Sentences with phrase «actual subsequent returns»

Specifically, the Fed model will most probably creep to higher and higher levels of putative «undervaluation,» which will be completely uninformative and uncorrelated with actual subsequent returns.

The most reliable measures of individual stock valuation we've found are based on formal discounted cash flow considerations, but among publicly - available measures we've evaluated, price / revenue ratios are better correlated with actual subsequent returns than price / earnings ratios (though normalized profit margins and other factors are obviously necessary to make cross-sectional comparisons).

The critical observation, however, is this metric is no less correlated with actual subsequent returns than in the past.

As we've demonstrated repeatedly, the valuation measures most strongly correlated with actual subsequent returns, particularly over a 7 - 15 year horizon, are those that normalize for profit margin variability in some way.

Not exact matches

Actual results, including with respect to our targets and prospects, could differ materially due to a number of factors, including the risk that we may not obtain sufficient orders to achieve our targeted revenues; price competition in key markets; the risk that we or our channel partners are not able to develop and expand customer bases and accurately anticipate demand from end customers, which can result in increased inventory and reduced orders as we experience wide fluctuations in supply and demand; the risk that our commercial Lighting Products results will continue to suffer if new issues arise regarding issues related to product quality for this business; the risk that we may experience production difficulties that preclude us from shipping sufficient quantities to meet customer orders or that result in higher production costs and lower margins; our ability to lower costs; the risk that our results will suffer if we are unable to balance fluctuations in customer demand and capacity, including bringing on additional capacity on a timely basis to meet customer demand; the risk that longer manufacturing lead times may cause customers to fulfill their orders with a competitor's products instead; the risk that the economic and political uncertainty caused by the proposed tariffs by the United States on Chinese goods, and any corresponding Chinese tariffs in response, may negatively impact demand for our products; product mix; risks associated with the ramp - up of production of our new products, and our entry into new business channels different from those in which we have historically operated; the risk that customers do not maintain their favorable perception of our brand and products, resulting in lower demand for our products; the risk that our products fail to perform or fail to meet customer requirements or expectations, resulting in significant additional costs, including costs associated with warranty returns or the potential recall of our products; ongoing uncertainty in global economic conditions, infrastructure development or customer demand that could negatively affect product demand, collectability of receivables and other related matters as consumers and businesses may defer purchases or payments, or default on payments; risks resulting from the concentration of our business among few customers, including the risk that customers may reduce or cancel orders or fail to honor purchase commitments; the risk that we are not able to enter into acceptable contractual arrangements with the significant customers of the acquired Infineon RF Power business or otherwise not fully realize anticipated benefits of the transaction; the risk that retail customers may alter promotional pricing, increase promotion of a competitor's products over our products or reduce their inventory levels, all of which could negatively affect product demand; the risk that our investments may experience periods of significant stock price volatility causing us to recognize fair value losses on our investment; the risk posed by managing an increasingly complex supply chain that has the ability to supply a sufficient quantity of raw materials, subsystems and finished products with the required specifications and quality; the risk we may be required to record a significant charge to earnings if our goodwill or amortizable assets become impaired; risks relating to confidential information theft or misuse, including through cyber-attacks or cyber intrusion; our ability to complete development and commercialization of products under development, such as our pipeline of Wolfspeed products, improved LED chips, LED components, and LED lighting products risks related to our multi-year warranty periods for LED lighting products; risks associated with acquisitions, divestitures, joint ventures or investments generally; the rapid development of new technology and competing products that may impair demand or render our products obsolete; the potential lack of customer acceptance for our products; risks associated with ongoing litigation; and other factors discussed in our filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), including our report on Form 10 - K for the fiscal year ended June 25, 2017, and subsequent reports filed with the SEC.

As we've noted previously, MarketCap / GVA has a correlation of about 92 % with actual subsequent 10 - year S&P 500 total returns, even in recent market cycles.

If one creates as scatter plot of the Shiller P / E versus actual subsequent 10 - year market returns, one gets a nice scatter, but a good deal of noise as well.

MarketCap / GVA is better correlated with actual subsequent S&P 500 total returns than price / forward earnings, the Fed Model, the Shiller P / E, price / book, price / dividend, Tobin's Q, market capitalization to GDP, price / revenue and every other valuation ratio we've developed or examined in market cycles across history.

As a result, starting valuations, on historically reliable measures, are 90 % correlated with actual subsequent 10 - year total market returns.

This adjustment has historically been important, as adjusting for that embedded profit margin significantly improves the relationship between the CAPE and actual subsequent market returns (something we can demonstrate both with algebraic return estimates and regression models — see Margins, Multiples, and the Iron Law of Valuation).

We find that in market cycles across history, this new measure is better correlated (92 %) with actual subsequent S&P 500 nominal total returns than even the S&P 500 price / revenue ratio and market capitalization / nominal GDP.

The following chart shows the same data on an inverted log scale (blue line, left), along with the actual subsequent 12 - year nominal average annual total return of the S&P 500 Index (red line, right).

At this point, obscene equity valuations are already baked in the cake on valuation measures that are reliably correlated with actual subsequent stock market returns.

Among the valuation measures most tightly correlated across history with actual subsequent S&P 500 total returns, the ratio of market capitalization to corporate gross value added would now have to retreat by nearly 60 % simply to reach its pre-bubble average.

While our Margin - Adjusted CAPE has a very slightly lower correlation with actual subsequent market returns than our preferred measure (MarketCap / GVA), the available data history is longer.

At present, the valuation measures we find most strongly correlated with actual subsequent S&P 500 total returns suggest zero total returns for the S&P 500 over the coming 10 years, and total returns averaging only about 1 % annually over the coming 12 - year period.

Last week, the U.S. equity market climbed to the steepest valuation level in history, based on the valuation measures most highly correlated with actual subsequent S&P 500 10 - 12 year total returns, across a century of market cycles.

The red line shows the actual total returns for this portfolio mix over the subsequent 12 - year period.

The chart below shows the relationship between the Margin - Adjusted CAPE, on an inverted log scale, and actual subsequent S&P 500 total returns, in data since the 1920's.

Indeed, even Robert Shiller's cyclically - adjusted P / E (CAPE) is much better correlated with actual subsequent market returns, across a century of market cycles, when we account for the profit margin embedded in the 10 - year average of earnings.

At present, the valuation measures that we find best correlated with actual subsequent S&P 500 total returns are at the most offensive levels in history, matching or eclipsing the 1929 and 2000 extremes.

Notably, the relationship between the Margin - Adjusted CAPE and actual subsequent market returns is more reliable than for the raw Shiller CAPE.

Actual results may vary materially from those expressed or implied by forward - looking statements based on a number of factors, including, without limitation: (1) risks related to the consummation of the Merger, including the risks that (a) the Merger may not be consummated within the anticipated time period, or at all, (b) the parties may fail to obtain shareholder approval of the Merger Agreement, (c) the parties may fail to secure the termination or expiration of any waiting period applicable under the HSR Act, (d) other conditions to the consummation of the Merger under the Merger Agreement may not be satisfied, (e) all or part of Arby's financing may not become available, and (f) the significant limitations on remedies contained in the Merger Agreement may limit or entirely prevent BWW from specifically enforcing Arby's obligations under the Merger Agreement or recovering damages for any breach by Arby's; (2) the effects that any termination of the Merger Agreement may have on BWW or its business, including the risks that (a) BWW's stock price may decline significantly if the Merger is not completed, (b) the Merger Agreement may be terminated in circumstances requiring BWW to pay Arby's a termination fee of $ 74 million, or (c) the circumstances of the termination, including the possible imposition of a 12 - month tail period during which the termination fee could be payable upon certain subsequent transactions, may have a chilling effect on alternatives to the Merger; (3) the effects that the announcement or pendency of the Merger may have on BWW and its business, including the risks that as a result (a) BWW's business, operating results or stock price may suffer, (b) BWW's current plans and operations may be disrupted, (c) BWW's ability to retain or recruit key employees may be adversely affected, (d) BWW's business relationships (including, customers, franchisees and suppliers) may be adversely affected, or (e) BWW's management's or employees» attention may be diverted from other important matters; (4) the effect of limitations that the Merger Agreement places on BWW's ability to operate its business, return capital to shareholders or engage in alternative transactions; (5) the nature, cost and outcome of pending and future litigation and other legal proceedings, including any such proceedings related to the Merger and instituted against BWW and others; (6) the risk that the Merger and related transactions may involve unexpected costs, liabilities or delays; (7) other economic, business, competitive, legal, regulatory, and / or tax factors; and (8) other factors described under the heading «Risk Factors» in Part I, Item 1A of BWW's Annual Report on Form 10 - K for the fiscal year ended December 25, 2016, as updated or supplemented by subsequent reports that BWW has filed or files with the SEC.

Actual subsequent 12 - year S&P 500 nominal total returns are plotted in red (right scale).

Recent cycles provide no evidence of deterioration in the relationship between reliable valuation measures (particularly those that aren't highly sensitive to fluctuations in profit margins) and actual subsequent market returns.

The strong one - to - one relationship between these estimates and actual subsequent market returns is presented in numerous prior weekly comments (see for example Too Little to Lock In).

While other historically reliable metrics carry a very similar message, Market Cap / GVA has the highest correlation with actual subsequent 10 - year S&P 500 total returns than any other valuation ratio we've examined across history.

Don't criticize historically reliable valuation measures that have maintained the same tight relationship with actual subsequent 10 - 12 year market returns that they've demonstrated across a century of history.

Our perspective is straightforward: on the basis of measures that have been reliably correlated with actual subsequent market returns in market cycles across a century of data, we estimate that the S&P 500 Index will be no higher a decade from now than it is today.

That's fairly close to our own estimate of about 2.4 % based on a broad range of alternative measures that are highly correlated with actual subsequent market returns.

Among the valuation measures having the strongest correlation with actual subsequent market returns, current levels are actually within 10 % of the March 2000 extreme.

For example, our effort to carefully account for the impact of foreign revenues, and to create an apples - to - apples measure of general equity valuation led us to introduce MarketCap / GVA, which is better correlated with actual subsequent 10 - 12 year market returns than any of scores of measures we've studied.

Essentially, Selsick examined the Shiller P / E (the S&P 500 divided by the 10 - year average of inflation - adjusted earnings), and showed that the multiple is even better correlated with actual subsequent S&P 500 total returns using 16 - year smoothing and a 16 - year investment horizon.

On the basis of the most reliable valuation measures we identify (those most tightly correlated with actual subsequent 10 - 12 year S&P 500 total returns), current market valuations stand about 140 - 165 % above historical norms.

The chart below shows this relationship using market capitalization to corporate gross value added (blue, on an inverted log scale) versus actual subsequent 12 - year S&P 500 nominal total returns (red).

Here's a chart from a recent Weekly Market Comment showing the projections for 10 - year annual total returns on the S&P 500 versus actual subsequent 10 - year total returns:

On a wide range of historically reliable measures (having a nearly 90 % correlation with actual subsequent S&P 500 total returns), we estimate current valuations to be fully 118 % above levels associated with historically normal subsequent returns in stocks.

Based on the valuation measures most strongly correlated with actual subsequent total returns (and those correlations are near or above 90 %), we continue to estimate that the S&P 500 will achieve zero or negative nominal total returns over horizons of 8 years or less, and only about 2 % annually over the coming decade.

Last week, the most historically reliable equity valuation measures we identify (having correlations of over 90 % with actual subsequent 10 - 12 year S&P 500 total returns) advanced to more than double their reliable historical norms.

The red line is the actual subsequent 10 - year return earned by holding this particular policy portfolio.

Indeed, because the level of interest rates at any point in time is highly correlated with the level of nominal economic growth over the preceding decade, the relationship between starting valuations and actual subsequent S&P 500 nominal total returns is nearly independent of interest rates.

On valuation measures most reliably correlated with actual subsequent market returns (a test that is never imposed on popular measures), current valuations now exceed 1929 levels.

On valuation measures most strongly correlated with actual subsequent S&P 500 nominal total returns, we presently expect negative total returns for the S&P 500 on a 10 - year horizon, and total returns averaging only about 1 % annually over the coming 12 - year period (chart).

On the basis of valuation measures most tightly related to actual subsequent long - term market returns, we also estimate that the S&P 500 is likely to be lower 12 years from now, compared with current levels, though dividend income may push the total return just over zero on that horizon.

Only those who are historically uninformed believe that valuations have no relationship to subsequent returns, or place their faith in scraps of analytical debris like the «Fed Model» without examining their poor correlation with actual subsequent market returns.

We emphasize «historically reliable» because as in every bubble, there are numerous popular measures with quite poor correlation with actual subsequent market returns that Wall Street can offer to convince investors that valuations are just fine.

I saved the next chart until you could first see the strong correlation between the margin - adjusted CAPE and actual subsequent S&P 500 total returns across history.

Finally, the chart below shows the interaction between the raw Shiller P / E and the embedded profit margin in determining actual subsequent market returns.

The next chart shows the margin - adjusted CAPE on an inverted log scale (blue), along with actual subsequent S&P 500 average annual nominal total returns (red).

On the measures we find most tightly correlated with actual subsequent market returns across history, the S&P 500 is now between 150 % and 170 % above valuation norms that have been approached or breached over the completion of every market cycle in history, including the most recent one.