Sentences with phrase «applications to that court under»

The Court of Protection Rules have been amended to accommodate applications to that court under s 21A of MCA 2005 arising from the operation of the scheme, for example an application which disputes a finding by a «supervisory authority», such as a local authority, that a care home resident is in fact deprived of his or her liberty within the meaning of Art 5 of the Convention.

It should also be noted that if a step - child was treated as a child of the family by a married step - parent, or was financially dependent on a step - parent who has died, and there is either no or inadequate provision on the death of the step - parent, s / he can potentially make an application to the court under the Inheritance Act (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975.

Not exact matches

Under most circumstances, that would conclude the legal story as several Canadian courts reviewed Eli Lilly's patent applications and ruled that they failed to meet the standards for patentability.

Affirms that information on hemp grower applications is proprietary and is subject to inspection only under a court order

55 (1) Judicial review by the Federal Court of Appeal with respect to any order made under subsection 54 (1) is commenced by making an application for leave to the Court.

Ruling on the bail application, Magistrate Segun - Bello noted that bail had been liberalised said under the ACJA, adding that the prosecution counsel had not placed anything before the court to show why the defendant should not be granted bail.

Any secretary of a political party listed on the part of the ballot paper that relates to the party vote may, instead of making 1 or more separate applications for recounts under section 180 (2), apply to the Chief District Court Judge for recounts of the party votes to be conducted in every electoral district.

While moving the application brought under Section 35 (1) & (4) and 36 (5) and (6) of the 1999 constitution and Section 158, 162, 163 & 165 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015, Eze urged the court to exercise its discretion in favour of his client by releasing him on bail pending trial.

There had been previous attempts to orally examine Mr. Woyome with Mr. Amidu himself, in 2016, filed an application at the Supreme Court seeking to examine Alfred Woyome, on how he was going to pay back the money, after the Attorney General's office under the Mahama Administration, led by the former Minister for Justice, Marietta Brew Appiah - Oppong, discontinued a similar application.

While moving the bail application which was brought under section 35 (1) & (4) and 36 (5) and (6) of the 1999 constitution and section 158, 162, 163 & 165 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015, Uche had urged the court to release his client on bail pending his trial.

A lower court's 23 August preliminary injunction halting hESC research «has a profound impact» that «disrupts not only the processing of grant applications currently under review by NIH, but it disrupts many of its currently funded grants, and it has already threatened ongoing programs to educate physicians and physician - researchers,» the brief states.

Any employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor - management committee which believes that the application to it of any regulation or order issued under this section would result in undue hardship may (1) apply to the Commission for an exemption from the application of such regulation or order, or (2) bring a civil action in the United States district court for the district where such records are kept.

Whenever an action has been commenced in any court of the United States seeking relief from the denial of equal protection of the laws under the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution on account of race, color, religion, or national origin, the Attorney General for or in the name of the United States may intervene in such action upon timely application if the Attorney General certifies that the case is of general public importance.

(b) If the respondent named in a charge filed under section 706 fails or refuses to comply with a demand of the Commission for permission to examine or to copy evidence in conformity with the provisions of section 709 (a), or if any person required to comply with the provisions of section 709 (c) or (d) fails or refuses to do so, or if any person fails or refuses to comply with a demand by the Commission to give testimony under oath, the United States district court for the district in which such person is found, resides, or transacts business, shall, upon application of the Commission, have jurisdiction to issue to such person an order requiring him to comply with the provisions of section 709 (c) or (d) or to comply with the demand of the Commission, but the attendance of a witness may not be required outside the State where he is found, resides, or transacts business and the production of evidence may not be required outside the State where such evidence is kept.

then you are entitled to bring an application before a court seeking a «court - ordered discharge» pursuant to a «hardship provision» under federal bankruptcy law

If you satisfy the five - year waiting period then, you have the option of making an application before a judge in Bankruptcy Court, and the judge has the discretion to grant a «court - ordered discharge» under a «hardship provision&raCourt, and the judge has the discretion to grant a «court - ordered discharge» under a «hardship provision&racourt - ordered discharge» under a «hardship provision».

If you file for personal bankruptcy more than five years after the date of the «end of your education» then you are entitled to bring an application before a court seeking a «court - ordered discharge» pursuant to a «hardship provision» under federal bankruptcy law

(1.1) At any time after five years after a bankrupt who has a debt referred to in paragraph (1)(g) ceases to be a full - or part - time student, as the case may be, under the applicable Act or enactment, the court may, on application, order that subsection (1) does not apply to the debt if the court is satisfied that

The Court further reminded that the Qualification Directive (Directive 2011 / 95 / EU) requires the Member States to grant the refugee status when a third country national or a stateless person meets the relevant conditions under that Directive, and then pointed out that «after the application for international protection is submitted in accordance with Chapter II of Directive 2011/95, any third - country national or stateless person who fulfils the material conditions laid down by Chapter III of that directive has a subjective right to be recognised as having refugee status, and that is so even before the formal decision is adopted in that regard».

Lord Justice Thorpe characterised the failure to obtain a court order, ie issue an application under ChA 1989, s 15 and Sch 1 on a Form C1 and then settle it as an order on the terms agreed, as a «surprising feature» of the case (para 35).

The Court further pointed out that as «the duration of an asylum procedure may be relevant and that, in particular in periods of substantial surges in applications for international protection, the time laid down by EU law are often exceed it» making the right to family reunification depend upon the moment when the asylum procedure is closed would de facto have the effect of nullifying that right and the protection under Article 10 (3)(a)(para 57).

[a] tax measure such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which is, according to the referring court's description of its history and purpose, intended to prevent excessive capital flow towards the Netherlands Antilles and to counter the appeal of that OCT as a tax haven, comes under the tax carve - out clause cited above and remains, consequently, outside the scope of application of Article 47 (1) of the [Seventh] OCT Decision, provided it pursues that objective in an effective and proportionate manner, which is a matter for the referring court to assess.

Acting for claimants in applications to the High Court and Court of Appeal under sections 288 and 289 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990.

70 While the principles of fairness and flexibility have informed the modern approach to the application of proprietary estoppel, as adopted by this Court in its jurisprudence (see Idle - O Apartments Inc. v. Charlyn Investments Ltd., 2014 BCCA 451 (B.C. C.A.) at para. 49; Sabey v. von Hopffgarten Estate, 2014 BCCA 360 (B.C. C.A.); Scholz v. Scholz, 2013 BCCA 309 (B.C. C.A.) at para. 31; Sykes v. Rosebery Parklands Development Society, 2011 BCCA 15 (B.C. C.A.) at paras. 44 - 46; Erickson v. Jones, 2008 BCCA 379 (B.C. C.A.) at paras. 52 - 57; Trethewey - Edge Dyking (District) v. Coniagas Ranches Ltd. [2003 CarswellBC 657 (B.C. C.A.)-RSB- at paras. 64 - 73; Zelmer v. Victor Projects Ltd. (1997), 34 B.C.L.R. (3d) 125 (B.C. C.A.) at paras. 36 - 37), there remains a necessary balancing between an overly broad application of the doctrine under the general guise of «unfairness» and an overly narrow application of the doctrine that places excessive weight on the technical requirements of the doctrine.

Under the current system, if one of the party's contests the other's application for financial remedy, all of the divorce proceedings are transferred to a local court.

Much of Siddharth's arbitration practice involves arbitration - related applications to the Commercial Court under the 1996 Act.

This application is made to the Family Proceedings Court under the Children (NI) Order 1995.

In a case concerning an application for enforcement that was subject to both the New York Convention and the European Convention, the Italian Court of Cassation decided that enforcement should be denied where the presumption under Article VIII had not been rebutted because one party seeking enforcement had expressly requested during the arbitral proceeding that reasons be given for the award.

(application to European Court of Human Rights; whether violation of presumption of innocence; challenge to refusal of the Secretary of State to grant F compensation under s. 133 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 arising from his wrongful conviction in 2004 for various sexual offences).

The Court also held that the plaintiffs» recovery, even if sustained, would be limited to $ 20,000 by virtue of the application of the statutory cap on damage awards arising out of charitable activities under G.L. c. 231, § 85K.

The Ontario Court of Appeal has consistently held that the insured is «entitled to a defence... at no cost to them».2 In other words, an insured is «entitled to be made financially whole» for legal costs incurred in securing a defence under the policy.3 This broad principle has not only been used to indemnify insureds for their past defence costs, but also the future defence costs of counsel of their choice, the costs of the coverage application and the costs of any subsequent appeal.4 This principle of full indemnity is based, not in the law of costs, but in the law of contract.

«RECALLING the obligations of the Contracting Member States under the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), including the obligation of sincere cooperation as set out in Article 4 (3) TEU and the obligation to ensure through the Unified Patent Court the full application of, and respect for, Union law in their respective territories and the judicial protection of an individual's rights under that law;

Essentially, the Court of Appeal recognized that Reeb would be better off accepting the plaintiff's settlement offer under the $ 1 million limit of his mother's home owner's policy, than continuing to pursue the application to determine if there was any coverage in excess of the limit, under the two additional insurance policies.

Symbion Power LLC v Venco Imtiaz Construction Company [2017] EWHC 348 (TCC)-- We acted successfully for the defendant, Venco, in this High Court case where the Court rejected an application to set aside an ICC arbitration award for serious irregularity under section 68 (2)(d) of the Arbitration Act 1996 on the basis that the tribunal had failed to deal with issues which were put to it.

the court can confine its consideration to factors relevant to the variation application — although MCA 1973, s 31 (7) requires the court to have regard to all the circumstances of the case, that is not the same as requiring the court to undertake the exercise under MCA 1973, s 25 afresh; and

cases invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court, whether in relation to children (wardship) or incapacitated or vulnerable adults; and international cases involving applications for relief under either the Hague Convention or Brussels II bis.

[3] In doing so, the Court made a link to inadmissible applications under Article 25 (2)(f) the Asylum Procedures Directive.

Part 36 can be used in respect of issues in the case but may not be used in relation to interim applications (in respect of which the court will exercise its usual discretion as to costs under CPR 44).

He brought proceedings for damages by way of application under the elusive Pt 19 of the Family Procedure Rules 2010 (SI 2010/2955) and which were dismissed and he was back before the Court of Appeal to challenge that dismissal.

(3) Without prejudice to any other power to deal with an act of contempt under paragraph (a) of subsection (1), the court may order the instrument, or any recording made with it, or both, to be forfeited; and any object so forfeited shall (unless the court otherwise determines on application by a person appearing to be the owner) be sold or otherwise disposed of in such manner as the court may direct.

The Court of Appeal's reasons for judgment (from which the application was made), dismissing an application for leave to appeal to it, can be found under Re Ivaco Inc. (2007 ONCA 746).

A new application form The C100 is being introduced for orders under the Children Act 1989 s 8 in place of the C1 which includes new questions about the use of mediation before going to court and is more user friendly with simplifi ed language and additional direct questions and «tick box» responses.

Parental involvement s 11 On an opposed application to make, vary or discharge an order under s 8 of the Children Act 1989, or where the court is considering whether or not to make a parental responsibility order, a rebuttable presumption is raised that involvement of the parents — of some direct or indirect kind but not any particular division of a child's time — will further the child's welfare.

However, in Harb v King Fahd Bin Abdul Aziz [2005] EWCA Civ 1324, [2005] All ER (D) 110 (Nov) the Court of Appeal, with some hesitation, found that an application under s 27 of MCA 2005 (neglect to maintain) depended upon joint lives.

Unfortunately, since the Court decided against the applicability of the Visa Code in the case of X and X, it was not required to look further into the question of whether Member States» authorities should assess applications made under Article 25 of the Visa Code in the light of Articles 4 and / or 18 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights or any other international obligation by which they are bound.

He grounds this on the requirements of the CILFIT test: accordingly the UKSC will be under an obligation to refer unless (i) the question raised is irrelevant; (ii) the EU provision in question has already been interpreted by the Court; or (iii) the correct application of EU law is so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt.

Two questions arose: (i) whether s 204 contained an express requirement under which the county court was required by an enactment to make a decision applying the principles that were applied by the court on an application for judicial review, thus placing s 204 appeals within the public law category; and (ii) if not, whether there were any other reasons requiring the application of judicial review principles with the result that s 204 appeals fell within the post-LASPO 2012 civil legal aid regime.

The monopoly of dispute settlement maintained by the EU courts under Art. 344 TFEU obliges the Member States to settle disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaties by no other means than the ones provided for in the latter and thereby strengthens the jurisdictional order of competences within the EU.

In other words, the Court does not agree with the Belgian government, which argues that it is obvious that visa - applications submitted under the Visa Code should not be dealt with under EU law if the applicants» aim is to prolong their legal stay beyond 90 days on arrival in the Member State they applied to through an application for international protection.

The Plaintiff brought an application to compel pre trial examination under oath of this witness but this was dismissed with the Court noting that a witness willing to speak through counsel is indeed being responsive.