Furthermore, the panel agreed with the application judge's alternate conclusion that the mark - up is not a tax because
the appellant agreed to it in its contract.
By an Agreement of Purchase and Sale made in July 2015 (the «APS»),
the appellant agreed to sell to the respondent an undeveloped 3.6 acre parcel of land for a sale price of $ 3,960,000.
However, there was ample evidence for the summary trial judge to conclude that
the Appellant agreed to the reduced amount, including the fact that the Appellant took no steps after her relationship with the abusive partner ended to enforce the terms of the original support order or seek arrears.
Not exact matches
In written reasons, the Court of Appeal
agreed the
appellant was a vexatious litigant; had caused a public nuisance; that the AG had standing
to seek an injunction
to prevent the public nuisance from continuing; that the court had inherent jurisdiction
to control its own process; and that the activities of the
appellant interfered with the administration of justice.
Counsel for the
appellant agreed that he could not rely on res ipsa loquitur on the facts of this case and he limited himself
to the two submissions
to which we have referred.
But I
agree with the trial judge that if the Legislature had intended
to limit the scope of the words «sufficient reason»
to the extent suggested by the
appellant, it could readily have done so.
Rather, the Court
agreed that the application judge, leaving the choice of dispute resolution proceedings open
to the parties granted better flexibility and that a trial would not grant any material advantage as argued by the
appellant.
The
appellant, Ahmed Baig,
agreed to purchase a property from a court - appointed receiver for approximately $ 6.2 million.
In an interim decision in Pieters v. Law Society of Upper Canada, Michael Gottheil, executive chair of the HTRO,
agreed with the
appellant, Toronto lawyer Selwyn Pieters, that a variety of documentation should be produced
to him by Ontario's Law Society pertaining
to his apprehension by a security guard when Pieters entered the Law Society building that day, the seizing of his membership card, and Pieters» subsequent experience in the Law Society building.
But the parties were
agreed that when counsel for the secretary of state was making submissions in the Inner House on the appropriate remedy she had conceded that the
appellant would be granted indefinite leave
to remain if the court were
to decide
to restore the decision of the adjudicator.
No sir, the 6th Circuit held, because the
appellant had
agreed to undergo drug testing and
Counsel for the respondents
agreed that if Talisman was liable
to the
appellant, KBR would be also.
[4] The
appellants unsuccessfully argued the motion and the appeal, with both courts
agreeing that the defence of qualified privilege, but not absolute privilege, applies
to statements made by municipal councilors in council meetings.
As such, the Court of Appeal could not
agree with the
Appellants» argument that, in the circumstances of this case, the Trial Judge ought
to have relaxed the causation test so as
to permit a «common sense» analysis of the issue.
[5] The parties propose, and we
agree, that the term of probation be six months, that the
appellant have no contact with the complainant, that the
appellant be subject
to a weapons ban, that the
appellant reside at a location approved by his probation officer, and that he report
to his probation officer as that officer directs.
Did you know that in Alberta since September last year just about every appeal
to the Alberta Court of Appeal — the
appellant has
to get permission from the court
to file the appeal and often the judge whose decision is being appealed has
to agree.
The ONCA dismissed the
appellant's first argument, noting that the trial judge had properly considered the expert evidence, but
agreed that the trial judge had erred in allowing the wife
to deduct notional costs of disposition from the value of the property.
The appellate court
agreed with
appellant Wilson that the trial judge lacked jurisdiction
to strike and dishonor the dismissal, but critically found the lower court retained jurisdiction
to enter discovery sanctions and attorney's fees (the latter, subject
to any Santisas limitations) post-dismissal anyway.
The
Appellant Municipality of Middlesex Centre opposes the Respondents» attempt
to «get around the planning act» (see para. 41); does not
agree Bear Creek is a navigable stream.
We
agree with counsel for the
appellant that the trial judge wrongly focused on the likely difficulties of a change in custody — which the only evidence on the subject indicates will be short - term and not «devastating» — and failed
to give paramountcy
to M.'s long - term interests.
The Respondent, Al Boom Wooden Pallets Factory,
agrees to purchase a certain volume of finished lumber from the
Appellant, Jazz Forest Products (a lumber products wholesaler).
As part of these particular negotiations, the Respondent
agrees to credit the
Appellant $ 27,121.23 for unused hanger space and encourages the
Appellant to enter into an extension.
After the Trial Judge reminds the
Appellants of their onus
to prove monies received were not taxable, the
Appellants approach the Respondents and
agree to discontinuance of the action on consent.
The S.C.C. was unable
to agree with the
Appellant, and instead
agreed with the Commissioner that the «Prevention» wording of s. 92 generally supports the analysis and conclusions of the Tribunal and the Federal Court of Appeal.
The
Appellant said that she was pressured into
agreeing to the reduction by other people present at the meeting.
In a concurring judgment, Lord Clarke
agrees with Lady Hale that by the terms of the
appellant's contract with the respondent LLP, she undertook
to perform personally certain work or services for it and her status was not by virtue of the contract that of a client or customer.
The vice ‑ president
agreed that the
appellant had just won the grand prize referred
to in the Document.
In delivering the Panel's decision, Justice Sachs
agreed with the
Appellants that the case law surrounding Commission reviews of SRO decisions highlights the importance of deference
to an SRO's findings.
However, in order
to prevent the APS from floundering on this issue, the respondent
agreed to pay the $ 407,582 necessary
to satisfy the severance condition but reserved its rights
to seek that amount back from the
appellant.
The Court of Appeal does not
agree, finding s. 9 operates in this case
to bar the
Appellant's claims.
When the contract was entered into the principal of the
Appellant, Mr. Astrope, ordered blank change order forms for the purpose of evidencing
agreed changes
to the contract.
An
appellant is one who does plea; Begs the Court of Appeals
to agree That the lower court erred.
Lord Hope,
agreeing, said that the ordinary rules of causation did nothing
to advance the
appellants» claim for the psychological effect of risks of injury.
While the Respondent argued that the decision
to proceed by special case was a discretionary one
to which deference was owed, the
Appellants argued that the special case was not appropriate because: the questions posed in the special case rested on a hypothetical assumption that the agreements were valid; necessary facts were not included and not all the facts were
agreed upon by the parties; and the parties did not sign the statement of special case as required by Rule 9 - 3 (3)(c).
We
agree with the majority of the Quebec Court of Appeal that it was open
to the trial judge
to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant would not have engaged in sexual relations had he known about the
appellant's HIV positive status.
On the question of keeping treaty promises, the court
agreed with the
appellants that the provincial Crown has the same section 35 duties
to consult and accommodate that are outlined by the Supreme Court of Canada in Mikisew.
The
appellants had always believed that St. Catherine's Milling was the complete answer on the issue of Ontario's sole power
to take up lands, and the Court of Appeal evidently
agrees.
The master specifically preferred the respondent's evidence over the
appellant's evidence, and found that the
appellant had
agreed to the charges for the extra work
to be completed.
The motion judge found there was no evidence that the parties had
agreed to waive the limitation period and no explanation for the
appellant having consented
to the order, only
to attempt
to resurrect it over four years later.
The respondent's spouse, who had been borrowing large sums of money from the
appellant, signed a promissory note
agreeing to register a mortgage against the property in the
appellant's favour as security for the loans.
Although
appellant disputes the legitimacy of this theory, we
agree with petitioner that the psychologist's use of this theory at trial was merely a way
to explain
appellant's behavior
to deprive the children of their emotional well - being.