Sentences with phrase «appellants contended»

The motion judge's reasons, read in context, indicated that there were innocent explanations for conduct the appellants contended was sinister.

The appellants contended that hope or expectation of earning income in the future is not a «possession» and that NHS doctors have no goodwill in their patient lists.

The appellants contended that the motion judge erred in failing to find that a genuine issue requiring a trial existed as to whether 111 had made a valid equitable assignment to Nadeau of an October 19, 2011 promissory note executed by Caparelli and another in favour of 111 (the «Note») and guaranteed by 229.

Among other things, appellants contended at the trial that the Maryland statutes under which they were charged were contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment for the reasons stated at the outset of this opinion.

Appellants contend their motion to intervene was timely and they satisfied all the statutory conditions for intervention.

In Hasan, counsel for the appellant contended that the law relating to the giving of reasons should no longer be allowed to develop on an incremental, case by case basis.

The appellant contends the judge erred in law by adopting a flawed approach in her assessment of the evidence of Ms. Iverson and Mr. Easdon, in order to determine whether the presumption of undue influence was rebutted.

[53] The appellant contends that the trial judge's failure to impute income to the respondent was an error justifying appellate intervention, because the respondent's evidence was that she made no attempts to find employment or training.

[60] While the appellant contends that imputation of income to the respondent can be justified on the mere existence of some level of capacity or, independently, by the existence of some level of opportunity which is inferred in isolation from other circumstances, this contention is neither the view of the Federal Child Support Guidelines as adapted to the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines, nor the view of any decision of this Court.

Thirdly, appellants contend that this same statutory provision, Art. 27, § 509, violates the «Equal Protection» Clause because it permits only certain merchants within Anne Arundel County (operators of bathing beaches and amusement parks et cetera) to sell merchandise customarily sold at these places while forbidding its sale by other vendors of this merchandise, such as appellants» employer.

The appellant contended, however, that «aspects» of the claim were in time as s 6 (6) of the Act provides that an «act» includes a failure to «act», and this implies that, where an initial decision is taken to act in a way that violates a person's human rights, the «act» for the purposes of the Act continues until the public authority decides to cease violating that person's rights.

[43] The appellants contend that the trial judge's reasons provide no indication of why he awarded the respondent $ 20,000 for the cost of future care.

The Appellant contended that, in any event, police should be required first to obtain a Feeney warrant; pursuant to Section 529 of the Code, in order to affect his arrest inside the building (Mr. Webster was arrested in the elevator).

The Appellant contended that, because his civil claim was broader than his traffic violation, it could not be a collateral attack.

[2] The main issue on appeal is whether, as the appellant contends, the court may make a disposition order directing that treatment begin immediately even though the hospital or treating physician does not consent to that disposition.

[2] The appellant contends that the order under appeal in effect varied the order of the Ontario Court of Justice made under s. 29 of the Children's Law Reform Act, and that the Superior Court of Justice had no jurisdiction to make the order.

The appellant contended that shouting at a partner and child was not reprehensible behaviour as the law understands it.

[1] The appellant contends the trial judge did not have jurisdiction over his trial.

The appellants contend that it was an error in principle for the motion judge to rely on a case that neither party cited.

[21] The appellant contends that this paragraph shows the trial judge's concern for «the father's rights» and not the child's best interests.

Not exact matches

It was contended on behalf of the appellant that the law relating to the offence of outraging public decency had developed in such a way that the offence was confined to those instances where the necessary lewd act had been witnessed by at least one person, and the public nature of the offence was only satisfied if, in addition, at least one other person either had or could have seen the act.

The appellant accepted that he had been guilty of conduct unbefi tting a solicitor but contended that the appropriate penalty was one of suspension rather than striking off.

It was contended that the facts of that case were indistinguishable from those of the present appeal and that they were all but conclusive in the appellant's favour.

The fact determinative of this issue is not that the officer relied on the assistance of a flashlight to illuminate the otherwise dark interior of the vehicle as my colleague contends, but that, without permission, the officer physically placed himself inside the interior of the vehicle, a space where the appellant had a reasonable expectation of privacy.

The appellant, Mrs. Ojeikere, and the Office of the Children's Lawyer («OCL») both contend that an Ontario court has jurisdiction.

«[A] ppellant contends that the trial court erred in allowing expert testimony regarding Parental Alienation Syndrome, because the testimony did not meet the standards of Frye... Appellant failed to make this argument before the expert testified, therefore the point is waived for review.»