Sentences with phrase «subordinate nexus»

In terms of the distinction Whitehead draws between a subordinate nexus and a subordinate society, I would classify the soul as a subordinate nexus.

The difference between a subordinate society and a subordinate nexus is that the subordinate society is a group of occasions which can retain its»... dominant features of its defining characteristic in the general environment, apart from the structured society.»

[Whitehead then goes on to say that a subordinate nexus can not sustain itself apart from the special environment provided by that structured society.]

So the point of Whitehead's example in the above passage would be that in talking about the membership of the complex structured society which is a total man, in the ordinary sense of the term, one is referring not to a subordinate society, such as the enduring object which is the life, or soul, of the man, but to all the individual actual occasions in all the subordinate societies and subordinate nexus which make up the man.

The passage is set in the context of a discussion of structured societies and the two types of component groups that may be included in them, «subordinate nexus» and «subordinate societies.»

This distinction between subordinate societies and subordinate nexus of occasions within structured societies is extremely important for Whitehead's discussion of «living» societies a few pages later.

Subordinate nexus, on the other hand, are groups of occasions whose character is derived exclusively from the role which they play in the structured society; hence, when and if that «level of social order» dissolves, they, too, go out of existence.

Such subordinate nexuses possess a diminished degree of mental spontaneity as compared to the dominant living person.

Not exact matches

The membership of the complex structured society which is the electron is not, properly speaking, any of the subordinate societies or nexus of the electron, such as the personally ordered society, the enduring object, which constitutes the «life» of the electron, but, rather, the individual actual occasions of which these subordinate entities are composed.

At this point Cobb might be tempted to make one last ditch stand, arguing that I have begged the question by merely assuming that a structured society can not be an enduring object, whereas what he is saying, when he says that one regional standpoint can include another, is that one enduring entity, one nonspatial, serially ordered society, can still be a structured society in that its temporally successive occasions can include the regional standpoints of the «narrower» actual entities which make up its subordinate societies and / or nexus.

Man, the living organism, is a structured society which includes subordinate societies and nexus with a definite pattern of structural interrelations.

It is not only a reasonable hypothesis to say that «eternal object» and «nexus of successive occasions» refer to the pattern of behavioral definiteness sustained by subordinate «living persons» and the regnant society: it is also one of the few hypotheses available for avoiding the «Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness» by not making the entire nexus the locus of subjectively immediate feelings (WEP 183).