His main research focus is on
Union citizenship law and its interaction with criminal law.
Not exact matches
Despite the existence of a democratically elected assembly since 1979 in the form of the European Parliament, the links between this parliament and the status of
Union citizenship have been ambiguous [1] with the parliament representing not a single group of
Union citizens but rather the «peoples» of Europe, those peoples being defined by Member States and national
law.
(3) Therefore, in the conduct of the negotiations mandated by Article 50 TEU which will presumably culminate in one of the conditions for the withdrawal of the United Kingdom being fulfilled, the government of the United Kingdom and the European
Union institutions are bound by the relevant general principles of EU
law to negotiate in good faith so as to find a political solution in order to fulfil insofar as possible the status and rights of those who shall be losing the status of EU
citizenship
In Paragraph 5.19, the District Court provides a delineation of the ECJ's conception of EU
citizenship: «the CJEU has ruled that
citizenship of the
Union should be the primary status of nationals of the EU Member States and that, on that basis, subject to explicit legal exceptions, [they] are entitled to equal treatment in
law».
Still, while that provision was once thought to make
Union citizenship dependent on national
citizenship, in Rottmann the Court turned it neatly around, showing how it made national
citizenship equally dependent on EU
law.
This is particularly relevant as the EFTA court has been called upon to adjudicate rights analogous to those found in primary and secondary
law, but with the explicit caveat that the concept of
citizenship of the European
Union does not apply to nationals of EEA states.
They wish to extend the logic of Rottmann apparently, in which the Court said that Member States measures affecting whether people acquire or lose
citizenship of that state, if those measures affect the access of the individual to
Union citizenship, are subject to
Union law and must be proportionate.
A subtle yet significant aspect of this statement is that it is posed in contrast as opposed to congruence with the positive
law sources discussed in Option I above through the conjunction used in the pre-emptory sub-clause «[w] hile Article 20 TFEU states that
citizenship of the
Union comes alongside national
citizenship... (emphasis added)».
Nonetheless part of that review does involve identifying an objective public interest «recognised by
Union law», identifying such an interest would not only appear to be an essential part of the test outlined in the Charter but would have been welcome in articulating the approach adopted by
Union law towards the interaction of criminal activity and the exercise of the rights of
Union citizenship, including the newly found political rights.
Delvigne is an important judgment from the point of view of constitutional
law, the political nature of
Union citizenship and the role played by the Court of Justice in reviewing increasingly large areas of national
law.
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[18] Lord Mance himself (writing for a group of four judges on a seven - judge court) found it, in the context of a decision stripping a British national of
citizenship (with the corollary that he would also lose the benefits of being a European
Union national), «improbable that the nature, strictness or outcome of such a review would differ according to whether it was conducted under domestic principles or whether it was also required to be conducted by reference to a principle of proportionality derived from
Union law».
35 By its questions, which should be examined together, the referring court essentially asks whether the provisions of European
Union law on
citizenship of the
Union must be interpreted as precluding a Member State from refusing to grant a third country national a residence permit on the basis of family reunification where that national seeks to reside with his spouse, who is also a third country national and resides lawfully in that Member State and is the mother of a child from a previous marriage who is a
Union citizen, and with the child of their own marriage, who is also a third country national.
(Freedom of movement for persons —
Union Citizenship — Directive 2004 / 38 / EC — Right of residence for more than three months — Article 7 (1)(b)-- Person no longer having worker status — Person in possession of a retirement pension — Having sufficient resources not to become a burden on the «social assistance system» of the host Member State — Application for a special non-contributory cash benefit — Compensatory supplement intended to augment a retirement pension — Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 — Articles 3 (2) and 70 — Competence of the Member State of residence — Conditions for granting — Legal right to reside on the national territory — Compliance with European
Union law)
Reference for a preliminary ruling —
Citizenship of the
Union — Extradition to a third State of a national of a Member State who has exercised his right to freedom of movement — Scope of EU
law — Protection of a Member State's nationals against extradition — No protection for nationals of the other Member States — Restriction of freedom of movement — Justification based on the prevention of impunity — Proportionality — Verification of the guarantees provided for in Article 19 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union