We've passed the point of
arguing whether charters are a good idea.
Instead of
arguing whether charter schools should be included in No Child Left Behind, a more fruitful question is how to ensure that state accountability schemes allow enough flexibility for boutique programs within the public system while not opening up loopholes that low - quality schools can slip through.
Not exact matches
The central problem with making growth the polestar of accountability systems, as Mike Petrilli and Aaron Churchill
argue in «Stop Focusing on Proficiency Rates When Evaluating Schools,» is that it is only convincing if one is rating schools from the perspective of a
charter authorizer or local superintendent who wants to know
whether a given school is boosting the achievement of its pupils, worsening their achievement, or holding it in some kind of steady state.
As Kelley notes in his legal review,
charter operators often
argue that all that matters is
whether charter school students do well on standardized tests and that parents are generally satisfied with the schools» performance compared to public schools.
«The public policy rhetoric changed from an emphasis on how
charters could best serve as laboratory partners to public schools to
whether charters as a group are «better» or «worse,»» the book
argues.
Loke
argues the government had to look at
whether the decision interferes with
Charter rights and says the failure to do so breaches equality rights by approving a law school that requires all students to abstain from same - sex intimacy.
We will
argue that individuals who go to the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario because of discrimination they've faced under a government policy should be granted damages for the harms they suffer, regardless of
whether damages would have been granted under the
Charter.
One may already stop here to wonder
whether the EFTA Court is not making its life too easy speaking of an interpretation of EEA law «in the light» of fundamental rights in the present case; a more thorough reasoning would have had to grapple with the scope of EEA law in the case: Only if Iceland was acting effectively within the scope of EEA law here the fundamental rights standards of EEA law apply under the EFTA Court's supervision; otherwise one could
argue that the Supreme Court of Iceland's action ought to be judged against the benchmark of domestic fundamental rights and ECHR standards (compare the rich debate on the parallel problem in EU law which focuses on Article 51 of the EU
Charter of Fundamental Rights).