Commission Suspends Campaign to Draft a Proposal on
Nonlawyer Ownership of Law Firms» Main Harvard law student group singles out big firms for their representations»
At its meeting on April 12 - 13, 2012, [40] the [Commission] decided not to propose changes to the ABA policy prohibiting
nonlawyer ownership of law firms... The Commission considered the pros and cons, including thoughtful comments that the changes recommended in the [December 2, 2011 paper] were both too modest and too expansive, and concluded that the case had not been made for proceeding with even a form of nonlawyer ownership that is more limited than the D.C. model.
[5] Louise Lark Hill, «The Preclusion of
Nonlawyer Ownership of Law Firms: Protecting the Interest of Clients or Protecting the Interest of Lawyers?»
The Commission would, it explained, continue to consider how to provide practical guidance in relation to choice of law problems that arise because D.C. and a growing number of jurisdictions outside the US permit
nonlawyer ownership of law firms.
The General Counsel of nine large corporations submitted a letter to the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 in strong opposition to
nonlawyer ownership of law firms.
And allowing for minority
nonlawyer ownership of law firms might be just a preliminary phase in ultimately allowing for majority nonlawyer ownership.
It appears that multidisciplinary practices and
nonlawyer ownership of law firms is the future.
In this context, it is not a surprise that DC's Office of Bar Counsel has never been presented with any complaint, and the Office has never investigated any firm, in connection with
nonlawyer ownership of a law firm.
We are not opposed to ABS, but
nonlawyer ownership of law firms implies policy issues that my Task Force is not being asked to consider at this time.
The second change clarified that the ABA has not changed its position with respect to
nonlawyer ownership of law firms.
Before I decided to move out of Oracle Capital Group in order to create Oracle Family Office, I shared the view that having
nonlawyer ownership of a law firm would create ethical issues.
Actually, you will pay through the nose if
nonlawyer ownership of the legal profession takes hold.
The debates in the U.S. go on: Should ethics rules blocking
nonlawyer ownership of law firms be lifted?
In 2011, J&M brought litigation against bar authorities in New York, New Jersey and Connecticut requesting that the enforcement of the «antiquated» ethical rule that restricts
nonlawyer ownership of law firms be enjoined.
«ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 Will Not Propose Changes to ABA Policy Prohibiting
Nonlawyer Ownership of Law Firms.»
Leslie, Richard M. «
Nonlawyer Ownership of Law Firms.»
I say let us help deliver needed legal services to the less fortunate, but let us do it without making the historical and irreversible blunder of allowing the wedge of
nonlawyer ownership of law firms.
Not exact matches
The «protectionist instincts» that I and others have are (1) to protect the independence
of the bar (sure to be lost eventually under
nonlawyer ownership), (2) to protect the health
of the legal marketplace (sure to be badly harmed by the cartelization
of ABS (see the 5 % commissions charged by the cartel
of real estate agencies who still control the vast majority
of the realty market, and especially see the ridiculously high costs
of dealing with the American title insurance industry where four companies have upwards
of 87 %
of the conveyancing and title insurance market after first decimating the real estate bar with predatory pricing and other unfair business practices)-RRB-, and (3) to protect the public from those ravages.
Incentive bonuses, ex post facto bonuses, and salary increases work perfectly well but without the evil
of giving up
ownership of the legal profession to
nonlawyer profit seekers.
«While the discussion
of U.K. regulations is often focused on
nonlawyer ownership, MDPs and the creation
of the ABS structure, the changes in our regulations are much more profound.
The 400 - page act instigated hundreds if not thousands
of changes, including allowing
nonlawyers to hold
ownership and management positions in law firms and allowing creation
of multidisciplinary practices.
The Kutak Commission said over thirty years ago that «[t] he assumed equivalence between [
nonlawyer ownership] and interference with the lawyer's professional judgment is at best tenuous» and «[a] dherence to the traditional prohibitions has impeded development
of new methods
of providing legal services» [1].
But selling
ownership of the legal profession to
nonlawyers who want hefty returns on their investments is most certainly not the answer considering that it will worsen, not improve, worsen the profit motivations / greed in the process (more layers
of entities to pay), and considering that it will most certainly weaken the independence
of the legal profession to the profound detriment
of society, and considering that the access to outside capital will serve only to greatly accelerate anti-competitive concentrations (a trend various ABS insiders and observers in the UK candidly admit is happening and one they candidly admit that they are working hard to accelerate).
Nonlawyer ownership would simply increase the percentage
of vultures in the
ownership structure
of the legal profession — a very bad thing.
In 1983 and again from 1999 to 2000, the ABA considered revising Model Rule 5.4 in order to allow for
nonlawyer ownership and multidisciplinary practices in some form, but in each case the House
of Delegates declined to make any changes.
However, the California rules have the effect
of prohibiting
nonlawyer ownership and multidisciplinary practices in the same manner as Model Rule 5.4).
In the United States, lawyers are prohibited from splitting legal fees with
nonlawyers and therefore banned from sharing
ownership of a law firm.
Just this: the regulations that restrict
nonlawyer ownership and control
of law firms combined with rules on the unauthorized practice
of law.
Save for one exception, the District
of Columbia is the only jurisdiction in the U.S. that under very limited circumstances actually permits
ownership or management
of a law firm by
nonlawyers.
This change reflects an undercurrent
of fear in the US that
nonlawyer ownership will cause our institutions to change too much, such that we lose client confidentiality and the ethos
of the lawyer - client relationship.
I have heard the arguments that bringing a
nonlawyer into the
ownership or management
of a law firm will erode ethics, but I see no reason why that should be the case.
Our experience suggests that
nonlawyer ownership (provided it is properly regulated) is more likely to benefit consumers
of legal services than not — it is more likely to make justice more accessible and affordable.
Without trade - offs to our personal injury law practice, as a result
of a new company structure providing a larger capital base in Australia and the UK, we are now able to offer a wider range
of other consumer services including services that critics
of nonlawyer ownership claim are the sort
of «less profitable services;» that
nonlawyer owned firms would stay away from such as: employment law, wills, conveyancing, family law and criminal law.
In sum, even though the Report mentions alternative structures only briefly, and expressly advocates for only a limited form
of them (minority
nonlawyer ownership) in a lukewarm manner, a close reading the Report suggests that its authors in fact enthusiastically support alternative structures.
It was easy for us to set up their because
of the similar regulatory regime that permits
nonlawyer ownership.
In my experience, it is only lawyers who criticize
nonlawyer ownership and management
of law firms.
Most lawyers who are members
of the DC bar are also members
of the bar
of another state, and that state does not permit
nonlawyer ownership in any form.
In this context, the Commission called for comments on the «potential benefits and risks associated with ABS,» as well as «evidence or other input» on the relative advantages and disadvantages
of different types
of ABS (for example, with limits on the percentage
of nonlawyer ownership and / or multidisciplinary practices).
The Commission ruled out the D.C. approach in favor
of a «narrower,» more restrictive approach, which was to require not only that the firm be engaged in legal practice only (not in combination with non-legal services) and that the
nonlawyer provide services to assist the firm in providing legal services (again, no passive investment), but also imposing (i) a cap on
nonlawyer ownership and (ii) a fit to own test on the
nonlawyers.
The sharing
of legal fees with
nonlawyers and the
ownership and control
of the practice
of law by
nonlawyers are inconsistent with the core values
of the legal profession.
And Indiana's Bill Henderson warns about the costs to the profession
of delay, arguing that our ban on
nonlawyer ownership is driving
nonlawyers to take on various disguises to deliver creatively financed legal services in competition with lawyers.
In the United States this complete bar to
nonlawyer ownership has been codified by the American Bar Association as paragraph (d)
of Rule 5.4
of the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct and has been adopted in one form or another in all U.S. jurisdictions, [1][2] except the District
of Columbia.
[3] However, D.C.'s rule is narrowly tailored to allow equity
ownership only by those
nonlawyer partners who actively assist the firm's lawyers in providing legal services, and does not allow for the sale
of ownership shares to mere passive
nonlawyer investors.
The U.K. had a similar rule barring
nonlawyer ownership, but under reforms implemented by the Legal Services Act
of 2007 law firms have been able to take on a limited number
of non-lawyer partners and lawyers have been allowed to enter into a wide variety
of business relationships with non-lawyers and non-lawyer owned businesses.
The country studies in this article show that while both sets
of claims have some merit, they also miss critical components
of nonlawyer ownership's actual impact.
Those issues relate to virtual law practice, choice
of law problems associated with conflicts
of interest and
nonlawyer ownership, and domestic practice authority for inbound foreign lawyers.