Sentences with phrase «actual order of the world»

But Hellenistic Christianity assumed a nondialectical form: the world became the arena of sanctification, redemption now takes place without any effect upon the actual order of the world, and consequently ethics is dissociated from redemption.
My point now is that the actual order of the world is leading to unparalleled catastrophes.
I have argued that these may be the best lives possible within the actual order of the world.

Not exact matches

The problem is that this approach makes it easier for demagogues and anyone who is unconcerned with the actual truth of a statement — a group that Donald Trump demonstrably falls into — to peddle rumors and innuendo in order to advance their view of the world.
Christian sentimentality wants to transcend the material reality of the world, gesturing toward it only with stock abstractions — Grandma's hands, baby feet, home sweet home — that have no correspondence with the actual physical world, in order to get to a prearranged rendezvous of feeling.
In any case, in the following paragraphs I will first analyze Whitehead's remarks in Process and Reality on societies as the necessary environment for the ongoing emergence of actual occasions and then show how this analysis throws unexpected light on Whitehead's further explanation of the hierarchy of societies within the current world order, in particular, the difference between inorganic and organic societies, and, among organic societies, those with a «soul» or «living person» and those without such a central organ of control.
In reference to any given society the world of actual entities is to be conceived as forming a background in layers of social order, the defining characteristic becoming wider and more general as we widen the background.
Thus, even though actual occasions are «the final real things of which the world is made up» (PR 18/27), societies as the progressive «layers of social order» into which they are organized are clearly of equal importance for the self - constitution of the universe from moment to moment.
If the requisite disjunctive synthesis can not be explained by appeal to the doctrine that God values all possible worlds, this is not so much because evaluation is logically dependent upon gradations of importance, but because (accepting Christian's explanation of the absence of such gradations in the primordial nature) the logic of the doctrine itself entails that God be inextricably involved in the formation of actual worlds as «circles of convergence,» i.e., in «the orderings effected by individuals in the course of nature.»
When Whitehead describes the approach to intellectuality as a gain in the power of abstraction, so that «the irrelevant multiplicity is eliminated, and emphasis is laid on the elements of systematic order in the actual world» (PR 388), we take this to mean that mentality becomes habitually effective when its potentially anarchic initiatives are both nourished and preserved at lower, more reiterative levels of conceptual functioning.
Hence, we must attribute to God not only the conceptual ordering of the eternal objects by virtue of which he lures the occasions of the world toward order and value; we must attribute to him as to all other actual entities physical feelings as well.
Pace Donald Sherburne's solution (viz. ditching God altogether, positing the multiplicity of actual entities as the only source of a plural «order, meaning and value»), one possible response might run as follows: in the primordial nature there are no general (fixed a priori) standards of value, there is only the capacity to offer «guidelines» relative to already individuated worlds, This, or something very like it, seems to be the solution implicitly adopted by Christian when he says of the primordial nature:
«The definite determination which imposes ordered balance on the world requires an actual entity imposing its own unchanged consistency of character on every phase.»
God's ordering of possibilities is such that every possible state of the actual world is already envisioned as possible and every possible development from that actual state of the world is already envisioned and appraised.
Here order appears as a state of affairs in which the supportive structured society is adapted to prevailing circumstances such that the dominant ideal of its personal strand of mental occasions is least frustrated by the actual world of its environment.
(1) On page 163, in discussing the scope of the divine actual world, Kraus tells us that «some Whiteheadian scholars, notably Charles Hartshorne, have rejected Whitehead's assertion that God is «always in concrescence and never in the past» (PR 47) and replaced it with an interpretation of God as a personal order of divine occasions.»
God and world are just this sort of coupled system, with God limiting the absolute field of pure possibility to that region or order compatible with the actual world.
The tension I have in mind is generated by (i) this process of temporally ordered actual occasions articulating his vision of the metaphysical ultimatum — atomism — and (ii) the complex product of this process which he so obviously cherished as an organic interconnectedness — the web of interrelations which comprise a world so badly misunderstood by the science Whitehead himself prehended from out of his immediate past.
The Whiteheadian notion would simply add to Crossan's basic idea that the formation and transformation of world would be not only a transformation of human perception, but an actual ordering and reordering of the concrete entities of the world.
This is clear in Whitehead's description of the natural social order: «In reference to any given society, the world of actual entities is to he conceived as forming a background in layers of social order, the defining characteristics become wider and more general as we widen the background» (PR 98 / 150).
As Whitehead says, «transmutation is the way in which the actual world is felt as a community, and is so felt in virtue of its prevalent order» (PR 384).
If our world were a centered universe, a universe with an all - seeing (i.e., all - prehending) God with the ability to introduce, on his own, new information pertaining to the past into the experience of emerging actual occasions by means of their subjective aims, then our world would be a much more harmoniously ordered world than it in fact is.
Thus God seeks to «lure» the world toward more desirable forms of order.81 The power of the divine ideal, however, is not different in kind from the influence of other past actual entities.
From Ely one gets the picture of a God who somehow (being uncreated in time) stands back of the order in the world — a primordial God who exists apart from the order and / or the ordered events which make up the actual world.
While the general position seems more reminiscent of the «organic mechanism» of Science and the Modern World, Russell's discussion of minds and the entities of physics bears an interesting resemblance to the more technical Whiteheadian discussion of personally ordered societies and corpuscular societies of actual occasions in Process and Reality.
Rather, we are applying certain methodological features of Quine's analysis of things in the world to Whiteheadian actual entities in order to recover aspects of the less radical Quinian world view.
5 This is a remarkable anticipation of Whitehead's view in Process and Reality that God's primordial ordering of the world's possibilities (the eternal objects) is the ultimate source of novelty in an emergent universe, except that Thornton understands these possibilities to be everlasting rather than timeless.6 This reification of what for Whitehead is purely possible, needing concrete embodiment in the actual world, leads Thornton to conceive of the eternal order as absolutely actual in its unchangeableness, identical with God.
This god is the God of worship because he is both the primordial actual reality who is the source of order and creativity in the temporal world (that is, he is worthy of worship), and he is the one who incorporates every actual occasion into himself in a harmonious and everlasting unity (that is, he is capable of responding).
The whole neo-orthodox case against the liberal doctrine that the orders of this world can be transformed into the Kingdom of love rests ultimately on two propositions about the actual situation of man in nature and in society, which we need carefully to examine.
In order for an occasion to be something definite most of the physical data from the actual world must be eliminated.
Assuming the omnibenevolence of Whitehead's God (that God wills the best for each actual occasion), in order for all evil to be merely apparent, there has to be an absolute conformity between God's will and what transpires in the actual world.3 For if the actual world fails to conform to God's aim, then actualizations will have occurred in the place of which other actualizations would have been better.
After commenting on the necessity of a principle of limitation and of its identification with God in Science and the Modern World, Lowe concludes that «the actual entity that is needed to order the possibilities is called the primordial nature of God» (101).
Consider, for example, Simpson at time T (i.e., the actual entity at T which is a member of that serially ordered society known as «Simpson») being confronted by his past actual world including Simpson at T - T, T - 2, etc..
Recalling the principles of ordinality and commensurateness, there is no single order «the World,» for there can be no single order determinative of all complexes, actual and possible.
Whitehead says here (PR 127, for instance, the» «order» in the actual world is differentiated from mere givenness by introduction of adaption for the attainment of an end.»
For the same reason, I do not think it is necessary to choose between Whitehead's (and Oomen's) conception of God as a transcendent actual entity and Hartshorne's (and Voskuil's) rival conception of God as a personally ordered society of actual occasions in setting forth ones understanding of the God - world relationship.
Moreover, in a follow - up comment a few sentences later, the field - metaphor also figures: «the world of actual entities is to be conceived as forming a background in layers of social order, the defining characteristics becoming wider and more general as we widen the background» (90).
There is an actual world because there is an order of nature.
Adventure is the universes search for continually more intense forms of ordered novelty.5 If the actual world is a process, composed of becoming and perishing occasions then its movement toward integrating these occasions into ever richer modes of order may be called adventure.
That is to say, each occasion not only concretizes its relative actual world, but also passes the structure of order achieved within it along to the worlds of other occasions which are polycontextually concretizing themselves.
In other words — considered from the perspective of the feeling occasion — in the interest of expanding its own room for development, its relative actual world, and its capacity for feeling, the occasion which is in the process of concretion will give privilege to those occasions in its environment which embody a high integration of the world and thus an order as complex as possible.
But to elucidate this «contribution» of actual occasions to the construction of more complex states of order in the world, we need an even more profound presentation of the way in which actual occasions relate to each other.
If God must wait to prehend what the world creates, the actual entities of the world would have to include what they inherit, without loss, and not die, in order to pass on all they actualized to God.
It is not the case that there is an actual world which accidentally happens to exhibit an order of nature.
Therefore, we identify God with the creative order of the world, a process which transforms human beings, brings values from a potential to an actual state, and works to overcome evil with good.
Especially given the complexities inherent in the world today (and therefore the depth of detail, legal obscurities, and the like represented in actual legislation), the ordinary voter in a democracy may find his or her time better spent on other activities than doing enough research in order to form an opinion on each potential piece of legislation.
«Economic growth in our modern times can simply no longer be achieved with actual consumption and production patterns, and in order to take on this enormous challenge, we need to mobilise all knowledge of the world
Through the 1940's and 50's the Soviet Union experienced begun in order to dominate the actual Olympic games, and also the use of sexual energy by most of its athletes left other parts of the world lagging very good behind.
The policies that were criticized were those that increased attention to academic outcomes at the expense of children's exploration, discovery, and play; methods that focused on large group activities and completion of one - dimensional worksheets and workbooks in place of actual engagement with concrete objects and naturally occurring experiences of the world; and directives that emphasized the use of group - administered, computer - scored, multiple - choice achievement tests in order to determine a child's starting place in school rather than assessments that rely on active child engagement, teacher judgment, and clinical opinion.
After all, life is sometimes entirely too busy to do it all and be everything we need to be in order to get that book off of our laptop and into the world in the form of actual, beautiful printed books.
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