In B.C. the scope of
appellate intervention in commercial arbitration is narrow: there is limited jurisdiction for appellate review of arbitration awards because B.C. is statutorily limited to questions of law (Arbitration Act, s. 31); even where such jurisdiction exists, the S.C.C. held that a deferential standard of review — reasonableness — «almost always» applies to arbitration awards (Sattva Capital v. Creston Moly Corp., [2014] 2 S.C.R. 633, at paras. 75, 104 and 106).
«The majority opinion reflects the persistent disregard in a number of judgments that this Court has issued of the clear and unequivocal directions of the Supreme Court of Canada that emphasize the importance of individualized sentencing and limit
appellate intervention in the exercise of sentencing discretion by trial judges.
Not exact matches
The Court's decision
in Barton will potentially expand the frequency of
interventions in criminal matters — a positive opportunity for
appellate counsel and interest groups alike to explore alternatives to the traditional binary process.
That judges deviate from the proper sentencing range does not
in itself justify
appellate intervention.
While being very careful not to elevate them from their guidlininess, Mme. Justice Smith
in her reasons
in Domirti v. Domirti, 2010 BCCA 472, an appeal from a trial court spousal support review application, quoted Redpath v. Redpath, 2006 BCCA 338, 62 B.C.L.R. (4th) 233
in finding that that, ``... while SSAG is not to be applied as a matter of law
in determining the quantum of spousal support,
in circumstances where it is appropriate to consider the application of SSAG an award that falls substantially outside the SSAG ranges may permit
appellate intervention».
She gave clear and cogent reasons
in her ruling and the Court saw no ground for
appellate intervention.