This will sometimes include expert evidence on complex matters, even
at summary judgment applications.
Not exact matches
An Ontario Court of Appeal justice has warned against «
summary judgment at all costs» in her dissent of a ruling on the
application of the doctrine of emergency in a personal injury case.
In deciding that wrongful dismissal damages were not an appropriate matter for
summary judgment, the court's reasoning expressly went beyond the question of the jurisdiction of a Master under the Court of Queen's Bench Act, but rather was based upon «the purpose and nature of
summary judgment applications, trials and
summary trials» (
at paragraph 31).
The company made an
application for
summary judgment, seeking to dismiss the claim
at the outset or, in the alternative, to strike out portions of the claim.
Moreover, McDonald J.A. highlights the fact that, on review of the transcript before the Chambers Judge, the Respondent did not clearly and unequivocally advise the court
at the outset of the
application that he was seeking dismissal of the claim and not simply seeking dismissal of the
application for
summary judgment (see the exchange between Appellant's counsel and the Chambers Judge reproduced
at para. 39).
In denying
summary judgment to GE and granting
summary judgment to Boston Edison, the Court found that: (1) while the construction work performed by GE met the definition of an improvement to real property for purposes of the statute of repose, public policy considerations necessitated an exception to the
application of the statute in cases involving alleged asbestos - related disease; (2) the installation of asbestos insulation was not an abnormally dangerous activity; (3) Boston Edison did not exercise sufficient control over the work
at issue to be held negligent; and (4) a premises owner, such as Boston Edison, has no duty to warn where the subcontractor has knowledge of the hazard which is equal to or greater than that of the premises owner.
The chambers judge's assessment of the facts, the
application of the law to those facts, and the ultimate determination of whether
summary judgment is appropriate are entitled to deference: Hryniak v Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7 (CanLII), [2014] 1 SCR 87
at paras 81 - 84; Windsor v Canadian Pacific Railway Ltd, 2014 ABCA 108 (CanLII)
at para 10, 371 DLR (4th) 339.
A chambers judge's assessment of the facts based on the record before the chambers judge, the
application of the law to those facts and the ultimate determination of whether
summary judgment is appropriate are all reviewed for palpable and overriding error: Amack v Wishewan, 2015 ABCA 147 (CanLII)
at para 27, 602 AR 62.
The Trademark Office in this case stated that in order to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to its intent to use on a motion for
summary judgment, an applicant must rely on specific facts that establish the «existence of an ability and willingness to use the mark in the United States to identify [the goods in the
application]
at the time of the filing of the
application.»