Sentences with phrase «as substantive equality»

Not exact matches

The second requires substantive equality, combining fair equality of opportunity with limitations on inequality so as to maximize the position of the least well off group.

As yet another pilgrim season moves into its peak, The Hindu presents a substantive volume that captures the temple's message of timeless spirituality, equality and brotherhood.

Like you, I believe that there are strategies the LSUC could pursue which would achieve their substantive goals, strategies which accurately reflect existing (and unambiguous) legal and ethical obligations and which are consistent with constitutional requirements and principles (as I've noted above, if the current requirement around a Statement of Principle merely required acknowledgement of our actual existing obligations under the Rules, rather than a general duty to promote equality, diversity and inclusion which is found nowhere in the Rules, I suspect much opposition would melt away and the LSUC would be on far stronger Charter grounds).

Promoting (substantive) equality entails «the promotion of a society in which all are secure in the knowledge that they are recognized at law as human beings equally deserving of concern, respect and consideration.»

The starting point of an approach to the law that advances substantive equality is to recognize the existence of older adults as a group who may in some respects have different needs and experiences from many younger persons, whether due to the accumulated effects of their life courses, social structures, or marginalization and stereotyping of older persons, and to take those particular needs and circumstances into account when designing laws, policies and programs.

«When a private institution, such as Trinity Western University, seeks recognition as a provider of legal education to the public, it must respect the Charter's substantive equality protections.

It further occurred to me that family breakdown would be far easier to manage if: people were less devoted to the idea that romantic relationships are permanent and either monogamous diamorous, and approached separation with more equanimity; monogamous or diamorous relationships were entered into with the same degree of contemplation and intentionality as polyamorous relationships; imbalances of power, knowledge and resources were less tolerated; and, women's formal equality were accompanied by substantive political, social and economic equality.

Perhaps if you (and the criticism would apply equally to Omar, since he and I have had this debate here before, as well as numerous other benchers and law society bureaucrats) actually addressed the substantive concerns — perhaps actually cited a source for the purported obligation to promote equality, diversity and inclusion generally — rather than dismissing the critics of this proposal for being inadequately woke, you might win over critics like me (and many of the people I've spoken with).

The principle of substantive equality and its corresponding protection of difference, is a requirement of the basic equality standard, not just an additional «special measure» tacked onto formal equality - as Dr Sarah Pritchard has stated:

A substantive equality approach would seek to provide Indigenous interests in land with the protection necessary to ensure they can be enjoyed, according to their tenor and to the same extent as non-Indigenous interests in land.

If likening native title to a proprietal interest within a tenurial system provides a vehicle for the enjoyment of the unique Indigenous laws and customs within the protection of the common law then such a translation is justifiable as providing substantive equality to Indigenous people.

As discussed above the international law concept of equality is a substantive one.

Under a human rights approach this differential treatment can not be justified as meeting either a formal or a substantive equality standard.

The PJC's analysis of the four sets of provisions by reference to a substantive equality approach reveals that the majority of the PJC have sought to justify differential treatment which prefers non-Indigenous interests over Indigenous interests, so long as the purposes are «legitimate».

Substantive equality is required by international human rights standards [25] and agreed as an appropriate measure by the Commonwealth Parliament [26] and current Australian Government.

Thus, it is accepted that for justice to be served there must be an element of substantive equality, and that to rely on formal equality is to deny justice.18 As Professor Peter Bailey has pointed out, «adopting the principle of substantive equality leads to difficult value judgements and distinctions, but in the interests of justice and human rights, there is no escape from this course.»

In international jurisprudence, particular regimes for the preservation of the characteristics and traditions of minorities are accepted as consistent with, and sometimes required to achieve factual or substantive equality.

Even though the High Court had rejected, in the Native Title Act Case, the argument that because native title has different characteristics from other forms of title and derives from a different source, native title holders can be deprived of their property rights, this argument was recouched as part of an international law notion of substantive equality.

The protection of the unique, subtle and highly particular nature of native title is a reasonable and proportionate means to achieve substantive equality [42], required as a matter of international obligation to safeguard the characteristics of indigenous minorities.

[43] This reflects the accepted human rights principle of substantive equality, where equality is not blind to differences [44] as explained in Text Box 1.2.

The Commission submits that protection of the unique, subtle and highly particular nature of native title is a reasonable and proportionate means to achieve substantive equality [75], required as a matter of international obligation to safeguard the characteristics of indigenous minorities.

Substantive equality on this view is not seen as a fundamental requirement at international law, but as an optional extra.

If by likening native title to a proprietary interest the common law provides the same level of protection and security to the unique relationship that Indigenous people have with their land and sea country as that which is provided to all non-Indigenous proprietary interests, then such a translation is consistent with the principle of substantive equality.

Such an understanding of equality, often referred to as «substantive equality», takes into account «individual, concrete circumstances».

[16] This is the principle of «relative» or «substantive» equality, [17] which is acknowledged by the Australian government as the international standard required under ICERD.

Issue: Does Australia regard the Convention as requiring formal or substantive equality.

This approach is often referred to as a «substantive equality» approach.

As I noted in relation to the government's partial acceptance of a substantive equality approach to Articles 2 and 5 of ICERD, the standard against which the Committee makes its objective assessment is different to that which exists in domestic politics.

Rather, the right to negotiate is a reflection of traditional law and as such is an inherent property and cultural right protected by the international guarantee of substantive equality.