Sentences with phrase «at summary judgment applications»

This will sometimes include expert evidence on complex matters, even at summary judgment applications.

Not exact matches

An Ontario Court of Appeal justice has warned against «summary judgment at all costs» in her dissent of a ruling on the application of the doctrine of emergency in a personal injury case.
In deciding that wrongful dismissal damages were not an appropriate matter for summary judgment, the court's reasoning expressly went beyond the question of the jurisdiction of a Master under the Court of Queen's Bench Act, but rather was based upon «the purpose and nature of summary judgment applications, trials and summary trials» (at paragraph 31).
The company made an application for summary judgment, seeking to dismiss the claim at the outset or, in the alternative, to strike out portions of the claim.
Moreover, McDonald J.A. highlights the fact that, on review of the transcript before the Chambers Judge, the Respondent did not clearly and unequivocally advise the court at the outset of the application that he was seeking dismissal of the claim and not simply seeking dismissal of the application for summary judgment (see the exchange between Appellant's counsel and the Chambers Judge reproduced at para. 39).
In denying summary judgment to GE and granting summary judgment to Boston Edison, the Court found that: (1) while the construction work performed by GE met the definition of an improvement to real property for purposes of the statute of repose, public policy considerations necessitated an exception to the application of the statute in cases involving alleged asbestos - related disease; (2) the installation of asbestos insulation was not an abnormally dangerous activity; (3) Boston Edison did not exercise sufficient control over the work at issue to be held negligent; and (4) a premises owner, such as Boston Edison, has no duty to warn where the subcontractor has knowledge of the hazard which is equal to or greater than that of the premises owner.
The chambers judge's assessment of the facts, the application of the law to those facts, and the ultimate determination of whether summary judgment is appropriate are entitled to deference: Hryniak v Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7 (CanLII), [2014] 1 SCR 87 at paras 81 - 84; Windsor v Canadian Pacific Railway Ltd, 2014 ABCA 108 (CanLII) at para 10, 371 DLR (4th) 339.
A chambers judge's assessment of the facts based on the record before the chambers judge, the application of the law to those facts and the ultimate determination of whether summary judgment is appropriate are all reviewed for palpable and overriding error: Amack v Wishewan, 2015 ABCA 147 (CanLII) at para 27, 602 AR 62.
The Trademark Office in this case stated that in order to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to its intent to use on a motion for summary judgment, an applicant must rely on specific facts that establish the «existence of an ability and willingness to use the mark in the United States to identify [the goods in the application] at the time of the filing of the application
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