Sentences with phrase «as knower»

Therefore, logical interdependence entails ontological interdependence — God as knower and the world as known depend, in some respects, on each other.87

God knows all things, but in such fashion (it was held) that there is zero relativity or dependence in God as knower, and maximal dependence in the creatures as known.

Fueled by this suspicion, it questions the legitimacy of the powerful as knowers and their right to decide who is and is not «one of them.»

Not exact matches

As I have argued in my book Moral, Believing Animals, all human beings are believers, not knowers who know with certitude.

Nevertheless, his work of that period left many readers with the impression that nature and its structures are ontologically autonomous and also that the knower may be understood as a part of nature.

In thomistic terms, form - as - intellectual - species is a «likeness» of the knowable thing, ordered towards the same, and adequate to the knower's task of knowing.

One could accordingly treat the knower as a being when the knower was viewed as a body.

If one still wanted to know about the knower and the knower's experience, this could be treated in a secondary way as a particular form of the body or a relation of the body to external objects.

Just as Hartshorne claimed that God is not only the knower of all, but known by all, he now claims that God not only causes all (in a supreme but non-determinative sense), but is the supreme effect of all.

Just as we would say that the person in the Chinese Box has no real knowledge of Chinese, Hartshorne would say that God does not have real knowledge of the world unless God is a sympathetic knower.

-- power - knowers read these as humiliations rather than as features of the daily human landscape that should require only sobriety, not courage, to acknowledge.

«7 It challenges the definition of power as domination and insists on the partialness of what can be known by any of its knowers and / or by all of us together.

Little significance has been attached to questions like, «Who qualifies as a «knower,» and who doesn't, and why?»

There are differences, secondly, as to the nature of the subject, which is variously regarded as pure consciousness, will to life, will to power, the scientific observer, or the intuitive knower.

Primary qualities are viewed as objective, i.e., independent of the knower's frame of reference, while secondary qualities are judged to be subjective, i.e., involving the complicity of the subject imposing his own peculiar sensory apparatus on the bodies perceived.

Only I - Thou sees this wholeness as the whole person in unreasoned relation with what is over against him rather than as a sum of parts, some of which are labeled objective and hence oriented around the thing known and some subjective and hence oriented around the knower.

I Let us follow John Wilcox in defining temporalistic or process theism as any theism which portrays God as an experiencing subject, the knower of temporal processes, whose knowledge is itself subject to growth, expanding along with the growth in temporal reality which is the object of that knowledge (2:295 a).

I would accept this stress on the importance of the categories of understanding imposed by the knower, but I would want to attribute them less to the given structures of the mind (as in Bohr's neo-Kantian view) than to the limitations of our experience and imagination.

In this way the self - knowledge of man, the knower, is accepted as an essential part of the process of inquiry.

What they miss is that at the heart of this semantic and of the very success of language as a communal project is a relationship of the knower with that which is distinct from him, the objective realm.

I believe that similar insights are conveyed by Whitehead when he argues against understanding the relationship between subject and object as only that between knower and known in a Cartesian conceptualism (Al 117ff.).

Can we not define the perfect knower as the one who can know any positive state?

As long as it is not fully evolved, it is half concealed from itself and from the knoweAs long as it is not fully evolved, it is half concealed from itself and from the knoweas it is not fully evolved, it is half concealed from itself and from the knower.

Of course no human knower completely grasps or includes the entities he knows, but God fully incorporates and thus preserves all events as they occur.

Thus, it is the cognitive context that shapes Hartshorne's conception of actuality; hence, in the final analysis what anything (including the concrete) is, is what it is as an item of knowledge in the perfect knower.

----- So I answer her and you, knower of all things, guru of my life experiences, the man with the crystal ball, ---- wait a minute; are you telling me as I describe my relationship with God that I haven't had an actual experience, as I describe to Lynn with God?

For the possible, however articulated or specific, is in principle accessible to the knower; the actual, as an instantiation of possible structure and quality, is knowable, but, as concrete, it exceeds any knowledge of its structures and qualities.

And as the use of what is lower - than - man can only be for what is lower and not for what is higher in the user himself, the knower and user becomes in such use, if made all - inclusive, himself lower than man.

Late - twentieth - century thinkers are rediscovering many things Augustine knew» that knowing begins with the self as a basic datum; that the knower tends to become what he or she knows; and that knowers «must be roused and shaken up from time to time if [they are] to pay real attention once again.»

He saw reason and faith as complementary forces that cooperate to bring the knower closer to the truth.

The issue of the structure of experience is often discussed as a choice between two epistemological theories: «realism» (in which «the known creates the knower» or the noetic pole depends on the ontic) and «idealism» (in which «the knower creates the known» or the ontic pole depends on the noetic).

The universal structure of the universe is not given, as in most other forms of theology; it is in part constructed and deconstructed by the knower's particular interests and actions.

9Monism for James meant «either the mere name One, the universe of discourse; or it means the sum total of all the ascertainable particular conjunctions and concatenations; or, finally, it means some one vehicle of conjunction treated as all - inclusive, like one origin, one purpose, or one knower» (PRAG 74).

The early modern view of knowers as conditioned only by the known has given place to a far more insightful understanding of every act of knowledge as conditioned by the particular historical, cultural, economic, gender, and racial situation.

For the denial of factors which are accessible to any knower represents a sheer negation and thus amounts to a denial of know - ability itself, as well as of meaning.

H. Richard Niebuhr in his classic study The Meaning of Revelation, put this idea in the context of religious revelation:»... no universal knowledge of things as they are in themselves is possible,... all knowledge is conditioned by the standpoint of the knower.

So it is not just that to be is to be known, but also that to be significant (as an utterance) or possible (as the extralinguistic referent of an utterance) is to be so for some conceivable knower.

«The vaunted transcendence, taken as externality of known to knower, is... really a defect of our human knowledge.»

At the same time, I do not think that the notion of the active participation of the knower in the process of knowing needs to lead to such sinister consequences as is sometimes suggested.

The discovery of subjectivity is coupled with an awareness of the world as an object for thought as distinct from the knower.

As Thomas Aquinas repeatedly mentions, «to know» means, as a first approximation, that a being is not just itself as this determinate actuality, but also is another, that is, by holding in itself other «forms,» purely as forms, without at the same time itself having the real being that normally attaches to those forms.7 In this perspective, «knowing» expresses the possession of a multiplicity of forms that extends beyond the formal existence of the knower and includes forms that the knower in reality is noAs Thomas Aquinas repeatedly mentions, «to know» means, as a first approximation, that a being is not just itself as this determinate actuality, but also is another, that is, by holding in itself other «forms,» purely as forms, without at the same time itself having the real being that normally attaches to those forms.7 In this perspective, «knowing» expresses the possession of a multiplicity of forms that extends beyond the formal existence of the knower and includes forms that the knower in reality is noas a first approximation, that a being is not just itself as this determinate actuality, but also is another, that is, by holding in itself other «forms,» purely as forms, without at the same time itself having the real being that normally attaches to those forms.7 In this perspective, «knowing» expresses the possession of a multiplicity of forms that extends beyond the formal existence of the knower and includes forms that the knower in reality is noas this determinate actuality, but also is another, that is, by holding in itself other «forms,» purely as forms, without at the same time itself having the real being that normally attaches to those forms.7 In this perspective, «knowing» expresses the possession of a multiplicity of forms that extends beyond the formal existence of the knower and includes forms that the knower in reality is noas forms, without at the same time itself having the real being that normally attaches to those forms.7 In this perspective, «knowing» expresses the possession of a multiplicity of forms that extends beyond the formal existence of the knower and includes forms that the knower in reality is not.

When classical theists state that God is the being of all things, they could just as easily say that God is the thinker of all things, the eternal knower whose thinking is what we perceive as reality.

These questions present no special difficulty if one's philosophical stance is external to the human knowers one is considering as subjects; if, in other words, one speaks of knowers only in the third person.

«10 But the question of consciousness can of course not be dismissed when the philosophical stance is that of oneself as a human knower; and if cognitive consciousness is always the result of processing an input, as it appears to be with Kant's doctrine of synthesis, consciousness of the input can not be a cognition of reality.

Throughout the course of this paper I shall argue that the proper interpretation of «relative» as it is used in this text bears not on the subjective notion of an object's relation to a knower but on the objective factor of the object's own relations.

I thank Michael Knower for his insightful «on - the - ground» report as a palliative care physician in Oregon, which affords him firsthand experience with the adverse effects of the law permitting assisted suicide.

And what is hilarious, is that in the case of all those gods, be they current religions, cults or dead pantheons, they all had, in their time, believers who fervently believed that THAY were the only knowers of the truth, just as you are now.

By rendering feeling as the interactive function of dative and concrescent actual entities, he can maintain that the subject - object distinction does not merely supervene at any special cognitive level and hence need not be identified either with the difference or the identity of knower and known.

Whitehead sees the cogito as the paragon of clear and distinct ideas, involving a fusion if not identity of knower and known.

We would propose it as a sort of medium between OTWTL's adoption of the post-modern subject and what it calls «scholastic rationalism», as well as between Lonergan's recognition of the importance of reflecting upon the a priori knowing subject and Gilson's counter-affirmation of the necessity of maintaining the knower's immediate grasp of being.