(3) Did the trial judge err in refusing to admit surreptitious recordings made by
the appellant mother of statements made by the children?
The appellant mother requested an adjournment of the appeal due to (1) illness; (2) the trial transcripts not having been ordered or filed; and (3) not having counsel.
The ONCA adjourned the appeal to December 12, 2016, peremptory on
the appellant mother.
The appellant mother submitted that the trial judge erred in granting joint custody to the mother and father, in light of their inability to communicate.
With respect to (3), the ONCA set aside the costs order from the trial and made an order for costs in favor of
the appellant mother of $ 10,000 for the motion to change and $ 7500 for the appeal.
The appellant mother appealed a Crown wardship order in respect of three of her children, arguing that she had been inadequately represented by her trial counsel and that the children should have been placed with the maternal grandmother (who was herself, at the time of trial, involved in ongoing proceedings with child protection authorities vis - a-vis her own children).
The ONCA noted that
the appellant mother's arguments on appeal focussed on the reasons for the current state of affairs, rather than on her son's current best interests.
The self - represented
appellant mother argued that the trial judge was biased, that he erred in his custody determination, and that he erred in not awarding spousal support.
In this particularly heartbreaking case,
the appellant mother appealed only the «no access» portion of the order.
The crux of
the appellant mother's argument was that the trial judge erred in hearing evidence in the absence of the self - represented mother and that the trial judge was biased.
The ONCA further pointed out that 15 months had passed from the making of the trial judge's order and
the appellant mother had not sought to tender any fresh evidence that the current joint regime was not working.
In this high conflict case,
the appellant mother made extensive arguments on appeal, submitting:
The appellant mother also argued that the trial judge ignored the evidence of her good parenting and failed to give sufficient weight to domestic violence issues in the parties» relationship.
This question was raised in EM (Lebanon)(FC) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] UKHL 64 but was only tangential to the main issue, which was the relationship between
the appellant mother and her son as opposed to the father whose entitlement to custody would have been secured under Islamic law.
Not exact matches
Approximately seven months after Richard's death, his
mother,
appellant Sally Reed, filed a petition in the Probate Court of Ada County,
The Father (
Appellant) and
Mother (Appellee) had a child together in 2004.
Criminal law: The
appellant, a Saskatchewan
mother, had sexual intercourse with the 14 - year - old complainant, who was a friend of her son.
The
appellant was the
mother of a female child born in July 2006.
The
appellant, A, was born in 1990 in Somalia and came to the UK with his
mother and siblings in 1998.
The case concerned a little girl «B», now aged 7, who had been taken to Pakistan by the Respondent
Mother, unbeknown to the
Appellant.
This was a criminal proceeding with penal and monetary consequences and so, in our opinion, the requirement in the recognizance for judicial interim release, that the
appellant «reside with his
mother» does not preclude temporary absences particularly where, as here, such absences are connected with one's job.
In the present case it amounts in my judgment to conscripting the
mother and
mother - in - law to the services of the
appellant and his children for the benefit of the tortfeasor and any reduction of the award on this basis is and was an error in principle.
The
appellant, Kevin Coe («father»), and appellee, Seon Hwa Coe («
mother»), married in 2004, and had a daughter, «J.C.,» in 2007.
The
appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the CAS, the OCL, and the
mother — a sum totalling $ 20,500.
The
mother (
Appellant) was granted sole custody of their child, and the father (Respondent) granted access.
Jean, the Respondent, is not the biological
mother of any of the
Appellants.
Synopsis: The
Appellant (Mr. Hordyski), his son, and Ms. Peters (the
mother of his son) were shopping at a retail store.
In 1989 their
mother had transferred the title of her home to herself and the
appellant sister, Ms. Cooper, as joint tenants.
In addition, the
appellant challenges the trial judge's ruling on equalization when he allowed the respondent to deduct from her net family property the loans made by the respondent's
mother.
The
appellant acquired the unit in 2013 from his
mother who had owned the unit since 2004.
The
appellant's evidence was that he instructed the respondent's
mother to bring her back if her condition did not get better but the evidence of the respondent's
mother was that she was to bring her daughter back only if her condition worsened.
The life insurance policy in issue was originally issued by Metropolitan Life Insurance Company in the names of the
appellant's
mother and father.
The
appellants were denied leave to introduce as fresh evidence on the appeal an affidavit from Ms. Seliverstova providing additional bank records in support of her argument that the funds she received had come from her
mother in Russia and not Mr. Purcaru.
Furthermore,
appellant seemed to have little understanding of the effect his feelings towards appellee might have on the girls» feelings about their
mother.
In observing that Lori was openly hostile toward and alienated from her
mother, one expert also noted that Lori made statements glorifying her father, a pattern of polarization which could very well develop in Jaime if
appellant is granted custody of both children.»