Sentences with phrase «as the trial judge concluded»

Jarvis was acquitted at trial, as the trial judge concluded that the students had a reasonable expectation of privacy, but he was not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the videos were done for a sexual purpose.

Not exact matches

The trial judge also concluded that (para 285) «the threat of sale by independent retailers to the major supermarket chains constrained Metcash's wholesale pricing decisions» and that the competitive constraint imposed by Franklins was much less than that imposed by the major supermarket chains - these findings of the trial judge were set out by Yates J at para 297 as follows:

On this basis the trial judge concluded that (para 298) «if Franklins was in the relevant market with Metcash (as the Commission clearly contended), it must be the case that the major supermarket chains, which his Honour found to be a closer competitive constraint than Franklins, must be included in that market.»

A review of those cases has concluded that «Most trial judges have heeded the Supreme Court's admonition to act as gatekeepers, and their review of admissibility is generally more detailed and in depth than in pre-Daubert cases» (Bert Black.

Accused went to cottage of JC with whom she previously cohabited — Accused found JC with victim, another lady, in sauna — Angry words were exchanged between accused and JC — Victim testified that accused pushed her following verbal exchange, as a result victim lost balance and ended up against stove, thereby sustaining serious burns to body — Trial judge accepted victim's evidence that there was some kind of pushing — Accused convicted on one count of assault causing bodily harm, and sentenced to two - year term of probation and $ 1,000.00 fine, and accused was also ordered to provide DNA sample pursuant to s. 487.04 of Criminal Code — Accused appealed — Appeal against conviction dismissed — Although trial judge did not address analytical steps in order, he properly analyzed evidence and concluded that injuries sustained by victim were not accidental and could not have occurred in any other fashion than as stated by victim — Having provided reasons for accepting victim's evidence, trial judge was entitled to reject accused's evidence — Trial judge's reasoning, though skeletal, permitted accused and appellate court to determine how and why finding resuTrial judge accepted victim's evidence that there was some kind of pushing — Accused convicted on one count of assault causing bodily harm, and sentenced to two - year term of probation and $ 1,000.00 fine, and accused was also ordered to provide DNA sample pursuant to s. 487.04 of Criminal Code — Accused appealed — Appeal against conviction dismissed — Although trial judge did not address analytical steps in order, he properly analyzed evidence and concluded that injuries sustained by victim were not accidental and could not have occurred in any other fashion than as stated by victim — Having provided reasons for accepting victim's evidence, trial judge was entitled to reject accused's evidence — Trial judge's reasoning, though skeletal, permitted accused and appellate court to determine how and why finding resutrial judge did not address analytical steps in order, he properly analyzed evidence and concluded that injuries sustained by victim were not accidental and could not have occurred in any other fashion than as stated by victim — Having provided reasons for accepting victim's evidence, trial judge was entitled to reject accused's evidence — Trial judge's reasoning, though skeletal, permitted accused and appellate court to determine how and why finding resutrial judge was entitled to reject accused's evidence — Trial judge's reasoning, though skeletal, permitted accused and appellate court to determine how and why finding resuTrial judge's reasoning, though skeletal, permitted accused and appellate court to determine how and why finding resulted.

Accused went to cottage of JC with whom she previously cohabited — Accused found JC with victim, another lady, in sauna — Angry words were exchanged between accused and JC — Victim testified that accused pushed her following verbal exchange, as a result victim lost balance and ended up against stove, thereby sustaining serious burns to body — Trial judge accepted victim's evidence that there was some kind of pushing — Accused convicted on one count of assault causing bodily harm, and sentenced to two - year term of probation and $ 1,000.00 fine, accused was also ordered to provide DNA sample pursuant to s. 487.04 of Criminal Code — Accused appealed — Appeal against sentence was allowed — Trial judge erred in concluding that discharge was not appropriate in circumstances, especially given conclusion that accused did not deliberately attempt to injure victim — Trial judge found that there was no need for either specific deterrence or general deterrence; prime concern was need for denunciation of her conduct — Section 730 of Criminal Code permits discharge in cases of this nature, provided that it was in best interest of accused and not contrary to public interest — Accused was responsible individual with no record whatsoever, she held position as counsellor and social worker for 25 years — Trial judge did not find that conviction would definitely affect her employment, but possibility existed, and such conviction would necessarily result in criminal record — There was no likelihood of re-offending — Conditional discharge would not be contrary to public interest.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the trial judge, who used the Guidelines to determine spousal support but concluded that any economic disadvantage suffered by Mrs. Fisher as a result of the marriage was not sufficient to warrant indefinite support.

Furthermore the Court of Appeal was of the view on the issue of credibility that it was not open to the trial judge to discount the claimant's reports to doctors as exaggeration because of his account of the accident unless the judge concluded the claimant was not so informed, a finding that the judge did not make and an issue he did not address.

The trial judge concluded, based on her analysis of the relevant law, that the other driver was the dominant driver and enjoyed the right of way as she entered the intersection.

Expert evidence supporting his injury claim was ruled inadmissible at trial, and the judge concluded the plaintiff had suffered no physical injuries as a result of the crash.

After a hearing on the motion, the trial judge concluded that the introduction of the information about Flynn's searches impacted the jurors» decision as to whether the product was defective and whether Takata had notice of any defects.

The trial judge, having heard all the evidence, concluded that, whatever the correct diagnosis might be, he was satisfied the claimant had been suffering from the effects of a prolonged grief reaction to an extent that prevented her from resuming as yet her previous levels of functioning.

As a result of this research, the trial judge concluded there were a number of «troubling aspects» that arose from the RCMP officer's testimony and his conclusions.

Instead, the Court allowed the appeal because there was no evidentiary basis upon which the trial judge could have concluded that Mr. Lau had suffered mental distress as a result of the employer's conduct.

A number of trial court judges have concluded (some reluctantly) that Brooks holds that consent is voluntary as a matter of law any time the implied consent procedures are followed.

It was therefore an error for the trial judge to effectively treat the contract as repudiated, and conclude that the limitation period started running, in September 1994.

His appeal against conviction was dismissed by a majority of the Court of Appeal for Ontario... We agree with Justice Pardu that the trial judge's reasons, even when read as a whole and in the context of the trial record, fail to reveal the basis on which the trial judge concluded that the Crown had proven the mental element of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

The law in British Columbia is however clear, unless it could be said that, on the evidence properly adduced, it was not open to him to conclude as he did without making what is said to be a palpable and overriding error, the Court of Appeal can not interfere with the decision of a trial judge.

As a result, the court of appeals concluded the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in allowing the recording to be played at trial.

As the court interpreted the two reports together, it concluded that the trial judge could have reasonably decided that the reports constituted a good faith effort to summarize the causal relationship between the defendant's alleged failure to comply with the standard of care and Hathcock's injuries and subsequent damages.

The Ontario Court of Appeal confirmed this is the case even where a criminal trial judge gave reasons for acquittal that expressed an opinion that no wrongdoing had occurred, as opposed to simply concluding there was a reasonable doubt as to whether an offence was committed.

As noted above, the trial judge had concluded that IFP's working interest was limited to an interest in thermal production from the leased lands.

The trial judge concluded unjust enrichment, used the value received and value survived methods to award damages of about 1/4 of the appellants» net estate ($ 190,000), and set aside the trust agreement as a fraudulent conveyance.

With respect to (2), the ONCA accepted the trial judges» determination of the parties» incomes but engaged in a thorough review of the case history, concluding that spousal support should terminate as of January 2012 (not 2006) and child support for the son should cease as of December 2010 when he began receiving ODSP payments.

[34] I conclude that the reasonable expectations of both the miners and Pinkerton's as well as Pinkerton's undertaking to exert some control over the risk to the miners supported the trial judge's finding of proximity...

In the case before me there is an affidavit from Dr. Reebye setting forth a basis for the examination sought, although ultimately what Dr. Reebye may regard as purely responsive may be different from that which the trial judge eventually concludes to be so.

In the end, the trial judge concluded that the plaintiff had not discharged his onus of proof and, as such, found the teacher had not committed sexual assault.

However, the context in this case it was open to the trial judge to conclude that the statement was not recognizable as comment, and even then, the defence of fair comment would fail,

MacKenzie J.A., for the majority of the B.C.C.A., concluded (at para. 148): «It is my view that if [the trial judge] erred in not attributing to the Crown responsibility for the five months» delay arising from the direct indictment,... such error does not upset the overall result, as I have found that other factors weigh more heavily on the other side of the balance.»

Although the trial judge erred in concluding Midland could recover its loss as the beneficiary of a fiduciary duty Roberts owed to Magellan, the court saw no error in the trial judge's finding that Midland suffered a loss of US$ 8.27 million as a direct result of Roberts» failure to disclose material information at the Magellan February Board meeting.

The amendments created a new condition precedent to voting that did not exist before and this, as the trial judge rightly concluded, constituted a facial breach of s. 3.

3) it was open to the trial judge on the evidence to conclude, as he did, that continued parental access was not in P.A.V.'s best interests, that the appellants had not satisfied their onus of demonstrating that access would benefit P.A.V. once he became a Crown ward, that V.D.'s inability to control her conduct, including her harassing behaviours, demonstrated a present and continuing impediment to permanency planning for P.A.V., and that V.D. routinely ignores directions and rules regarding P.A.V. with which she disagrees; and

The Divisional Court properly concluded that the trial judge erred in principle by failing to make a finding as to the plain and ordinary meaning of the grade.

Were the trial judge's repeated interventions, considered in the context of the entirety of the proceedings, sufficiently egregious to lead the reasonable observer to conclude that the appearance of impartiality had been sufficiently compromised so as to undermine the appearance of the fairness of the trial?

As such, the Court of Appeal concluded that the motion judge's determination that the limitation period had not run is not binding on the trial judge and is an interlocutory and not a final order.

The trial judge concluded that the father could have overnight stays with his son, as suggested in a parenting plan created by a child psychologist involved in the case.