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Uncertainty about feedback mechanisms is one reason why the ultimate goal of climate modeling — forecasting reliably the future of key variables such as temperature and rainfall patterns — is not realizable.»
I like the simple calculations that I did in post 24 because it dodges all
the uncertainties about the feedbacks and about getting to an equilibrium.
Not exact matches
In return,
feedback from the modelling work will inform the experimental work in BIOACID
about uncertainties in models and the relevant process parameterisations.
AR4 specifically excluded Greenland and Antarctica ice sheet melting, due to the
uncertainties about ice flow dynamics, and also specifically excluded slow
feedbacks, also due to the
uncertainties involved.
Disputes within climate science concern the nature and magnitude of
feedback processes involving clouds and water vapor,
uncertainties about the rate at which the oceans take up heat and carbon dioxide, the effects of air pollution, and the nature and importance of climate change effects such as rising sea level, increasing acidity of the ocean, and the incidence of weather hazards such as floods, droughts, storms, and heat waves.
Far better this than running a dozen GCMs with funamentally different assumptions
about climate
feedbacks, plotting them on a graph and claiming that as a measure of the
uncertainty in the behaviour of the real climate.
Uncertainty about important
feedback mechanisms is one reason why the ultimate goal of climate modeling — the forecasting reliably the futures key variables such as temperature and rainfall patterns — is not realizable.
That means there is still a lot of
uncertainty about the extent of future warming — estimates of the effect of doubling CO2, including all
feedback processes, range from 2 °C to 6 °C.
All those climatic variables and
uncertainties and probabilities and «forcings» and «
feedback loops,» those cans of worms that Bill Gray talks
about, get boiled down to their essence.
Reviewing the IPCC papers, I see that you are right
about the
feedback uncertainty being more related to clouds rather than water vapour, although they also state that the precise mechanisms of water vapour
feedbacks are quite complex and the form its spacial distribution would take is still not well understood.
;) But seriously... I don't think you are quite correct in claiming any
uncertainty about water vapor
feedback being positive or negative.
Just seems on top of the un / certainty pick - ems (
uncertainty about negative or positive
feedback) or the other of gritty hinges we see are at the «core» of the issue that we're almost assuming we can explain the last 14,000 years in climate history to a resolution of a decade and rule out all factors effecting all changes over that time prior to 1850 effectively when we hear statements «high» (most, likely, probably, etc) certainties of understanding what we are seeing being used to support invoking PP.
Climate sensitivity is somewhat uncertain as there are remaining scientific
uncertainties about the magnitude of the positive and negative
feedbacks in the climate system.
It's all as it was in those happy carefree days of 2009 and before, BC (yes, Before Cli **** ga **) as we call it now, when the MSM would happily «highlight the most alarmist aspects and downplay any mention of
uncertainty» (Zorita), when no doubts were allowed, or should I say expressed,
about the holy trilogy of WG1, 2, and 3 — how certain it was that the well - accepted theory of ghg effect, and the impacts thereof, would lead to a Copenhagen / Kyoto utopia of global cooperation, and that the IPCC was cool (whoops, «the request for more research
about the social dynamics of the IPCC, of positive
feedbacks as described by Judith, is meaningful for me» (von Storch).)
The wide range of estimates of climate sensitivity is attributable to
uncertainties about the magnitude of climate
feedbacks (e.g., water vapor, clouds, and albedo).
First,
uncertainty about climate sensitivity is fundamentally asymmetric, both because of the mathematical form of the
feedback function and also because there's more data to constrain the low - sensitivity side of the distribution.
In a broad sense this arises both from the social
uncertainty about whether and when mitigation efforts will be agreed and achieved, as well as from the scientific
uncertainty about how the many
feedbacks in the Earth system operate, arising from imperfect climate modelling, the role of tipping points [9] and other limits to our understanding of the system.
These
feedbacks are the primary source of
uncertainty in how much the earth will warm (side note: the question that most climate scientists who study the forcing due to CO2 try to answer is, how much will the long - term globally averaged surface temperature of the earth rise due to an rapid rise of CO2 to twice its industrial level, that is, 270 ppm to 540 ppm; it is currently
about 380 last time I checked, and rising at ~ 3ppm / year, although this rate of change appears to be accelerating).
The researchers emphasize that there are numerous
uncertainties about the magnitude of future climate change, such as energy
feedbacks from clouds and the carbon cycle.
Although the most advanced theoretical climate models still leave
uncertainty, particularly
about the sign and magnitudes of the effects, on GHG
feedbacks, of some low - and high - clouds, a consensus began to develop that threats of resulting increases in global temperature — and the very large risks associated with their possible consequences — deserved substantial increase in attention.
When you have huge economic issues and great amounts of
uncertainty with regard to things like sensitivity to a doubling of CO2,
feedbacks from evaporation (including increases in clouds and their
feedbacks), not to mention regarding consequences, then a legalisitic, «does climate change exist or not» approach isn't the right way to think
about the issue.