As an actual entity, God is an instance of creativity — the universal substance and material cause.
Granted that the primordial nature constitutes God's «free» (though unconscious), nontemporal decision, yet
as an actual entity he is completed by the conscious, temporal, self - creative propositional feelings he bears toward particular occasions.
Once God is regarded
as an actual entity, the use of personalistic language follows naturally, for our basic clue to the nature of an actual entity is given in our own immediate human experience.
In explanation of this shift from treating God as a «principle» to treating
him as an actual entity, I noted that Whitehead must have recognized that only something actual could perform the role of the principle of limitation.
V, sec. 2, from thinking of god
as an actual entity to thinking of him as a living person reduces the force of this speculation.)
It may be argued that if human occasions of experience prehend God, and they do, they must prehend him as a contemporary, since God
as actual entity is contemporary with all other occasions.
God,
as an actual entity, or a society of actual entities, would be limited by the power in all occasions.
There is another way in which God contributes to the world, and that is by offering
himself as an actual entity to be prehended.
If process is a whole with parts, the meaning of «process» as temporal extension can not be a growing together of parts into a whole, or the «concrescence of many potentials» (Process 22), because the «togetherness of things» in the occasion of experience (Adventures 234) is already established
as the actual entity begins since «relationship is not a universal.
But since he never conceived of God
as an actual entity, he confronted the challenge of conceiving creativity as wholly, unambiguously good.
Eventually (there is disagreement over when), Whitehead developed the idea of God
as an actual entity who, though probably not free of tragedy and ambiguity, actively promotes goodness.
The result tends to undermine the unity of God
as an actual entity and, especially, the unity of God's functioning.
Throughout Process and Reality he refers to God
as an actual entity.
As an actual entity, God will undergo concresence, a development of Himself, His distinctive unity of experience, Out of His prehensions of the other actual entities.
Thw., the actual entities rif the past are fully actual, just
as the actual entities of the present are.
The most striking difference is that Whitehead's perception of God
as an actual entity made it possible to conceive him as the source of the initial aim.
The latter
as an actual entity is the effective agency for the initial aim.
A key to this problem lies in the distinction between the primordial nature of God and God
as an actual entity.
(Religion in the Making, Cleveland: Meridian Books, 1960, 115) A clearer statement of the significance of the ordering to God
as an actual entity is: «The conceptual feelings, which compose his primordial nature, exemplify in their subjective forms their mutual sensitivity and their subjective unity of subjective aim.
Griffin & Sherburne, New York: The Free Press, 1978, 22) This principle applied to God
as a actual entity means that God's consequent nature is prehended by actual occasions.
First, the ordering or valuing of the eternal objects has to do with God
himself as an actual entity.
Hartshorne often affirms his conviction that Whitehead erred in referring to God
as an actual entity, because he believes that God is a society of actual entities or a «society of societies»; 54 but this latest suggestion might tend to impair the usefulness of the mind - body analogy.
We are speaking here simply of one God, who is represented
as an actual entity and who manifests at least two ways in which his divinity is related to the world.
1 Cobb's view of God as a living person places him at some variance with Whitehead, since Whitehead prefers to treat God
as an actual entity and nowhere refers to him as a living person.
As an actual entity, he can be described in the same terms as every other actual entity.
It is, generically speaking, a nexus, all of whose members exist in their own right
as actual entities.
Finally, it should be pointed out that Whitehead himself is unable to stick with the postulated uniform character of an actual entity as resolutely and univocally as he alleges: God
as an actual entity is more than just specifically different from the other actual entities.
It is clear that Whitehead himself thought of God
as an actual entity rather than as a living person.
God
as an actual entity does have such efficacy for other entities, but creativity is not an actual entity and hence, can not function as an efficient (or final) cause of anything.
When we recognize the indissoluble unity of the mental and physical poles in God as in other actual entities, we have no difficulty in seeing that even when the mental pole of God is primarily involved, God
as actual entity is involved.
He has in mind the consequent nature of God, but I have argued that God
as actual entity is involved.
In the latter book it is explicitly recognized that the primordial nature of God is an abstraction from God
as actual entity, (PR 50.)
-LSB-...] This principle applied to God
as an actual entity means that God's consequent nature is prehended by actual occasions.
God's existence
as an actual entity; in other words, does not derive from God's physical prehension of the other entities but derives from the divine entity itself, where God is not only the source of creativity - esse but is also the source of all possible characterizations (eternal objects).
It would be high abstraction to inquire whether a certain thing is or is not properly regarded
as an actual entity, apart from consideration of the interaction of that entity with others.
Since percipients encounter relatively persistent sources of agency, patterns of interactions of these agents with each other can give rise to compound individuals of indefinitely - high degrees of complexity.21 Whitehead often wrote, particularly in his less - formal work, as if entities of various sizes could properly be classed
as actual entities.
In contrast to these two views, my interpretation understands creativity as a factor that accounts for a variety of important things, such
as an actual entity's particularity, its being - here, its capacity to chose freely a self - identity, etc..
For conceiving God
as an actual entity would imply, according to him, that God has not yet reached satisfaction, and therefore could not be efficacious towards world occasions (A Christian Natural Theology Philadelphia, PA: Westminster, 1965], 188; henceforth cited as CNT).
Further, there is direct continuity between what is said of God in Science and the Modern World and what is said of the primordial nature of God in Process and Reality.5 In the latter book it is explicitly recognized that the primordial nature of God is an abstraction from God
as actual entity, 6 yet most of the references to God in that book are references to this abstraction.
First of all, no account is taken of the fact that God
as an actual entity has a reversed polar structure and thereby does not have any phases of indeterminateness, while it is exactly because of that reversal of poles that God's aim «shifts» and hence is infinite.
(Religion in the Making, Cleveland: Meridian Books, 1960, 88) So Whitehead now conceives of God
as an actual entity who performs the function of limitation.
We earlier cited the objection against Whitehead's conception of God on the grounds that God
as an actual entity could never know satisfaction.
Not exact matches
But this is to interpret «the occasion
as a whole» to mean the complete set of phases in the occasion, not the occasion
as a singular
actual entity whose phases are abstractly, that is, analytically, contained in it.
As Whitehead comments in Process and Reality, «the actual world, insofar as it is a community of entities which are settled, actual, and already become, conditions and limits the potentiality for creativeness beyond itself (PR 65/101; italics mine
As Whitehead comments in Process and Reality, «the
actual world, insofar
as it is a community of entities which are settled, actual, and already become, conditions and limits the potentiality for creativeness beyond itself (PR 65/101; italics mine
as it is a community of
entities which are settled,
actual, and already become, conditions and limits the potentiality for creativeness beyond itself (PR 65/101; italics mine).
After that point an
actual entity has only objective existence, whereby it serves
as an «object» in the constitution of a superseding actuality and becomes a datum for the creative advance (PR 72).
When Whitehead experimented with the notion of God
as a timeless
actual entity, this was, strictly speaking, an arbitrary disconnection of principles.
I take it that the «self - creative unity of the universe» refers to the
actual entity insofar
as it is a particular instance of creativity.
But are there not limits to this prescription for understanding and are these limits not exceeded when, in the account of the
actual entity as a composite, disparate or incompatible conditions are dissolved within each other, blended, or otherwise combined, without benefit of a principle according to which incongruities interpenetrate?
There is a deep cleavage between those who agree with Whitehead in describing God
as a single
actual entity, nontemporal in his primordial nature and everlasting in his consequent nature (the «entitative» view), and those who prefer with Charles Hartshorne to regard God
as a personally ordered temporal society of successive occasions (the «societal» view).
only
actual entities can function
as efficient causes.