To allege that deference is undermined by exercises of discretion not to
apply issue estoppel is to make a category error.
C.A., Sept. 27, 2010)(33959) April 5, 2013 There is not and should not be a rule of public policy precluding the applicability of issue estoppel to police disciplinary hearings based upon judicial oversight of police accountability; instead there should be a flexible approach, whereby courts have the discretion to refuse to
apply issue estoppel if it will work an injustice, even where the preconditions have been met.
Finally,
applying issue estoppel in a situation such as this carries a risk of judicializing the administrative process.
Not exact matches
For example, in the recent Liden v Burton [2016] EWCA Civ 275, [2016] Fam Law 687 (proprietary
estoppel: see next article) Hamblen LJ characterised the
issues on appeal as: «(i) whether the judge wrongly
applied the law to the facts as found; (ii) whether the judge erred in the exercise of his discretion in giving effect to the equity» in the particular case.
Baron J reviewed the authorities on
issue estoppel and found herself in agreement with Re B and another (minors)(care proceedings: evidence)[1997] 1 FLR 285, [1997] 2 All ER 29 and Mrs Justice Hale (as she then was) that
issue estoppel in children cases, in any strict sense, does not
apply.
This depends upon when a concept analogous to the principle of collateral
estoppel (also known as «
issue preclusion») in civil cases, in which facts previously litigated can bind a party in a later lawsuit, with or without constitutional double jeopardy dimensions,
applies in criminal cases.
In his Dictionary of Legal Usage, Bryan Garner explains that collateral
estoppel is «a miniature of res judicata: the former
applies to
issues, the latter to entire claims or lawsuits.»
Then came Edgerton v Edgerton and Shaikh [2012] EWCA Civ 181, [2012] All ER (D) 172 (Feb) in which Lord Neuberger MR again — in passing, only, on this occasion — consigned a family lawyer's assumption to the same dustbin as «Hildebrand rules»: «[36][The judge below] thought that, as the court in the ancillary relief proceedings had an inquisitorial, or quasi-inquisitorial (as Thorpe LJ put it in Parra v Parra [2002] EWCA Civ 1886, para 22), role, the normal rules as to
issue estoppel did not
apply.
Thus the belief that
issue estoppel can not
apply to family proceedings is shown to be «absurd»; and, in passing, Lord Neuberger allies himself with the minority in Re L (led by Lord Nicholls) who had been so disparaging — the «beguiling term inquisitorial» — of the non-adversarial system espoused by the majority.
The FCA
applied the doctrine of
issue estoppel, finding it would not be appropriate to allow a collateral attack on the findings of invalidity of the patent given that the
issue had already been decided.
In general, the English common law principles of res judicata and
issue estoppel apply to arbitrations sited in England and Wales.
Whether
issue estoppel or cause of action
estoppel is applicable, at the end of the day the court must determine whether it should exercise its discretion to bar the action by reason of res judicata or whether there are exceptional or special circumstances that should
apply.
Enmax Energy Corp. v. TransAlta Generation Partnership 2015 ABCA 383 Arbitration —
Estoppel Summary: The appellant appealed a chambers judge's decision where he held that the parties to an arbitration were not bound by a prior arbitration award involving the same parties, that a party (in this case, the respondent) was not estopped from taking certain positions in the current arbitration as a result of the prior arbitration decision, and that the doctrines of res judicata and issue estoppel did not apply to arbitration
Estoppel Summary: The appellant appealed a chambers judge's decision where he held that the parties to an arbitration were not bound by a prior arbitration award involving the same parties, that a party (in this case, the respondent) was not estopped from taking certain positions in the current arbitration as a result of the prior arbitration decision, and that the doctrines of res judicata and
issue estoppel did not apply to arbitration
estoppel did not
apply to arbitration awards.
In this case, it would be unjust if the
issue estoppel did not
apply to the second and third applications.
It is submitted that in any event, change in law subsequent to the previous proceedings, is an exceptional circumstance and
issue of
estoppel would not
apply.
In my view, the cause of action in application under section 9 and under section 34 are different and thus the
issue estoppel or cause of action
estoppel would not
apply in this situation.