While Oregon's judicial
review ensures that punitive damages are not awarded against defendants entirely innocent of conduct warranting exemplary damages, Oregon,
unlike the common
law, provides no assurance that those whose conduct is sanctionable by punitive damages are not subjected to punitive damages of arbitrary amounts.
Moreover, doctrinal entrenchment is particularly problematic in the FISA courts, where secrecy and institutional context indicate that outside efforts at doctrinal reform are less likely to be effective than they are with courts that publish their opinions.35
Unlike published opinions, secret opinions can not provoke the public into lobbying for a legislative override36 or judicial overruling37 — two important paths of legal reform.38 Perhaps to hedge against the risks of limited external oversight, FISA limits FISC and Court of
Review judges to non-renewable, seven - year terms, 39 a provision suggesting that Congress envisioned a FISA court whose membership would be responsive to shifting factual circumstances and policy priorities.40 Stare decisis, which requires judges to adhere to interpretations of
law that they might otherwise reject as unjust or unpersuasive, constrains these judges» ability to adapt to such factual and policy shifts.