Dunsmuir affirms the Supreme Court's continued reluctance to
apply judicial deference as originally contemplated by Dickson J. in his 1979 CUPE Local 963 v. New Brunswick Liquor Board judgment and later followed by Wilson J. in her National Corn Growers Assn. v. Canada (Import Tribunal), [1990] 2 SCR 1324 dissent.
Not exact matches
The decision is important for examining the level of
deference by the judiciary in
applying judicial review where matters extend into public policy relating to the precautionary principle in environmental law.
Then in 2011 Justice Rothstein, this time writing for the majority in Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v Alberta Teachers» Association, 2011 SCC 61, wrote that the principle of
judicial deference asserted in Dunsmuir had evolved to the point where there is a presumption the standard of review is reasonableness where a statutory decision - maker
applies and interprets its home statute (at para 39).
The respondent in
judicial review who seeks to defend the statutory decision will usually assert that reasonableness be
applied as the standard of review, such that the reviewing court affords
deference to the decision and making it less likely the court will interfere with the decision.
This is the California court decision
applying the rule of
judicial deference to HOA Board of Director's decisions.
It needs to stop trying to articulate and
apply a set of rules for
judicial deference to administrative decision - makers.
Recent
judicial experience suggests that wide application of the protean concept of proportionality would require the development of additional doctrinal tools (such as
deference) in order to ensure that the proportionality test is
applied with appropriate intensity across the wide spectrum of administrative law cases, ranging from fundamental rights on one end to purely economic interests at the other extreme.