M1 — 1.3 It is imperative that the Emergency
Spillway not receive additional flows and that a long - term mitigation and re-design plan begin now.
Not exact matches
Officials have
not released information on what exactly caused the dam's structural problems, including a gaping hole in the middle of the
spillway.
No doubt about it: If we hadn't operated those
spillways, we would have lost the levees downstream.
Students and teacher teams focusing on learning deeply have the force to achieve learning beyond the traditional education dam and shoot out over the
spillway to
not only understand the torrent of available knowledge, but to also add to it in phenomenal ways.
That's a
spillway problem,
not a dam problem proper.
Why then did both main and emergency
spillways fail though the PMP methodology was
not exceeded?
Inflow PMF is
not relevant directly to
spillway design.
Rogers said the problems the consultants described were so egregious he was surprised the
spillway didn't fail decades ago.
The foundation at the base of the Oroville emergency
spillway was buttressed with rap rap rock to prevent cavitation but my guess is that gunite - ing or shot - creting the steep downslope of the emergency
spillway wouldn't work anyway in the event of a full dam breach.
Why were dual emergency and
spillway failures, combined with hydropower flow blockage
not addressed during relicensing?
I really can't be bothered getting across all the details of flood attenuation in a particular scheme — but it is clear that
spillways of major dams are
not designed to a return period — even the 1000 year or more suggested by your obsolete reference on Oroville and global warming.
The real story is why was Folsom, a federal dam, recently retrofitted with an auxiliary
spillway and Oroville, a state dam,
not retrofitted when there were ample state bond monies available?
The design capacity of the Oroville
spillway derived using the PMP methodology was
not exceeded it seems.
A very significant risk would be incurred if the Gated
Spillway is
not operational by November 1.
With record precipitation, megaflood evidence, and studies warning of higher extreme weather, with likelihood of confluence and climate persistence, should
not the Oroville Dam Design Peak Maximum Flood and
Spillway Peak Outflow parameters be increased rather than decreased?
Re: «The design capacity of the Oroville
spillway derived using the PMP methodology was
not exceeded it seems.»
Even the 1.3 % hydropower flow could
not be used for lack of power lines and from being blocked by eroded
spillway material.
So they lawyered up and said the original design and permit called the weir an emergency
spillway so concreting wasn't necessary.
Let me say it just once more the flows did
not exceed
spillway design flows which are considerably higher than the ARkStorm flows.
«It is important to recognize that during a rare event with the emergency
spillway flowing at its design capacity,
spillway operations would
not affect reservoir control or endanger the dam,» wrote John Onderdonk, a senior civil engineer with FERC, in the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's San Francisco Office, in a July 27, 2006, memo to his managers.
The water was flowing even though the
spillway's gates were closed and it wasn't raining, the consultants wrote, adding that they believed further investigation is needed.
The DWR chose «
not to pursue installing Obermeyer gates, or any other structure requiring human or mechanical operation, on the emergency
spillway.»
The hardening of the downslope of the emergency
spillway may
not have worked (the weight of the spilled water wiped out a road on the downslope and may have just wiped out any concrete hardening of the slope as well).
It is interesting to note that in California Gov. Jerry «Moonbeam» Brown pushed legislative reform of the state's environmental law (CEQA) to fast track and streamline concentrated solar farm installations without regard for loss of bird life and the habitat the birds live on (e.g. insects); and more recently has fast tracked the installation of expensive batteries on its electric grid in record time without the usual delays for environmental clearances (see: «A Big Test for Big Batteries», New York Times, Jan. 14, 2017) but apparently did
not even have on a back burner a project to fix the open and notorious Oroville Dam
spillway defects and deficiencies.