This offer was declined and was fatal to the plaintiff's case
as the trial judge found this to be a failure to mitigate.
[17]... the theory that the accused would have sent the e-mail as a result of the inducement offered by the police officer some five weeks earlier when,
as the trial judge found, the officer appeared to imply that the accused would not be charged if he apologized for the sexual improprieties... Indeed the theory that there is some connection between the inadmissible confession and the e ‑ mail runs counter to S.G.T.'s own evidence and defence at trial that the contents of the e-mail had nothing to do with the allegations of sexual assault.
The court saw no basis for this court to interfere with the trial judge's conclusion.Although the trial judge erred in her characterization of the appellant's blog statement that the respondent was an anti-Semite as a statement of fact rather than opinion, the defence of fair comment could not apply if the statement was made,
as the trial judge found, with malice.
There was no evidence of abuse of process
as the trial judge found no dishonesty in relation to the application for a peace bond.
Not exact matches
The
trial judge also concluded that (para 285) «the threat of sale by independent retailers to the major supermarket chains constrained Metcash's wholesale pricing decisions» and that the competitive constraint imposed by Franklins was much less than that imposed by the major supermarket chains - these
findings of the
trial judge were set out by Yates J at para 297
as follows:
On this basis the
trial judge concluded that (para 298) «if Franklins was in the relevant market with Metcash (
as the Commission clearly contended), it must be the case that the major supermarket chains, which his Honour
found to be a closer competitive constraint than Franklins, must be included in that market.»
Notably, the
trial judge found that Woolworths and Coles «have approximately 80 % of the national grocery market share, and that independent retailers regard the major supermarket chains
as their competitors.»
As if to illustrate the findings of the State Integrity Investigation, the federal corruption trial of former state Senator Pedro Espada, Jr., continued this week, with Judge Frederic Block excoriating Espada's attorney for using questionable courtroom tactics, and with Espada characterized during trial as a «puppet master» for his alleged embezzlement of funds from the Soundview Healthcare Networ
As if to illustrate the
findings of the State Integrity Investigation, the federal corruption
trial of former state Senator Pedro Espada, Jr., continued this week, with
Judge Frederic Block excoriating Espada's attorney for using questionable courtroom tactics, and with Espada characterized during
trial as a «puppet master» for his alleged embezzlement of funds from the Soundview Healthcare Networ
as a «puppet master» for his alleged embezzlement of funds from the Soundview Healthcare Network.
The
trial judge also
found that the case against the accused person was established by Popoola's evidence which was corroborated by the evidence of his brother who handed over the ransom to the accused person and identified them
as recipients.
The SC is not a
trial court but an appellate one and should never constitute itself into a prosecutor,
judge and jury and sit in its own cause
as if it is the Chief's Palace where the accused is hauled before the Chief and his elders, tried,
found guilty and ordered to present seventy - two rams and seventy - two bottles of schnapps to pacify the gods and ancestors in a constitutional democracy.
Although a
judge initially ruled that Singh's words constituted an assertion of fact, which would have made it hard for him to win a
trial case, in April 2010 an appeals court
found that his statement qualified
as «fair comment» and was therefore protected.
Just
as Stockholm district court
judge Tomas Norström
found the four men guilty on Friday and sentenced each to a year in jail, it was revealed that he is a member of two pro-copyright groups, including one whose members include three of the lawyers who represented the plaintiffs in the
trial.
[170]... where the
trial judge finds that representation of an accused by counsel is essential to a fair
trial, the accused,
as previously indicated, has a constitutional right to be provided with counsel at the expense of the state if he or she lacks the means to employ one.
Yet,
as we all know, your average case law update spends maybe two paragraphs describing the impact of the ruling and close to 10 or 12 paragraphs setting out the background facts, the arguments by counsel, the
findings of the
trial judge (with quotes) and the conclusions of any appellate decisions (also with quotes).
The
trial judge, albeit observing the lack of time records but based upon 33 years of experience
as a practitioner, finally awarded $ 180,880 to plaintiff after a reconsideration motion from the defense — this included a 1.25 multiplier to the lodestar
found reasonable by the lower court.
Accused went to cottage of JC with whom she previously cohabited — Accused
found JC with victim, another lady, in sauna — Angry words were exchanged between accused and JC — Victim testified that accused pushed her following verbal exchange,
as a result victim lost balance and ended up against stove, thereby sustaining serious burns to body —
Trial judge accepted victim's evidence that there was some kind of pushing — Accused convicted on one count of assault causing bodily harm, and sentenced to two - year term of probation and $ 1,000.00 fine, and accused was also ordered to provide DNA sample pursuant to s. 487.04 of Criminal Code — Accused appealed — Appeal against conviction dismissed — Although trial judge did not address analytical steps in order, he properly analyzed evidence and concluded that injuries sustained by victim were not accidental and could not have occurred in any other fashion than as stated by victim — Having provided reasons for accepting victim's evidence, trial judge was entitled to reject accused's evidence — Trial judge's reasoning, though skeletal, permitted accused and appellate court to determine how and why finding resu
Trial judge accepted victim's evidence that there was some kind of pushing — Accused convicted on one count of assault causing bodily harm, and sentenced to two - year term of probation and $ 1,000.00 fine, and accused was also ordered to provide DNA sample pursuant to s. 487.04 of Criminal Code — Accused appealed — Appeal against conviction dismissed — Although
trial judge did not address analytical steps in order, he properly analyzed evidence and concluded that injuries sustained by victim were not accidental and could not have occurred in any other fashion than as stated by victim — Having provided reasons for accepting victim's evidence, trial judge was entitled to reject accused's evidence — Trial judge's reasoning, though skeletal, permitted accused and appellate court to determine how and why finding resu
trial judge did not address analytical steps in order, he properly analyzed evidence and concluded that injuries sustained by victim were not accidental and could not have occurred in any other fashion than
as stated by victim — Having provided reasons for accepting victim's evidence,
trial judge was entitled to reject accused's evidence — Trial judge's reasoning, though skeletal, permitted accused and appellate court to determine how and why finding resu
trial judge was entitled to reject accused's evidence —
Trial judge's reasoning, though skeletal, permitted accused and appellate court to determine how and why finding resu
Trial judge's reasoning, though skeletal, permitted accused and appellate court to determine how and why
finding resulted.
The
trial judge went on to consider a previous Supreme Court of Canada decision, which had
found that «[Courts] should be careful not to stigmatize every disproportionate or excessive sentence
as being a constitutional violation, and should leave to the usual sentencing appeal process the task of reviewing the fitness of a sentence.
Accused went to cottage of JC with whom she previously cohabited — Accused
found JC with victim, another lady, in sauna — Angry words were exchanged between accused and JC — Victim testified that accused pushed her following verbal exchange,
as a result victim lost balance and ended up against stove, thereby sustaining serious burns to body —
Trial judge accepted victim's evidence that there was some kind of pushing — Accused convicted on one count of assault causing bodily harm, and sentenced to two - year term of probation and $ 1,000.00 fine, accused was also ordered to provide DNA sample pursuant to s. 487.04 of Criminal Code — Accused appealed — Appeal against sentence was allowed —
Trial judge erred in concluding that discharge was not appropriate in circumstances, especially given conclusion that accused did not deliberately attempt to injure victim —
Trial judge found that there was no need for either specific deterrence or general deterrence; prime concern was need for denunciation of her conduct — Section 730 of Criminal Code permits discharge in cases of this nature, provided that it was in best interest of accused and not contrary to public interest — Accused was responsible individual with no record whatsoever, she held position
as counsellor and social worker for 25 years —
Trial judge did not
find that conviction would definitely affect her employment, but possibility existed, and such conviction would necessarily result in criminal record — There was no likelihood of re-offending — Conditional discharge would not be contrary to public interest.
Accused went to cottage of JC with whom she previously cohabited — Accused
found JC with victim, another lady, in sauna — Angry words were exchanged between accused and JC — Victim testified that accused pushed her following verbal exchange,
as a result victim lost balance and ended up against stove, thereby sustaining serious burns to body —
Trial judge accepted victim's evidence that there was some kind of pushing — Accused convicted on one count of assault causing bodily harm, and sentenced to two - year term of probation and $ 1,000.00 fine, accused was also ordered to provide DNA sample pursuant to s. 487.04 of Criminal Code — Accused appealed against order to provide DNA sample — Appeal allowed — Order was issued to destroy DNA sample that was taken —
Trial judge erred in failing to exercise discretion not to order DNA sample — Accused was first time offender, in circumstances that resulted in serious injuries, but with no intention of causing those injuries — Accused had otherwise been exemplary citizen, and likelihood of re-offending was remote.
In the case of R. v. Downey, the
trial judge found that the accused's suspicion had been aroused to the point that there was a need for inquiry, but she deliberately did not inquire so
as not to learn the truth.
As a result, the
trial judge found a lack of evidence to support the defendants» case.
The
trial judge's
findings on the claim for punitive damages undermine the
finding of conduct that was sufficiently egregious
as to give rise to a claim of aggravated damages.
Only three days after
Judge Kaplan's spectacular ruling in the Chevron / Ecuador case, notes Paul Barrett at Business Week, «a state appellate court in California upheld a trial judge's finding that what had been billed as a watershed liability verdict against Dole Food over pesticide use in Nicaragua was actually the product of a corrupt conspiracy by plaintiffs» lawyers.&r
Judge Kaplan's spectacular ruling in the Chevron / Ecuador case, notes Paul Barrett at Business Week, «a state appellate court in California upheld a
trial judge's finding that what had been billed as a watershed liability verdict against Dole Food over pesticide use in Nicaragua was actually the product of a corrupt conspiracy by plaintiffs» lawyers.&r
judge's
finding that what had been billed
as a watershed liability verdict against Dole Food over pesticide use in Nicaragua was actually the product of a corrupt conspiracy by plaintiffs» lawyers.»
Furthermore the Court of Appeal was of the view on the issue of credibility that it was not open to the
trial judge to discount the claimant's reports to doctors
as exaggeration because of his account of the accident unless the
judge concluded the claimant was not so informed, a
finding that the
judge did not make and an issue he did not address.
[76] The
trial judge found as a fact that the hearing fees are unaffordable and therefore limit access for litigants who do not fall within the exemptions for the indigent and the impoverished.
As indicated, the
trial judge settled upon the former on the basis that no evidence was negatively affected, and, weighing the seriousness of the crime for which T was convicted against the seriousness of the breach, he
found that this was not one of those «clearest of cases» where a stay should be granted.
[18] Moreover, the
trial judge did not
find that the employer's offer to provide the Respondent with an additional two weeks in exchange for a release was untruthful, misleading or unduly insensitive
as set out in Honda v. Keays.
There's no need for anybody to be concerned that Ontario courts will ever be unclogged so long
as each attempt by the Rules Committee to produce a mechanism for summary disposition of actions is frustrated by those
judges who
find issues warranting
trials lurking under every rock.
In Her Majesty the Queen v. Robert David Nicholas Bradshaw, the majority of the Supreme Court
found that the
trial judge had erred in admitting a video re-enactment statement into evidence,
as «[t] he Crown failed to establish the threshold reliability of this statement on a balance of probabilities.»
Although in this case the
trial judge did not
find the mandatory minimum to be grossly disproportionate to the accused, a
finding the Court upheld
as deserving deference, the Court was forced to contemplate reasonably foreseeable situations where it would be grossly disproportionate.
Consequently, the court
found that the
trial judges characterization of the exchange of emails
as «two separate offers»
as incorrect
as they should have been considered one contract signed in counterpart.
Although Markman assigned claim construction to the
trial judge, it did not expressly state whether factual
findings subsumed in that issue are subject to de novo review (
as normally would be the case for legal rulings) or to review for «clear error» (
as normally would apply to judicial fact
findings).
[25]
As noted by Mr. Finn, the
trial judge did not go on to determine the question of causation because he
found that Mr. Evoy met the duty of care.
The
trial judge made no
findings as to which version he accepted.
The
trial judge found that Nelson Aggregate had disclosed the likelihood of the shipping location being closed,
as it was under contract, a year prior to its closing.
Although Mancino was under his own business, the
trial judge found that there was a dependency between Mancino and Nelson Aggregate characterized
as «mutual and permanent in nature».
In his decision, Superior Court
Judge Thomas F. McGuire, Jr.,
found that one juror during Jones» 1986
trial was «racially biased» and that the lead Brockton, Mass. police detective assigned to the investigation testified falsely
as to the circumstances under which a key piece of evidence for the prosecution - a videotaped interview of an eyewitness - was altered before
trial.
The Court of Appeal
found that the
trial judge made an error of law by ignoring the legal doctrine that an agreement that is signed in counterparts forms a binding agreement
as demonstrated in Foley v R., [2000] 4 CTC 2016 (TCC).1
The court
found Potter was entitled to damages for wrongful dismissal
as assessed by the
trial judge, with the exception that the pension benefits he has already received are not to be deducted from those damages.
As you can guess, the property was sold within 6 months after the expiration of the listing agreement to a party whom the trial judge «found as a fact» was introduced to the property by Aristo
As you can guess, the property was sold within 6 months after the expiration of the listing agreement to a party whom the
trial judge «
found as a fact» was introduced to the property by Aristo
as a fact» was introduced to the property by Ariston.
Such
judge may direct that the indictment shall be kept secret until the defendant is in custody or has been released pending
trial and in that event it shall be sealed by the clerk, and no person shall disclose its
finding except
as necessary for the issuance and execution of a warrant or summons.
This was in itself untrue and the
trial judge found it appropriate, because of comments of counsel, to discharge the jury and continued the
trial as a
judge alone proceeding.
Both the
trial Judge and the Court of Appeal
found that no consideration existed for the signing of the employment agreement and,
as a result, the plaintiff was not bound.
The
trial judge's general
findings as to credibility were overturned on appeal and a new
trial ordered, but on the basis that the
judge had not paid enough attention to corroborating evidence of witnesses etc..
... In light of the fundamental constitutional rights at stake, before a
judge finds that a defendant has forfeited his right to counsel and imposes the extreme sanction of denying an indigent defendant the assistance of counsel at
trial or otherwise, she must first conduct a hearing at which the defendant has a full and fair opportunity to offer evidence
as to the totality of the circumstances that may bear on the question of whether the sanction of forfeiture is both warranted and appropriate.
The learned
trial judge found as a fact that the appellant killed the bear in self - defence and not with a view to selling, exchanging or bartering its hide.
Now, in Milne, a
trial judge — seemingly forget that a
finding of fault is not the same
as a
finding of liability: a person who is not sued can not be held liable — has recreated the problem by claiming the Taylor
as distinguishable.
Appellate courts must be cautious, however, in
finding that a
trial judge erred in law in his or her determination of negligence,
as it is often difficult to extricate the legal questions from the factual.
In the New Hampshire case, the Supreme Court
found no error because the blogger's posts were not shared with his fellow jurors and because he assured the
trial judge that he had followed his instructions once the jury was seated,
as Molly McDonough reported in October in the ABA Journal eReport.
In the Alberta Court of Appeal ruling reported
as R v Wagar, 2015 ABCA 327 Justice Brian K. O'Ferrall, speaking for a unanimous court, made short shrift of Justice Camp's judgment, at p. 1: ``... [W] e are satisfied that the
trial judge's comments throughout the proceedings and in his reasons gave rise to doubts about the
trial judge's understanding of the law governing sexual assaults and in particular, the meaning of consent and restrictions on evidence of the complainant's sexual activity... We are also persuaded that sexual stereotypes and stereotypical myths, which have long since been discredited, may have
found their way into the
trial judge's judgment.»