In Justice Stratas's view, judges and academics too often take a results - oriented approach to the law, rather than rigorously
applying legal doctrine.
Not exact matches
These Articles
applied and interpreted in sync, coupled with
legal doctrines or principles of «ex facie curiae», «actus reus», «mens rea», «respondeat superior» and «nemo judex in sua causa», all of which were breached and disregarded respectively by the SC, my conclusion is that the SC acted unconstitutionally in the Montie case.
As Justice Stratas put it to the attendees, should Canada ever be gripped by some form of threat or disorder, leading the government to abridge the civil liberties of many Canadians, do we want the judge deciding the constitutionality of the government's action to be able to turn to a body of constitutional law «based on fundamental principles, consistently
applied over decades» — in other words, «settled
legal doctrine» — or do we want the judge deciding the issue based upon «her or his own worldview?»
However, in Illinois and many other states, the
legal doctrine, implied warranty of habitability,
applies to landlords.
This exception to the
doctrine of waiver
applies when one party discloses information that is subject to solicitor - client privilege to another party (or parties) who have a common interest in a
legal matter.
Mr. Sirota offers quite a bit to chew on in just over 1000 words, but his argument, as I understand it, boils down to the following propositions: 1) Judges must generally
apply the law as written and should work to foster stable
legal doctrine, 2) In
applying the law, judges can not avoid making moral and value - laden judgments; and 3) Judicial moralizing is, to a certain extent, desirable due to «democratic process failures,» meaning that the legislative process is not properly responding to the changing will of the people (Mr. Sirota also discusses briefly the circumstances in which courts should be permitted to overrule precedents.
While there can be no doubt that s. 130 affords trial judges wide discretion, this does not preclude the courts from developing
legal doctrine that is
applied with consistency, just as they have done with the entitlement to costs.
The Court of Appeal confirmed that rectification is «an extraordinary remedy to be sparingly granted», and explained its reticence to
apply the
doctrine on the basis that persons who sign
legal documents are presumed to have chosen their words with care.
This legislation is then interpreted and
applied through the judiciary during trials; these rulings will then be
applied in future cases under the
doctrine of stare decisis, another name for
legal precedent.
The practice is incompatible with a precedent - based
legal system because it is inconsistent with the
doctrine of stare decisis — when a court has decided a principle of law applicable to certain facts, it will
apply that principle to all future cases where the facts are substantially the same.
This Comment joins other work in arguing that the legitimacy of stare decisis depends upon widespread publication.4 The
doctrine of stare decisis itself emerged only with the consistent and reliable publication of court opinions, 5 and
legal processes that do not result in the issuance of publicly available opinions, such as settlements and arbitrations, generally lack stare decisis norms altogether.6 Although previous scholarship has discussed the proper role of stare decisis in the context of «unpublished» opinions, 7 which make up around eighty percent of all United States courts of appeals opinions8 (and are usually publicly available despite their name), 9 this Comment provides the first examination of the tenability of stare decisis as
applied to truly secret opinions like those of the FISC.
Numerous commentators have bemoaned both the FISA courts» secretive nature and the content of specific
legal interpretations revealed in their leaked opinions.2 But an overlooked yet fundamental problem with the FISA courts» work is that judge - made law can be generated only through stare decisis, 3 a
doctrine that we argue is not justified when
applied to secret opinions of the type the FISA courts produce.
However, the recognition and protection of those right and interests in Australian law occurred only recently, with the High Court's 1992 decision in Mabo (No. 2).128 There the Court found that the
legal doctrine of terra nullius, or «land belonging to no one», that had
applied from the British colonisation of Australia, was false.
The
legal doctrine of caveat emptor («let the buyer beware») continues to
apply to real estate transactions in BC today, and can have the effect of denying the buyer a remedy for defects and deficiencies discovered in the property after purchase.