Sentences with phrase «as peirce»

But, as Peirce saw; before Whitehead gave technical expression to it with his concept of «prehension,» the merest feeling implies «spontaneity,» a degree above the zero of freedom.

It is no longer philistine to lay the rude hands of logical analysis upon them — and they need not come out the worse for so doing, as Peirce noted so well in his paper «Neglected Argument» years back!

So, although for practical purposes our lack of intuitive certainties is much as Peirce says, theoretically we can say what we mean by definite relations and definite terms, and this seems an advantage.

From these remarks, it would seem that fallibilism is the regulative principle that no hypothesis should be regarded as absolutely determinate and certain, while the doctrine of continuity, or «synechism,» as Peirce usually called it, is the corresponding constitutive principle that the things constituting reality are never absolutely determinate and discrete.

But then, as Peirce said, the only thing that does not need an explanation is pure chaos; order is most of all in need of explanation, and the explanation of a state of affairs in terms of first principles is not as penetrating as the explanation of the first principles themselves.

In so far as minding is not a direct confrontation with actualities, but is rather a process dealing with floods of possibilities, the semiotic imagery is highly appropriate since signs, as Peirce insists, belong to the order of possibilities.

Now, what is important here is that the pattern of development from the finite to the infinite as Peirce defines it can be accounted for by the notion of agape.

If, as Peirce says, agapasm is the proposition that the law of love is operative, this law could not be a regularity of any specific determinateness (6.302).

Full particularization is creation, as Peirce and Bergson co-discovered.

I agree but add: God had no alternative to willing that there be some free creatures, first because (pace Alston) the idea of not creating at all could occur (if I may say so) only to a confused creature, second because, as Peirce, Bergson, and Whitehead have seen, by a «creature» we can consistently mean only a lesser form of the freedom or creativity which in eminent form is deity.

All real questions, as Peirce said, are questions of degree, on this view» (Letter of July 19, 1935).

Not exact matches

Democrats Kara Stein and Robert Jackson sharply criticized the proposals, while Republicans Michael Piwowar, Hester Peirce and Chairman Jay Clayton generally praised the package as a positive step forward.

(Bloomberg)-- Arthur Levitt, former chairman of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, interviews Hester Peirce, who serves as a Commissioner on...

In the preface to Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method, Hartshorne celebrates «our English inheritance of critical caution and concern for clarity»; he seeks to learn more from Leibniz, «the most lucid metaphysician in the early modern period,» as well as from Bergson, Peirce, James, Dewey, and Whitehead, «five philosophers of process of great genius and immense knowledge of the intellectual and spiritual resources of this century.

It is obvious that Hartshorne later rejected this very peculiar view, probably under the influence of Peirce's philosophy as well as neopositivistic and analytical standards.

But... the infinite regress in question is an example of the «non-vicious» type of regress, since it concerns possibilities, and these not (on one view of potentiality) as a definite multitude, whose number is infinite, but as a continuum, which in the words of Peirce is «beyond all multitude,» as God was formerly described as being; and indeed, as we shall see, the continuum of possibilities is one aspect of God which may be truly so described.

All of these motifs are united in Whitehead, and all but the clear rejection of substance as relevant to ethics and as implying the primacy of unit - events rather than unit - things or persons, were in Peirce.

It is not even true that the omniscient must know details of the future, unless it can be proved, against Bergson, Whitehead, Peirce, James, and many others, that the future has any details to know.3 (Of course it will be detailed, but this does not imply that it has detailed will - be's as parts of itself now...)

This was measured praise since, as Morris knew, most of the great idealists were dead, including Peirce and Whitehead.

A brief exploration of Peirce's use of continuity in his account of individual existence as well as a review of this account in the light of Professor Hartshorne's criticisms.

After joining the faculty in philosophy at Harvard University in 1925, where he began editing the collected papers of C. S. Peirce, Charles Hartshorne also served as an assistant to Alfred North Whitehead.

As a student at Harvard, before I had met Whitehead or read Peirce, I wrote a paper called «The Self its own Maker.»

And those more recent thinkers who are most like Leibniz in comprehensive knowledge (Peirce and Whitehead being almost unique in this respect) reject any such jumble of notions as automatic yet spiritual realities.

Lowe, Victor, «Peirce and Whitehead as Metaphysicians,» Studies in the Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce, Second Series, ed.

In this Bibliography references to Charles Hartshorne simply as Editor of the Peirce papers have been omitted.

A contrasting difference is that Peirce had a powerful mathematician as father who tutored him in that subject, helped him in other ways, but was almost brutally unkind at times and a possible cause of a psychosomatic illness in his son.

The Buddhists held and hold it, at least one sect of Hinduism ditto, Peirce, perhaps the greatest cognitive genius this country ever had, and the Anglo - American (as I call him), A. N. Whitehead held it, as did Haeberlin, a Swiss philosopher and my best psychology teacher at Harvard, Leonard Troland.

A distinguished English mathematician, Sylvester, said of Charles Peirce, that he was a «much greater» mathematician than his father, Benjamin.14 The word «great» has not been used of Whitehead as mathematician, though his pupil Bertrand Russell said of him that as teacher of that sub1ect he was «perfect.»

Right away on receiving the information about natural selection as factor in the becoming of animal species Peirce said to Chauncey Wright that he'd have to give up his determinism; animal habits are not absolute regularities.

As W. P. Montague saw so clearly (with no doubt some help from Peirce and Bergson), becoming as sheer growth, increase without loss, is the concrete reality and the secret of both being and becominAs W. P. Montague saw so clearly (with no doubt some help from Peirce and Bergson), becoming as sheer growth, increase without loss, is the concrete reality and the secret of both being and becominas sheer growth, increase without loss, is the concrete reality and the secret of both being and becoming.

He was aided in this by Charles Peirce's theory of interpretation as the structure of historical existence.

Regarding his intellectual affinities, Hartshorne feels himself to be «closest» to Charles Sanders Peirce, Henri Bergson, and A. N. Whitehead.4 He expresses gratitude to his Harvard professors C. I. Lewis and H. M. Sheffer for introducing him to «logical exactitude,» and especially to Professor William Ernest Hocking, his first teacher in philosophical theology, for fresh insights into a philosophically trustworthy vision of God.5 Furthermore, he acknowledges some indebtedness to Josiah Royce, William James, and Ralph Barton Perry, as well as a close kinship to the Russian existentialist Nicolai Berdyaev.6 Nevertheless, Hartshome's philosophy is strikingly similar and most profoundly indebted to that of A. N. Whitehead.

For Bergson, like many process thinkers (Peirce, James and Dewey come particularly to mind), the entire concept of «necessity» only makes sense when applied internally to abstractions the intellect has already devised.11 Of course, one can tell an evolutionary story about how the human intellect came to be a separable function of consciousness that emphasizes abstraction (indeed, that is what Bergson does in Creative Evolution), but if one were to say that the course of development described in that story had to occur (i.e., necessarily) as it did, then one would be very far from Bergson's view (CE 218, 236, 270).

It is to Peirce's credit to have revealed a fundamental insight in introducing agape as a dynamic principle.

My plan is to approach the topic in terms of a very brief account of Peirce's three categories as they bear on his view of evolution.

More than this, he was sensitive to the fact that the writing of philosophy's history can be at once technically competent and narrow He praised the «philosophical greatness achieved in American philosophy, from Peirce to Santayana, but he complained of the cultural chauvinism in failing to recognize it.5 According to Hartshorne, «One might about as easily reach great heights in philosophy without benefit of the work done in modern America as to reach them in physics without using the work of modern Germans» (Creativity 11).

Charles Peirce said this in his twenties with superb clarity, except that finitude is in this usage an inadequate word; we are but fragments of the finite cosmos, which so far as we know is itself finite.

Surpassing even the considerable efforts of Bradley, McTaggart, Royce, James, Peirce, Bergson, Alexander, Lotze and a host of other important practitioners of the metaphysical art, Whitehead developed a truly novel and original metaphysical stance that is sufficiently complex so as to border either on the profoundly esoteric or the arcane and obscure.

Never Whitehead's student in the technical sense, he graded papers for him, attended his lectures, and began an in - depth study of his writings about the same time as he was working on the Peirce papers.

Let me digress for a moment from the main course of the discussion to observe that this last point must be kept in mind as an answer to a possible objection to Peirce's account.

Peirce did not propose agapism as a premise, but rather as a hypothesis based on both inference and the experience of love.

But if Royce was incapable of rebuilding community on the basis of an abstraction as vague as loyalty, certainly Peirce was even less likely to have been able to construct a viable notion of community.

Peirce says that it must annul itself as nothing, because otherwise it would be idle, «do - nothing potentiality» (6.219).

Peirce seems to believe this, too, since he views agape as spreading among the creatures who participate in creative evolution, and he speaks of the genius as one who acts agapastically as an individual rather than as a community.

It will be helpful to look briefly at ways in which Peirce anticipated the need for agape as a condition in evolution.

Peirce, then, must assume that pure nothing in some sense is, viz., as potentiality.

As an account of spontaneity, Peirce's view leaves creativity just as inexplicable as does Whitehead's category of creativitAs an account of spontaneity, Peirce's view leaves creativity just as inexplicable as does Whitehead's category of creativitas inexplicable as does Whitehead's category of creativitas does Whitehead's category of creativity.

This last point is suggested in a number of Peirce's discussions, particularly in his accounts of the function of the sciences (see, for instance, 1.191) as well as in his references to the goal of rational conduct which is the summum bonum (e.g., 5.4 - 5, 5.433).

Furthermore, I shall extrapolate rather freely from Peirce's statements — and to such an extent that I should acknowledge that the result may not resemble Peirce as he is ordinarily interpreted.

Thus Peirce treats being as necessarily dynamic.