Sentences with phrase «peirce believe»

Did Peirce believe it?

First of all, we should observe that Peirce believed his thesis that there is spontaneity to be explanatory of «the general fact of irregularity, though not, of course, what each lawless event is to be.»

Not exact matches

Hausman believes that Peirce's insight is restricted in the role of eros and agape in creative evolution, but he also suggests the fruitfulness of his insight.

Hartshorne believed that Peirce and Whitehead were not widely enough appreciated in philosophy and that occasionally they were not appreciated for their best insights; for these reasons he was often their champion.

Peirce seems to believe this, too, since he views agape as spreading among the creatures who participate in creative evolution, and he speaks of the genius as one who acts agapastically as an individual rather than as a community.

Before continuing, I should emphasize that I believe that there is much common ground between Peirce and Bergson.

These issues will be reviewed in terms of what I believe is a proper extrapolation of Charles Peirce's notion of cognition and his view of the conditions of cosmic evolution.

However, unlike Peirce who eventually came to believe that an absolute and final interpretation was attainable, Whitehead's interpretive system maintains an ultimate non-finality to it (PR 9).

The source for both Hartshorne and Weiss's opinions on this point is Charles Peirce, whose essay, «The Doctrine of Necessity Examined,» presents a more dialectical argument than that of either of his students for why people might mistakenly believe in determinism (7: pars.

I do not know whether he would have done this or not, since I believe that with his pragmatism he might have accommodated relativity physics without altering his epistemology, though I can not go into the question here.16 What seems to me clear is that the philosophical issues underlying Hartshorne's criticisms of Peirce can not be settled by theories of physics or the mathematics of continuity.

Thompson may be right, and I believe he is, that Peirce had other reasons or inclinations (including an influence of Kant) supporting his conclusion; but it is demonstrable from his own language in praise of the wonders of continuity that he did have this reason.

I don't believe he was referring to «authority» in the sense of expertise; in some sense the role of the IPCC in fixing belief around climate science is similar to Peirce's «authority», but it has no enforcement power and to me it seems far more like a step in the process of fixation and communication of scientific information, part of the publishing process, than anything like what Peirce was talking about in method 2.

C. S. Peirce (1839 - 1914) observed [N, p. 1334] that: «This branch of mathematics [probability] is the only one, I believe, in which good writers frequently get results entirely erroneous.