Sentences with phrase «with valuations extreme»

With valuations extreme, interest rates rising, and market action now strongly unfavorable, the characteristics which were present during the vast majority of the recent bull market are now completely absent.

With valuations extreme, trend uniformity negative, and our breadth momentum overlay still on a negative reversal, there is nothing in our set of tools that allows us to take a constructive market position.

Moreover, this reversal occurred with valuations extreme and bullish sentiment clearly overextended.

With valuations extreme, and market action showing both a lack of trend uniformity and a lack of momentum in breadth (advancing issues versus declining issues), we have no willingness to take on market risk here.

Not exact matches

Tech companies with no profits (or even much of a business plan) soared to extreme valuations that were justified, in part, by the belief that future profits would be made faster and that equities were less risky than in the past.

Even with these extreme valuations, favorable trend uniformity is all we would need to become more constructive here.

Along with the steepest equity valuations in U.S. history outside of 1929 and 2000 (on measures that are actually reliably correlated with subsequent market returns), private and public debt burdens have reached the most extreme levels in history.

This, combined with extreme valuations and poor trend uniformity, is extremely hostile.

The problem is that with valuations now at obscene heights, future returns are likely to be dismal, and future downside risks are likely to be extreme.

However, the overall market return / risk climate could become consistent with a more neutral or modestly constructive outlook (with an obligatory safety net in either case, given current valuation extremes) if market internals were to improve decisively.

To expect normal or above - average long - term returns from current prices is to rely on the market bailing out the rich overvaluation of today with extreme bubble valuations down the road.

Presently, wicked valuations are coupled with still - unfavorable market internals on our measures, and have now been joined by the most extreme «overvalued, overbought, overbullish» syndrome of conditions we identify.

On nearly every measure - sentiment, valuation, volatility, oversold conditions, and others, we are observing extremes associated with strong expected return / risk profiles, on average.»

With the S&P 500 within about 8 % of its highest level in history, with historically reliable valuation measures at obscene levels, implying near - zero 10 - 12 year S&P 500 nominal total returns; with an extended period of extreme overvalued, overbought, overbullish conditions replaced by deterioration in market internals that signal a clear shift toward risk - aversion among investors; with credit spreads on low - grade debt blowing out to multi-year highs; and with leading economic measures deteriorating rapidly, we continue to classify market conditions within the most hostile return / risk profile we identify — a classification that has been observed in only about 9 % of histWith the S&P 500 within about 8 % of its highest level in history, with historically reliable valuation measures at obscene levels, implying near - zero 10 - 12 year S&P 500 nominal total returns; with an extended period of extreme overvalued, overbought, overbullish conditions replaced by deterioration in market internals that signal a clear shift toward risk - aversion among investors; with credit spreads on low - grade debt blowing out to multi-year highs; and with leading economic measures deteriorating rapidly, we continue to classify market conditions within the most hostile return / risk profile we identify — a classification that has been observed in only about 9 % of histwith historically reliable valuation measures at obscene levels, implying near - zero 10 - 12 year S&P 500 nominal total returns; with an extended period of extreme overvalued, overbought, overbullish conditions replaced by deterioration in market internals that signal a clear shift toward risk - aversion among investors; with credit spreads on low - grade debt blowing out to multi-year highs; and with leading economic measures deteriorating rapidly, we continue to classify market conditions within the most hostile return / risk profile we identify — a classification that has been observed in only about 9 % of histwith an extended period of extreme overvalued, overbought, overbullish conditions replaced by deterioration in market internals that signal a clear shift toward risk - aversion among investors; with credit spreads on low - grade debt blowing out to multi-year highs; and with leading economic measures deteriorating rapidly, we continue to classify market conditions within the most hostile return / risk profile we identify — a classification that has been observed in only about 9 % of histwith credit spreads on low - grade debt blowing out to multi-year highs; and with leading economic measures deteriorating rapidly, we continue to classify market conditions within the most hostile return / risk profile we identify — a classification that has been observed in only about 9 % of histwith leading economic measures deteriorating rapidly, we continue to classify market conditions within the most hostile return / risk profile we identify — a classification that has been observed in only about 9 % of history.

The reason why valuations are so tightly correlated with 10 - 12 year returns is that extreme deviations from historical norms tend to wash out over that horizon, and because interest rate fluctuations have a much less durable impact on market valuations than investors imagine.

With the most historically reliable valuation measures about 2.8 times their historical norms, these extreme starting valuations are worth considering here.

Given the increasingly steep slope of the current market advance, along with the most extreme valuations in history and the most lopsided bullish sentiment in more than three decades, it's quite possible that this instance will be different.

The only alternative to this view is to imagine that the collapses that followed valuation extremes like 1929, 1973, 2000, and 2007 somehow emerged entirely out of the blue, ignoring the fact that valuations accurately projected likely full - cycle losses, and remained tightly correlated with total returns over the subsequent 10 - 12 year horizons.

None of this will prevent us from becoming constructive if the Market Climate shifts to a positive condition, but it does feed into the amount of market risk we would be willing to take, particularly with valuations still extreme.

Though nearly every morning prompts the phrase «Yup, they're actually going to do this again,» the steepening pitch of this ascent — coupled with record valuation extremes, record overbought extremes, and the most lopsided bullish sentiment in over three decades — now produces the most extreme «overvalued, overbought, overbullish» moment in history.

At present, the valuation measures that we find best correlated with actual subsequent S&P 500 total returns are at the most offensive levels in history, matching or eclipsing the 1929 and 2000 extremes.

But with long - term bonds and non-cyclical equity sectors trading at historically extreme valuations while cyclical sectors trade at valuations below their long - term average, we think that risk aversion is creating numerous investment opportunities for investors willing to build a portfolio of more economically sensitive companies.

Even the decile with the best relative valuation is at the most extreme level in history.

Deep Value investors employ a more extreme version of value investing that is characterized by holding the stocks of companies with extremely low valuation measures.

Those opportunities are most likely to coincide with a material, if less extreme, retreat in valuations, coupled with an early improvement in market internals.

Among the valuation measures having the strongest correlation with actual subsequent market returns, current levels are actually within 10 % of the March 2000 extreme.

The central issue is much more general: when extreme valuations and lopsided bullish sentiment are joined by deterioration in market internals, one faces an environment that couples compressed risk premiums with increasing risk aversion.

Back in October, I noted «investors clearly are approaching the current market with every belief that the extreme valuations of 2007 represent the sustainable norm to which stocks should return.

With the extreme valuations Dave believes that there's no to place to go but down.

With the exception of the 2000 extreme, every secular bull market has died before reaching even the current level of valuations.

I can say with reasonable confidence that valuations are a lot closer to their upper historical boundary than their lower extreme.

Last year, we finally threw up our hands and adapted our approach to require explicit deterioration in market internals before adopting a negative market outlook, regardless of the level of valuations, regardless of the severity of overextended extremes, and with no exceptions.

Nothing could be further from the truth when one starts the clock with extreme valuations and weak structural growth.

As a result, it can be very easy to fall so much in love with a great company that you can't resist investing in the stock even when the valuation is extreme.

If some of your holdings are currently trading at extreme valuations, I believe it would be wise to evaluate the risks associated with holding on.

In Table 3, of the 96 tests for factors, only 2 have the «wrong» sign, with higher valuation pointing to (negligibly) higher subsequent returns; both instances of the «wrong» sign are in the emerging markets, for which we have shorter history, and are for the low beta factor, for which the current valuations, in the 99th percentile, are quite extreme relative to history.

Deep Value investors employ a more extreme version of value investing that is characterized by holding the stocks of companies with extremely low valuation measures.

«Momentum (growth) stocks trade at an extreme premium to value stocks, with the valuation spread the highest since 1980, except for during the tech bubble,» JPMorgan strategist Dubravko Lakos - Bujas wrote recently.

It may seem implausible that stocks could have gone this long with near - zero returns, and yet still be at valuations where other secular bear markets have started — but that is the unfortunate result of the extreme valuations that stocks achieved in 2000.

Combine that fact with today's extreme stock valuations and it's easy to see why our investing narrative has gradually shifted away from a primary focus on maximizing growth to preserving capital.

In terms of valuation, averaging the two extremes seems fair, with the resulting near - 16 % average margin deserving a somewhat generous 1.67 Price / Sales multiple *.