Sentences with phrase «as an actual character»

And while some TV has been essential viewing for believers because a show finds a way to show a Christian as an actual character rather than a stereotype, TWD succeeds spiritually as an overall metaphor, rather than putting just one or two believable Christ followers on screen.

Lots of people see him through the lens of Vince's project instead of as an actual character.

Id even be happy if it was just a small mission where you could play as an actual character of the movies, but you don't.

But only one comes to mind with racism as an actual character: the controversial drama «White Dog,» directed by Samuel Fuller, based on the novel by Romain Gary.

For the first time ever, there's an attempt to realise Link as an actual character with personal feelings and motivations.

But it's absolutely ludicrous that you can't use the gamepad to control Mario in a multiplayer game, where only players with Wii remotes can play as actual characters.

And now it turns out that Crews is set to feature as an actual character in the game!

With newly added personal memorabilia, «Elaine Reichek: A Postcolonial Kinderhood Revisited» introduces the artist as an actual character in the piece, who left Brooklyn and studied at Yale before embarking on her sometimes controversial art - world career.

Not exact matches

In my six years working as a Walt Disney World «cast member» (that's what they called us), I did everything from working attraction lines, to taking pictures of park guests with costumed characters, to being an actual costumed character (more on that one in a minute).

Primitively time has the character of process, which has «creativity» as its essence and reveals itself in the becoming of actual occasions (PR 31f).

By contrast with this vision, embedded as it was in history and actual transformation, the dispensational chart appeared contrived, ahistorical, and almost gnostic in character.

If we recall his definition of an enduring object as «a genetic character inherited through a historic route of actual occasions» (FR 166), we realize the extreme generality of this expression.

Here again, Brave acts as a sort of anti-typical-Disney-movie in that we have a female character with an actual mother!

For Aristotle, there was a tension between the unchangeability of God and God's character as being filly actual, since actuality for Aristotle definitely involved activity.

As it moves through the process of becoming a specific and complete something in the world, the actual occasion exhibits the character of a decision system.

The description of the generic character of an actual entity should include God, as well as the lowliest actual occasion, though there is a specific difference between the nature of God and that of any occasion.

Clearly, then, the ontological principle is meant to establish the kinds of particular causes — or, equivalently, of particular reasons or conditions — that can be given as explanatory of how and why a particular actual entity came to have the determinate characters it has.

These others could be actual living persons, or else personifications derived from them, such as dream images or the characters created by a child's imagination.

This statement, as well as the whole account of the reproduction of actual entities, appears to support those who see in his doctrine merely a transfer of character (cf. D. Emmet; see note 1).

This limitation is by no means evident in terms of the ontological principle as we know it from Process and Reality, but it was very real in terms of the ontological principle Whitehead was then working with: «That every condition to which the process of becoming conforms in any particular instance has its reason in the character of some actual entity whose objectification is one of the components entering into the particular instance in question» (EWM 323f).

For Santayana, «matter» is the appropriate name for such «substance» as the character possessed by the substance of our actual world (see RB 234).

This difficulty would however be mitigated if we could say (as Whitehead himself however nowhere does, as far as I know) that it is not actual entities which are objectively immortal in the constitution of other actual entities, but the characters, or forms of their experience which are reproduced» (op.

Though Whitehead's emphasis on the individual actual entity expressed in his Ontological Principle is Aristotelian in character, as he himself indicates, the twentieth century philosopher goes beyond the Greek in the prominence accorded to the essential interdependence of individuals.

It is the reality of what is potential, in its character of a real component of what is actual» (PR 103; italics added), We need now a clearer grasp of the nature of this potentiality and if we really understand what Whitehead means in this last sentence, when he refers to the character of this potentiality as «a real component of what is actual,» then we will understand the nature of the extensive continuum much more clearly.

It reads: «It is the reality of what is potential, in its character of a real component of what is actual...» I submit that our analysis of real potentiality has revealed that there is no incompatibility at all in recognizing that «future regions» have the sort of potential reality which does «underlie» the future in the way that real potentiality does this, and at the same time recognizing that, as actual, regions do indeed most definitely originate with the becoming of occasions.

But his answer diverges in two ways: (i) In speaking of «lateral tensions» as having some influence on what each natural moment passes on to later moments, Santayana is in conflict with Whitehead's view that in its process of becoming an actual occasion is causally quite detached from its contemporaries, and operates privately upon the past occasions which have entered into it in order to produce that over-all character which it will pass on to later occasions.

Thus, Whitehead holds that it is the actual occasion which decides which eternal objects it will participate in, so that one must not look to the eternal objects to explain why one enters existence as a character present in some actual occasion rather than another.

His way of carrying out this task is to suggest, as a speculative hypothesis, that actual entities of which the world is comprised all have the character of actual occasions, that these all embody creativity, and that creativity oscillates between two modes: transition or efficient causation, and concrescence or final causation.

As the first determination of real potentiality it is given with and by the actual world of each occasion, but in itself it arises out of the general character of the world rather than out of that particular actual world of which it is the first determination.

The character of the actual entity as an objective datum available for other actual entities establishes it as a distinct member of a plurality.

Whitehead does not identify creativity with God because, for Whitehead, God has to have a character as an identifiable actual entity.

I feel like this Doctor shows the underside of the previous Doctor's character / personality that we used to only see in glimpses or unguarded moments as his actual self.

Stokes moves exceedingly close to Neville's description of Being - Itself when he characterizes creativity as «indeterminate [having] no character of its own,» yet possessing a fundamental (reality not reducible to the characteristics of the actual entities («Recent Interpretations of Whitehead's Creativity,» The Modern Schoolman, XXXIX, 2 [May 1962], 32sf.

Value, as the intrinsic reality of an event, as the intrinsic reality of an actual entity, is just the character of that feeling which wraps up the actual entity in what Whitehead calls its satisfaction, or completion.

But at the same time Revelation itself enters a sphere of reality which is also determined by other forces, which indeed derive from God, the author of Revelation, but which on that account can not, in the actual form they take and in their special character, simply be derived from Revelation, which itself can not simply be identified with God as he is in himself.

Because Whitehead is thinking of God as the primordial actual entity, he attributes the same threefold character to God which other actual entities have.

Thus, just as in Whitehead's categoreal system the two first - mentioned elements, absolute concreteness and unique occurrence, are united in the concept of a determinate, fundamental, categoreal existence (the concept of an occasion or actual entity), so the corresponding counter-elements, absolute abstractness and the character of abiding existence [lmmer - Gewesen - Sein], are joined together in another concept of an opposite categoreal type, that of an utterly abstract entity, which always was and always is, which Whitehead calls an eternal object.

Whitehead defined more precisely the character of determinateness in its becoming and of indeterminateness in its perishing as a relationship between coherence and incoherence: «An actual entity... is self - creative; and in its process of creation transforms its diversity of rôles into one coherent rôle.

Finally, it should be pointed out that Whitehead himself is unable to stick with the postulated uniform character of an actual entity as resolutely and univocally as he alleges: God as an actual entity is more than just specifically different from the other actual entities.

This notion of the vector character of prehensions is basic to his attempt to describe the world as a multiplicity of actual things which are genuinely related.

For the perfected actuality passes back into the temporal world, and qualifies this world so that each temporal actuality includes it as an immediate fact of relevant experience» (351) 3 Some interpreters refer also to Whitehead's reference to the «superjective nature» of God in Process and Reality: «The «superjective» nature of God is the character of the pragmatic value of his specific satisfaction qualifying the transcendent creativity in the various temporal instances» (88).4 In this case, however, the actual warrant lies again on page 351, as it is under the light of that particular passage that the «superjective character» on page 88 is interpreted as a reference to the objectification of the consequent nature.

It is understood in connection with Aristotle, Locke, Hume and even Descartes.17 In the Category of Explanation xviii, it is formulated as follows: «that every condition to which the process of becoming conforms in any particular instance has its reason either in the character of some actual entity in the actual world of that concrescence, or in the character of the subject which is in process of concrescence.»

Not only actual entities as such can be reasons, but also elements in them can be reasons, as they influence, for example, a specific character in a later occasion.

Indeed, and although he admits that given their poetic character those remarks do not lend themselves to an easy interpretation, one thing is nevertheless clear to him: the «fourth phase» should not be understood as an implicit statement made by Whitehead to the effect that the consequent nature is prehended by the actual occasions.

Now, Whitehead considers the extensive continuum as «real» «because it expresses a fact derived from the actual world and concerning the contemporary actual world... It is the reality of what is potential, in its character of a real component of what is actual» (PR 66/103).

That is, while the character of the past may limit or enhance the range of options available to the concrescing entity; and while God may limit or (as the organ of novelty) expand that range of options, the actual choices come not from the past entities nor from God but from that concrescence itself.

First, there is the view of «prehensions,» of causation as not so much a transmission from the past as a picking up of a character, and in the later works, a «feeling» of an immediate predecessor by an actual entity in the present, when the predecessor has perished.

The above description of the process by which an actual entity becomes explains both the processive character of reality and the essential integration of reality as a whole.

As opposed to all theories which are not able to overcome conceptually the egoism of finitude, Whitehead's cosmology — without calling the concreteness, perspectivity, and transitory character of actual occasions into question — can disclose a broader horizon.

As a category in Whitehead's philosophy, creativity (along with «one» and «many») may be designated the «ultimate of ultimates» (Process 21), but as such it is only an abstraction, the formal character of any actual occasioAs a category in Whitehead's philosophy, creativity (along with «one» and «many») may be designated the «ultimate of ultimates» (Process 21), but as such it is only an abstraction, the formal character of any actual occasioas such it is only an abstraction, the formal character of any actual occasion.