Not exact matches
They wrote that the McDonnell ruling did hold that exerting pressure on another public official to perform an official act qualifies
as an official act under
bribery statutes.
That ruling, reached six months after the Skeloses were convicted, significantly narrowed the definition of an «official act»
as it applies to federal
bribery statutes and found that, while the McDonnell case was «distasteful,» it did not rise to the level of public corruption.
Indeed, the jurisdictional reach of
statutes such
as the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 1977 and the UK
Bribery Act 2010 means that conduct in Asia is often at the heart of enforcement actions by UK and US authorities, making the rules of privilege in the UK and US particularly important to multinational corporates.
Optimally, federal
statutes creating an agency or setting forth some comprehensive system of regulation should still contain criminal penalties - but only for more serious crimes, such
as willful fraud,
bribery, or reckless endangerment.
With regard to facilitation payments which the
Bribery Act 2010 unequivocally classes
as bribes (in contrast to the equivalent
statute in the US), Alderman drew up a «six - stage solution» the effect of which was to suggest that they might be tolerated.
(1) extending negligent misrepresentation beyond «business transactions» to product liability, unprecedented in Texas; (2) ignoring multiple US Supreme Court decisions that express and implied preemption operate independently (
as discussed here) to dismiss implied preemption with nothing more than a cite to the Medtronic v. Lohr express preemption decision; (3) inventing some sort of state - law tort to second - guess the defendant following one FDA marketing approach (§ 510k clearance) over another (pre-market approval), unprecedented anywhere; (4) holding that the learned intermediary rule does not apply whenever a defendant «compensates» or «incentivizes» physicians to use its products, absent any Texas state or appellate authority; (5) imposing strict liability on an entity not in the product's chain of sale, contrary to Texas
statute (§ 82.001 (2)-RRB-; (6) creating a claim for «tortious interference» with the physician - patient relationship, again utterly unprecedented; (7) creating «vicarious» breach of fiduciary duty for engaging doctors to serve
as expert witnesses in mass tort litigation also involving their patients, ditto; and (8) construing a consulting agreement with a physician
as «commercial
bribery» to avoid the Texas cap on punitive damages, jaw - droppingly unprecedented.
As taken out of context from a criminal commercial bribery statute, we were able to come up with the following general explanation as to what typically constitutes bribery: «Whoever corruptly offers, gives, or agrees to give directly or indirectly, any benefit, consideration, compensation, or reward to any agent or fiduciary of a person with the intent to influence the person's performance of duties as an agent is guilty of commercial bribery.&raqu
As taken out of context from a criminal commercial
bribery statute, we were able to come up with the following general explanation
as to what typically constitutes bribery: «Whoever corruptly offers, gives, or agrees to give directly or indirectly, any benefit, consideration, compensation, or reward to any agent or fiduciary of a person with the intent to influence the person's performance of duties as an agent is guilty of commercial bribery.&raqu
as to what typically constitutes
bribery: «Whoever corruptly offers, gives, or agrees to give directly or indirectly, any benefit, consideration, compensation, or reward to any agent or fiduciary of a person with the intent to influence the person's performance of duties
as an agent is guilty of commercial bribery.&raqu
as an agent is guilty of commercial
bribery.»