Sentences with phrase «appeal judge err»

Did the motion judge err in not appointing counsel for the children and did the appeal judge err in upholding that decision?

Did the summary conviction appeal judge err in upholding the decision to exclude the seized evidence?

As such, even though the appeal judge erred in the standard of review, he did not err by setting aside the arbitrator's decision.

Allstate appealed to Court of Appeal and argued that the appeal judge erred by reviewing the arbitrator's decision on a correctness standard and that the arbitrator's decision should be restored because it was reasonable.

The court was not persuaded that the motion judge erred in balancing the children's best interests or that the appeal judge erred in his consideration of the appeal.

Not exact matches

This Author feels that the judge in question erred in his statements justifying his decision and the plaintiff is almost certain to obtain a new trial at the least on appeal.

In its appeal to the Full Court, Prysmian argued that the trial judge erred in finding that it had engaged in cartel conduct in circumstances where the ACCC's case against Nexans SA, another alleged participant in the conduct, had been dismissed.

Considering the state's grounds of appeal which stated, among other things, that the trial judge erred in law when he stated that the prosecution woefully failed to establish a prima facie case against Woyome, Mr Justice Ofoe said that position was flawed.

But the state appealed on the grounds that the trial judge erred in law in not considering the evidence adduced by the prosecution.

If the defense claims a judge erred in admitting certain evidence, rearguing that point in a post-trial motion gives the judge a chance to clarify the earlier ruling, which could make it harder for the defense to win the point on appeal.

ECMC appealed, arguing that the bankruptcy judge erred when he took tax consequences into account when he granted the Murrays a partial discharge of their student loans.

The task for the chambers judge, from whom this appeal is taken, was to decide whether the Registrar had erred in failing to consider or to give sufficient weight to all relevant factors...

For example, in the recent Liden v Burton [2016] EWCA Civ 275, [2016] Fam Law 687 (proprietary estoppel: see next article) Hamblen LJ characterised the issues on appeal as: «(i) whether the judge wrongly applied the law to the facts as found; (ii) whether the judge erred in the exercise of his discretion in giving effect to the equity» in the particular case.

The Supreme Court of Canada will hear five appeals this week, including three criminal cases involving driving «over 80» and production of evidence; an unjust enrichment claim; and an appeal in a sexual assault case in which the Court of Appeal of Alberta had found that a trial judge had erred by relying on a stereotype about the behaviour of sexual assault viappeal in a sexual assault case in which the Court of Appeal of Alberta had found that a trial judge had erred by relying on a stereotype about the behaviour of sexual assault viAppeal of Alberta had found that a trial judge had erred by relying on a stereotype about the behaviour of sexual assault victims.

In response to the argument that the trial judge had erred in declining to declare a mistrial the Court of Appeal found, oddly, that to allow a trial judge to ignore the juries findings would come perilously close to setting aside an award on the basis that it was inordinately high, which power is only reserved for the Court of Appeal.

On appeal, Downey's counsel argued that the trial judge had erred in his application of the doctrine of wilful blindness.

On appeal, Affinia argued that the motion judge erred by failing to consider the case of Sharma v. Affinia Canada ULC («Sharma»), an unreported case which the appellant alleged had nearly identical facts.

Accused went to cottage of JC with whom she previously cohabited — Accused found JC with victim, another lady, in sauna — Angry words were exchanged between accused and JC — Victim testified that accused pushed her following verbal exchange, as a result victim lost balance and ended up against stove, thereby sustaining serious burns to body — Trial judge accepted victim's evidence that there was some kind of pushing — Accused convicted on one count of assault causing bodily harm, and sentenced to two - year term of probation and $ 1,000.00 fine, accused was also ordered to provide DNA sample pursuant to s. 487.04 of Criminal Code — Accused appealed — Appeal against sentence was allowed — Trial judge erred in concluding that discharge was not appropriate in circumstances, especially given conclusion that accused did not deliberately attempt to injure victim — Trial judge found that there was no need for either specific deterrence or general deterrence; prime concern was need for denunciation of her conduct — Section 730 of Criminal Code permits discharge in cases of this nature, provided that it was in best interest of accused and not contrary to public interest — Accused was responsible individual with no record whatsoever, she held position as counsellor and social worker for 25 years — Trial judge did not find that conviction would definitely affect her employment, but possibility existed, and such conviction would necessarily result in criminal record — There was no likelihood of re-offending — Conditional discharge would not be contrary to public interest.

Accused went to cottage of JC with whom she previously cohabited — Accused found JC with victim, another lady, in sauna — Angry words were exchanged between accused and JC — Victim testified that accused pushed her following verbal exchange, as a result victim lost balance and ended up against stove, thereby sustaining serious burns to body — Trial judge accepted victim's evidence that there was some kind of pushing — Accused convicted on one count of assault causing bodily harm, and sentenced to two - year term of probation and $ 1,000.00 fine, accused was also ordered to provide DNA sample pursuant to s. 487.04 of Criminal Code — Accused appealed against order to provide DNA sample — Appeal allowed — Order was issued to destroy DNA sample that was taken — Trial judge erred in failing to exercise discretion not to order DNA sample — Accused was first time offender, in circumstances that resulted in serious injuries, but with no intention of causing those injuries — Accused had otherwise been exemplary citizen, and likelihood of re-offending was remote.

The appeal is limited to the following submission: did the application judge err in concluding the «purpose test» contained in Amos is met in the circumstances (was the incident in question really an «accident»)?

The defendant employer appealed the award of aggravated damages given by the deputy judge, arguing that she erred in law when she awarded aggravated damages when there was no finding by the deputy judge that the employer had conducted itself in a manner that was unfair or in bad faith when it terminated Mr. Walker such as to justify an award of aggravated damages; and furthermore, there was no evidence, in any form, to show that the Respondent suffered any actual damages as a result of his termination.

On appeal to the Court of Appeal, the appellants argued that the motion judge had erred in several ways, namely by concluding that a broader claim was necessarily advantageous, and in turn assuming that the Rochon Group were better prepared and resoappeal to the Court of Appeal, the appellants argued that the motion judge had erred in several ways, namely by concluding that a broader claim was necessarily advantageous, and in turn assuming that the Rochon Group were better prepared and resoAppeal, the appellants argued that the motion judge had erred in several ways, namely by concluding that a broader claim was necessarily advantageous, and in turn assuming that the Rochon Group were better prepared and resourced.

This appeal raises the issue of whether a trial judge erred in dismissing an application to sever.

The main issues on Appeal were twofold, namely whether the Judge erred in his conclusions as to the reasonableness of the imposed catch limits and whether the conditions were closer to «control» than «deprivation» and therefore required the payment of compensation in order to comply with A1P1.

The trial judge acquitted Katigbak but the Ontario Court of Appeal ruled the trial judge had erred regarding the amendment and convicted him.

The Court of Appeal found the judge at Kusnierz» 2010 trial against his insurance company, Economical, erred when he concluded that Kusnierz» psychological impairments should not be combined with his physical impairments, and that Kusnierz had therefore not sustained a catastrophic impairment.

Jackson J.A. would have dismissed the appeal on the basis of lack of jurisdiction, and also found that even if the trial judge had erred in law the error would not have had a material bearing on the verdict.

The Crown appealed, arguing that the trial judge erred in his consideration and application of s. 150.1 (4) of the Criminal Code, which states that it is not a defence for an accused to say they believed a complainant was 16 years of age or older when the sexual acts occurred.

The College appealed to the Court of Appeal on several grounds, including that the chambers judge failed to apply a reasonableness standard of review while improperly re-weighing the evidence, and erred in finding the decision unreasonable by improperly requiring the inquiry committee to weigh the respondent's version of events.

The estate trustees appealed and argued that the motion judge erred in failing to order that their costs be paid out of the estate.

As The Lawyer's Daily reports, the decision was appealed, with the Swiss company arguing that the judge erred in concluding there was no likelihood of confusion and no passing off.

The taxi driver appealed this finding arguing that «the trial judge erred in law in finding that his conduct was a «contributing cause» of the plaintiffs injuries ``.

The British Columbia Court of Appeal also found that the Chambers judge erred in failing to consider whether fairness and consistency in the lawsuit required that waiver be implied.

Having the benefit of the complete record, the Court of Appeal determined that the motion judge had erred in finding that Carey was not in contempt.

The question on this appeal is whether the trial judge erred in law in the manner in which she addressed what remained of the... [more]

The trial judge, and later the New Brunswick Court of Appeal, erred by failing to apply the first test for constructive dismissal, which is whether the employer's action constitutes a breach of the employment contract, Wagner wrote.

[62] As previously stated, the central issue in this appeal is whether the judge erred in finding that the presumption of undue influence was not rebutted because of the inadequacy of the legal advice provided to Elizabeth by Ms. Iverson and Mr. Easdon when she signed the June 22, 2001 documents.

Overall, the Court of Appeal held that the motion judge erred by granting the stay for a variety of reasons.

On appeal, the sole issue was whether the judge in the circuit court erred in denying the defendant's request to stay the proceedings in the plaintiff's wrongful death claim pending the outcome of the arbitration proceedings.

Although the Court of Appeal did not find that Judge Lenehan had erred in law by stating that «a drunk can consent», his application of the legal test for a person's capacity to consent to sexual activity was a legal error.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in finding the plaintiff was in need, given the substantial equity in her house which was not being utilized for her benefit.

The Court of Appeal also found that Judge Lenehan had erred in discounting the extensive circumstantial evidence that would have allowed him to infer that the complainant had not voluntarily agreed to engage in sexual activity, or that she lacked the capacity to do so.

The court concluded that the trial judge did not err in fact or in law, and dismissed the woman's appeal.

In a section of the lengthy ruling entitled «The trial judge erred in his overall approach to sentencing and imposed a sentence that is manifestly unfit,» the appeal panel states: «To be sure, terrorism is a crime unto itself.

The Court of Appeal for British Columbia has dismissed an application asking for a rare order that a trial judge provide a report on his reasons for conviction of a man for dangerous driving causing death, just because he erred in saying «right» when it should have been «left» in his review of the evidence.

The judge also found that even if the Appeal Committee erred in disposing of the appeal on a tie vote, he had no authority to intervene because s. 57 of the Teaching Profession Act contains a privative cAppeal Committee erred in disposing of the appeal on a tie vote, he had no authority to intervene because s. 57 of the Teaching Profession Act contains a privative cappeal on a tie vote, he had no authority to intervene because s. 57 of the Teaching Profession Act contains a privative clause.

On appeal, the Crown asserted errors of law alone on the basis the judge erred in: (i) failing to properly instruct himself on the legal principles applicable to considering evidence of collusion; (ii) failing to consider all the evidence relevant to the issue of collusion; (iii) misapprehending the evidence relating to collusion; and (iv) correctly assessing the elements of perjury in one of the particulars.

While the Crown presented several questions in its appeal, the dispositive one was whether Judge Paul erred in concluding that Ms. Giroux's actions did not attract the guideline sentence because they were not commercial in nature owing to her lack of anticipated financial gain and / or her lack of knowledge of the exact nature or amount of the drugs in her purse (at para 7).

At issue in this particular appeal was whether the summary judgment motion judge erred by retroactively reducing the Husband's spousal support obligation and terminating it entirely, effective November 1, 2016.

Horizon appeals on the grounds that the judge erred in his interpretation of the Workers» Compensation Act.