But Hellenistic Christianity assumed a nondialectical form: the world became the arena of sanctification, redemption now takes place without any effect upon
the actual order of the world, and consequently ethics is dissociated from redemption.
My point now is that
the actual order of the world is leading to unparalleled catastrophes.
I have argued that these may be the best lives possible within
the actual order of the world.
Not exact matches
The problem is that this approach makes it easier for demagogues and anyone who is unconcerned with the
actual truth
of a statement — a group that Donald Trump demonstrably falls into — to peddle rumors and innuendo in
order to advance their view
of the
world.
Christian sentimentality wants to transcend the material reality
of the
world, gesturing toward it only with stock abstractions — Grandma's hands, baby feet, home sweet home — that have no correspondence with the
actual physical
world, in
order to get to a prearranged rendezvous
of feeling.
In any case, in the following paragraphs I will first analyze Whitehead's remarks in Process and Reality on societies as the necessary environment for the ongoing emergence
of actual occasions and then show how this analysis throws unexpected light on Whitehead's further explanation
of the hierarchy
of societies within the current
world order, in particular, the difference between inorganic and organic societies, and, among organic societies, those with a «soul» or «living person» and those without such a central organ
of control.
In reference to any given society the
world of actual entities is to be conceived as forming a background in layers
of social
order, the defining characteristic becoming wider and more general as we widen the background.
Thus, even though
actual occasions are «the final real things
of which the
world is made up» (PR 18/27), societies as the progressive «layers
of social
order» into which they are organized are clearly
of equal importance for the self - constitution
of the universe from moment to moment.
If the requisite disjunctive synthesis can not be explained by appeal to the doctrine that God values all possible
worlds, this is not so much because evaluation is logically dependent upon gradations
of importance, but because (accepting Christian's explanation
of the absence
of such gradations in the primordial nature) the logic
of the doctrine itself entails that God be inextricably involved in the formation
of actual worlds as «circles
of convergence,» i.e., in «the
orderings effected by individuals in the course
of nature.»
When Whitehead describes the approach to intellectuality as a gain in the power
of abstraction, so that «the irrelevant multiplicity is eliminated, and emphasis is laid on the elements
of systematic
order in the
actual world» (PR 388), we take this to mean that mentality becomes habitually effective when its potentially anarchic initiatives are both nourished and preserved at lower, more reiterative levels
of conceptual functioning.
Hence, we must attribute to God not only the conceptual
ordering of the eternal objects by virtue
of which he lures the occasions
of the
world toward
order and value; we must attribute to him as to all other
actual entities physical feelings as well.
Pace Donald Sherburne's solution (viz. ditching God altogether, positing the multiplicity
of actual entities as the only source
of a plural «
order, meaning and value»), one possible response might run as follows: in the primordial nature there are no general (fixed a priori) standards
of value, there is only the capacity to offer «guidelines» relative to already individuated
worlds, This, or something very like it, seems to be the solution implicitly adopted by Christian when he says
of the primordial nature:
«The definite determination which imposes
ordered balance on the
world requires an
actual entity imposing its own unchanged consistency
of character on every phase.»
God's
ordering of possibilities is such that every possible state
of the
actual world is already envisioned as possible and every possible development from that
actual state
of the
world is already envisioned and appraised.
Here
order appears as a state
of affairs in which the supportive structured society is adapted to prevailing circumstances such that the dominant ideal
of its personal strand
of mental occasions is least frustrated by the
actual world of its environment.
(1) On page 163, in discussing the scope
of the divine
actual world, Kraus tells us that «some Whiteheadian scholars, notably Charles Hartshorne, have rejected Whitehead's assertion that God is «always in concrescence and never in the past» (PR 47) and replaced it with an interpretation
of God as a personal
order of divine occasions.»
God and
world are just this sort
of coupled system, with God limiting the absolute field
of pure possibility to that region or
order compatible with the
actual world.
The tension I have in mind is generated by (i) this process
of temporally
ordered actual occasions articulating his vision
of the metaphysical ultimatum — atomism — and (ii) the complex product
of this process which he so obviously cherished as an organic interconnectedness — the web
of interrelations which comprise a
world so badly misunderstood by the science Whitehead himself prehended from out
of his immediate past.
The Whiteheadian notion would simply add to Crossan's basic idea that the formation and transformation
of world would be not only a transformation
of human perception, but an
actual ordering and reordering
of the concrete entities
of the
world.
This is clear in Whitehead's description
of the natural social
order: «In reference to any given society, the
world of actual entities is to he conceived as forming a background in layers
of social
order, the defining characteristics become wider and more general as we widen the background» (PR 98 / 150).
As Whitehead says, «transmutation is the way in which the
actual world is felt as a community, and is so felt in virtue
of its prevalent
order» (PR 384).
If our
world were a centered universe, a universe with an all - seeing (i.e., all - prehending) God with the ability to introduce, on his own, new information pertaining to the past into the experience
of emerging
actual occasions by means
of their subjective aims, then our
world would be a much more harmoniously
ordered world than it in fact is.
Thus God seeks to «lure» the
world toward more desirable forms
of order.81 The power
of the divine ideal, however, is not different in kind from the influence
of other past
actual entities.
From Ely one gets the picture
of a God who somehow (being uncreated in time) stands back
of the
order in the
world — a primordial God who exists apart from the
order and / or the
ordered events which make up the
actual world.
While the general position seems more reminiscent
of the «organic mechanism»
of Science and the Modern
World, Russell's discussion
of minds and the entities
of physics bears an interesting resemblance to the more technical Whiteheadian discussion
of personally
ordered societies and corpuscular societies
of actual occasions in Process and Reality.
Rather, we are applying certain methodological features
of Quine's analysis
of things in the
world to Whiteheadian
actual entities in
order to recover aspects
of the less radical Quinian
world view.
5 This is a remarkable anticipation
of Whitehead's view in Process and Reality that God's primordial
ordering of the
world's possibilities (the eternal objects) is the ultimate source
of novelty in an emergent universe, except that Thornton understands these possibilities to be everlasting rather than timeless.6 This reification
of what for Whitehead is purely possible, needing concrete embodiment in the
actual world, leads Thornton to conceive
of the eternal
order as absolutely
actual in its unchangeableness, identical with God.
This god is the God
of worship because he is both the primordial
actual reality who is the source
of order and creativity in the temporal
world (that is, he is worthy
of worship), and he is the one who incorporates every
actual occasion into himself in a harmonious and everlasting unity (that is, he is capable
of responding).
The whole neo-orthodox case against the liberal doctrine that the
orders of this
world can be transformed into the Kingdom
of love rests ultimately on two propositions about the
actual situation
of man in nature and in society, which we need carefully to examine.
In
order for an occasion to be something definite most
of the physical data from the
actual world must be eliminated.
Assuming the omnibenevolence
of Whitehead's God (that God wills the best for each
actual occasion), in
order for all evil to be merely apparent, there has to be an absolute conformity between God's will and what transpires in the
actual world.3 For if the
actual world fails to conform to God's aim, then actualizations will have occurred in the place
of which other actualizations would have been better.
After commenting on the necessity
of a principle
of limitation and
of its identification with God in Science and the Modern
World, Lowe concludes that «the
actual entity that is needed to
order the possibilities is called the primordial nature
of God» (101).
Consider, for example, Simpson at time T (i.e., the
actual entity at T which is a member
of that serially
ordered society known as «Simpson») being confronted by his past
actual world including Simpson at T - T, T - 2, etc..
Recalling the principles
of ordinality and commensurateness, there is no single
order «the
World,» for there can be no single
order determinative
of all complexes,
actual and possible.
Whitehead says here (PR 127, for instance, the» «
order» in the
actual world is differentiated from mere givenness by introduction
of adaption for the attainment
of an end.»
For the same reason, I do not think it is necessary to choose between Whitehead's (and Oomen's) conception
of God as a transcendent
actual entity and Hartshorne's (and Voskuil's) rival conception
of God as a personally
ordered society
of actual occasions in setting forth ones understanding
of the God -
world relationship.
Moreover, in a follow - up comment a few sentences later, the field - metaphor also figures: «the
world of actual entities is to be conceived as forming a background in layers
of social
order, the defining characteristics becoming wider and more general as we widen the background» (90).
There is an
actual world because there is an
order of nature.
Adventure is the universes search for continually more intense forms
of ordered novelty.5 If the
actual world is a process, composed
of becoming and perishing occasions then its movement toward integrating these occasions into ever richer modes
of order may be called adventure.
That is to say, each occasion not only concretizes its relative
actual world, but also passes the structure
of order achieved within it along to the
worlds of other occasions which are polycontextually concretizing themselves.
In other words — considered from the perspective
of the feeling occasion — in the interest
of expanding its own room for development, its relative
actual world, and its capacity for feeling, the occasion which is in the process
of concretion will give privilege to those occasions in its environment which embody a high integration
of the
world and thus an
order as complex as possible.
But to elucidate this «contribution»
of actual occasions to the construction
of more complex states
of order in the
world, we need an even more profound presentation
of the way in which
actual occasions relate to each other.
If God must wait to prehend what the
world creates, the
actual entities
of the
world would have to include what they inherit, without loss, and not die, in
order to pass on all they actualized to God.
It is not the case that there is an
actual world which accidentally happens to exhibit an
order of nature.
Therefore, we identify God with the creative
order of the
world, a process which transforms human beings, brings values from a potential to an
actual state, and works to overcome evil with good.
Especially given the complexities inherent in the
world today (and therefore the depth
of detail, legal obscurities, and the like represented in
actual legislation), the ordinary voter in a democracy may find his or her time better spent on other activities than doing enough research in
order to form an opinion on each potential piece
of legislation.
«Economic growth in our modern times can simply no longer be achieved with
actual consumption and production patterns, and in
order to take on this enormous challenge, we need to mobilise all knowledge
of the
world.»
Through the 1940's and 50's the Soviet Union experienced begun in
order to dominate the
actual Olympic games, and also the use
of sexual energy by most
of its athletes left other parts
of the
world lagging very good behind.
The policies that were criticized were those that increased attention to academic outcomes at the expense
of children's exploration, discovery, and play; methods that focused on large group activities and completion
of one - dimensional worksheets and workbooks in place
of actual engagement with concrete objects and naturally occurring experiences
of the
world; and directives that emphasized the use
of group - administered, computer - scored, multiple - choice achievement tests in
order to determine a child's starting place in school rather than assessments that rely on active child engagement, teacher judgment, and clinical opinion.
After all, life is sometimes entirely too busy to do it all and be everything we need to be in
order to get that book off
of our laptop and into the
world in the form
of actual, beautiful printed books.