Sentences with phrase «animal experience in»

If you don't have sales experience, try to offset that by mentioning significant animal experience in other fields.

He has small animal experience in a variety of settings in Colorado and Wisconsin since graduating from veterinary school.

In fact, the animal experience in chemotherapy is not nearly as dramatic.

There were many accidents their animals experienced in next hour while they played!

Mass commercial breeding, early transportation and the less intimate handling such animals experience in this trade are not conducive to balanced socialisation.

Educate others about the perils that outdoor animals experience in this weather.

Not exact matches

Your list of credentials should probably include personal pet ownership — if not currently, at least in the past — as well as other pet - related experience, including working at a pet food store, an animal hospital or other animal - related business.

For animals, intermittent stress is the bulk of what they experience, in the form of physical threats in their immediate environment.

(The Department of Transportation told me that it's looking into Robledo's experience, working in cooperation with the Department of Agriculture, the agency that enforces the Animal Welfare Act.)

In fact, you can give these donations as gifts (many of them come with an «experience» such as a safari when you donate to a local exotic animal zoo) and get good karma points, a tax write - off, and a genuine thank you to boot.

And our own research editor, Sofia Davis - Fogel, shares what she learned from our 2017 charity evaluation process, when she interviewed more than twenty - five animal advocates about their experiences working in the movement.

Aryenish's contribution is informed both by her experience working at animal charities and by her experience consulting with organizations in her role at Encompass.

He observes, however, that «the modernist desire in Frost and Eliot — to preserve an independent selfhood against the coercions of the market, a self made secure by the creation of a unique style — is subverted by the market, not because they wrote according to popular formulas, but because they give us their poems as delicious experiences of voyeurism, illusions of direct access to the life and thought of the famous writer, with the poet inside the poem like a rare animal in a zoo.

To be specific, a human being or higher - order animal organism is an ongoing subject of experience in and through its dominant subsociety of occasions; but the coordination therewith required to sustain the flow of consciousness can only be achieved through the collaboration and coordination of millions of sub-fields of activity, subordinate layers of social order, within the organism.

Value is located finally in the individual occasion, in this case, most significantly, in the individual occasion of animal experience.

If we view the soul as an effective social system for the procurement of intense experience, we can legitimately apply to it Whitehead's statement in «Immortality» that «the more effective social systems involve a large infusion of various soils of personalities as subordinate elements in their make - up — for example, an animal body, or a society of animals, such as human beings» (IMM 690).

It needs to be stated first that human beings are highly complex psycho - physical organisms with literally thousands of energy events interacting with each other and with and under the dominance of an «organizing center of experience» (the brain), also present in animals with central nervous systems.

We do not simply create the nonhuman realities — plants, animals, and inorganic materials — that we interpret; rather we experience these realities as given to us for interpretation, and in their givenness values are disclosed.

Although Whitehead's Category of the Ultimate is meant to lessen the distance, so to speak, between actual occasions and societies of actual occasions, the application of Whitehead's metaphysics to persons seems troublesome; the ancient metaphysical problem of appearance and reality seems to lurk in the background, for the philosopher who wishes to identify res vera in the system soon finds herself perplexed, asking if the subjects of experience are actual occasions, societies of occasions, or sentient beings, such as persons and animals.1

In the history of a living society, its more vivid manifestations wander to whatever quarter is receiving from the animal body an enormous variety of physical experience.

The stream of conscious experience and synthetic activity is the dominant society of actual occasions in human (and animal) bodies, being influenced by subordinate organic processes in those bodies, then influencing them in turn in an ongoing dialectic of causality and creativity.

Two of the specific experiences which Buber mentions in the essay on Boehme — that of kinship with a tree and that of looking into the eyes of a dumb animal — are later used in I and Thou as an example not of unity but of the I - Thou relation.

We have seen that research in nonhuman experience corroborates Whitehead's epistemological scheme in which perception takes the two forms of causal efficacy and presentational immediacy, propositions and concepts are primarily nonlinguistic, feeling is the dominant mode of world - and self - disclosure, and animals experience both morally and aesthetically.

Whitehead makes no assertions in this area, but his silence gives the impression that animals do not experience such judgments.

Its experience of the extent to which human brutality can go, of the fury that can be unleashed when the human animal is attacked, its acceptance in wry cynicism of the venality of great and small; its acceptance, too, of a psychological analysis that tends to show how slight the power of reason, how great the strength of obscure passions; how corrupting of children the possible love of mothers and the wrath of fathers; its portrayal of men and mankind in bitterly disillusioned novels and in shuddering chronicles of man's inhumanity to man — in all this the 20th century has perhaps gone beyond anything that Edwards said in dispraise of men, individually and in the collective.

This capacity to learn from experience in man, as in other animals, is primarily bound up with the interpretation of signals and with the ability to bring past experience to bear on present interpretation.

Also in the case of animals, it is often best to speak of dominant occasions of experience to refer to that entity which in man is organized as soul.

In primitive man, however, this individuality was located in the unconscious, and although it must be emphasized when we compare human experience with that of animals, it was not what we think of as individuality todaIn primitive man, however, this individuality was located in the unconscious, and although it must be emphasized when we compare human experience with that of animals, it was not what we think of as individuality todain the unconscious, and although it must be emphasized when we compare human experience with that of animals, it was not what we think of as individuality today.

The evolutionary sequence from protons, molecules, cells, plants and animals to people would be interpreted as an increase in complexity of experience and degree of self - determination.

In general it seems that we can be sure there are souls only where there are central nervous systems providing sufficient stimulus in some locus in an animal body for a unified experience to emerge far more complex than that of individual molecules or cellIn general it seems that we can be sure there are souls only where there are central nervous systems providing sufficient stimulus in some locus in an animal body for a unified experience to emerge far more complex than that of individual molecules or cellin some locus in an animal body for a unified experience to emerge far more complex than that of individual molecules or cellin an animal body for a unified experience to emerge far more complex than that of individual molecules or cells.

In that context there can be no interest in plants and animals except as they are given being in human experiencIn that context there can be no interest in plants and animals except as they are given being in human experiencin plants and animals except as they are given being in human experiencin human experience.

He would not have believed that human experiencing could have an infinite number of successive experiences in a second, and that the same infinity would also occur in a non-human animal.

In this second sense of the term, the «innocence» of the fetus is like that of the animals: an incapacity to distinguish right from wrong but a capacity to experience pain.

(2) Can we reduce, or hope to reduce, the consciousness of self and the creativeness of the human mind to animal experience, and thus, if questions (1) and (2) are answered in the affirmative, to physics and chemistry?

It is difficult to know where in the animal kingdom one has the need to postulate «self - consciousness,» «self - awareness» or, to use Eccles» phrase, «the experiencing self.»

(2) Can we reduce to biology or hope to reduce to biology those subjective conscious experiences which we may ascribe to animals, and, if question (1) is answered in the affirmative, can we reduce them further to physics and chemistry?

It was what the animal meant in the experience of human beings that preoccupied him.

Perhaps I might see that we are all rational animals, faced with similar limitations in experience and judgment, but capable of examining, deliberating about, and changing our beliefs.

This lack of interest in the subjective experience of nonhuman animals seems characteristic of other deep ecologists as well.

Work is any activity entered into for the sake of an end, and it is normal for the, human spirit, in contrast with animal experience, to have ends in view for which the immediate pleasures of idleness will voluntarily be surrendered.

In fulfilling the requirements of survival the animal experiences the world.

Moreover, all the larger (or more abstract) entities which are composed of the experience - events, from electrons to stones to animals to people to God, are bound in the bonds (or enjoy the freedom and love) of the universal sympathy.

The increased awareness and control made possible by symbolic thought enriches human experience to such an extent that it can be said to represent a difference not merely in degree, but rather in kind, from the experience of other animals (BSI 212 - 13).

The sequence of experience in a waking vertebrate animal is the paradigm case.

This hardening occurs to the extent that particular gaps, such as that between self - conscious human experience and that of animals, is asserted to be fundamentally different from all the other gaps to be found in reality.

Once we acknowledge that human experience plays a role in the world, we may acknowledge that the experience of our animal relatives may play a role also.

It must be remembered... that emotion in human experience, or even in animal experience, is not bare emotion.

But at the same time, rightly enough, it would be insisted that Whitehead's immediate experience can not be conflated with Bradley's; for in Whitehead, immediate experience operates as foundational only within the limited area of animal or human cognition and can not, as in Bradley's idealist metaphysic, be identified with the substratum itself.

There we see Arthur, on the eve of his final battle with Mordred, experience a kind of Piers Plowman — like dream vision in which he is reunited with his old teacher and the talking animals of his youth.

For Whitehead what is to be generalized from our experience are precisely not those aspects which emerge in evolution for the first time in the animal psyche or soul.