Sentences with phrase «barred by the doctrine»

In general, you can file a complaint asserting any cause of action whatsoever against a defendant, even if they are unrelated, in the same case, and if you don't, you risk having the claims that you do not file barred by the doctrine of res judicata, which bars new lawsuits between the same parties not only over all claims that were actually asserted and...

Carole J. Brown, J. held that the equitable claims were barred by the doctrine of laches.

In addition, Mr. Mavrick persuasively argued that any such claim for compensation was barred by the doctrine of ultra vires because nobody in the corporation had the authority to agree to such director compensation outside of the Board of Directors.

In their notices of motion, the appellants stated that the motions were for «[s] ummary judgment dismissing this action as against the defendant physicians [and as against the Crown] on the basis there is no genuine issue requiring a trial as the action against them [and the Crown] is statute - barred» or, in the alternative, is «barred by the doctrine of laches».

Not exact matches

In the town's response, an attorney for Oyster Bay argues that in addition to attorney - client privilege, the government is not entitled to the complete documents because the documents are also protected from disclosure by the attorney work product doctrine, which can bar disclosure of material attorneys develop in preparation of a case.

In June 2009, the court granted defendants» motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction finding that plaintiffs» federal claim for nuisance is barred by the political question doctrine and for lack of standing.

He or she may try to argue you somehow were at least partially at fault by raising the doctrine of contributory negligence (this means if the insurance company can prove you were in any way at fault, you may be barred from receiving compensation).

Plaintiffs» claims are barred by the legal doctrine of assumption of risk.»

The Commonwealth of Virginia still holds to the doctrine of contributory negligence, meaning that if the plaintiff (the person injured by someone else's actions or failure to act) is found to be in any way responsible for causing their own injury, this will bar any recovery to the plaintiff.

735 ILCS 5/13-213 (c): Alteration, modification or change No product liability action based on any theory or doctrine to recover for injury or damage claimed to have resulted from an alteration, modification, or change of the product unit after the date of first sale, lease, or delivery of possession of the product unit to its initial user, consumer, or other nonseller may be limited or barred by subsection (b) if the action is commenced within the applicable limitation period; and, in any event, within 10 years from the date the alteration, modification, or change was made, unless defendant expressly has warranted or promised the product for a longer period and the action is brought within that period.

The arbitrator granted summary disposition in favor of the defendants, finding that: (1) CHSI was not a proper respondent to the action and that Weirton failed to state claims against CHSI; (2) all of Weirton's claims, except for the breach - of - contract claim against Quorum, were barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel; (3) Weirton's breach - of - contract claim against Quorum was time - barred under the applicable Tennessee statute of limitations; (4) Weirton's tort claims were alternatively barred by the gist - of - the - action doctrine; and (5) Weirton's unjust enrichment claim was barred because of the parties» contracts (the «Second Award»).

Weirton argued that this manifest disregard occurred in connection with (1) the arbitrator's disposal of the case on summary disposition; (2) the arbitrator's determination that all claims but one were barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel; (3) the arbitrator's conclusion that one of Weirton's claims was barred by the statute of limitations; and (4) the arbitrator's determination that, if not barred by res judicata, a number of Weirton's claims were barred by the gist - of - the action doctrine.

(correct test for Barrister appeals; whether outside the ex improviso rule, prosecutor may call evidence after prosecution and defence case closed; use of debarring orders against prosecutor; whether tribunal may «enter the arena» and strongly request the attendance of a prosecution witness; whether BSB has power to summons witnesses; whether prosecutor may communicate with disciplinary judge behind the back of the defence; whether such communication redolent of actual bias of judge where judge wishes prosecutor good luck on appeal; whether apparent bias doctrine can be engaged by post-trial conduct of judge; legal effect of serving BSB prosecutions department officer being 1 of 4 appointing members of the COIC «Tribunals Appointments Body» (TAB); whether TAB ultra vires the Bar's Constitutions; whether open - ended power of removal of member of COIC pool without cause, unlawful given position of BSB Chair and senior staff on COIC; whether ECHR Article 6 guarantees against pressure on disciplinary judges to conform with a prosecutorial mentality; whether disciplinary judges Art. 6 «independent» within Findlay v United Kingdom given key role of BSB prosecutions department in appointing disciplinary judges; serious non-disclosure by BSB of notes of secret meeting between BSB and disciplinary judge until day before appeal and despite requests and application for disclosure by defence)

This is because Alabama law follows the doctrine of pure contributory negligence, which bars any recovery by the person filing the lawsuit if he or she was in any way responsible for causing the accident.

Additionally, the Court in the Mezerhane case ruled that the action was barred by the Act of State Doctrine.

The District Court ruled by summary judgment that SCA's suit was barred by laches (an equitable doctrine that prevents the plaintiff from unreasonably delaying in bringing an action), a decision that was affirmed by the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.

Claims of unlawful abduction, kidnapping and removal to Libya in March 2004 brought against a number of UK officials and departments were not barred by state immunity or by the act of state doctrine, the Court of Appeal has held in Belhaj & Anor v Jack Straw & Ors [2014] EWCA Civ 1394.

We also agree with the Crown's submissions that properly interpreted, s. 5.1 (4) constitutes a complete bar to the claim, and that the motion judge erred by applying the doctrine of equitable fraud to overcome the Crown's limitations defence.

Because she had been a member of the association and licensed to use the marks for 20 years, she was barred by a legal doctrine known as licensee estoppel.

The court also stated that the doctrine of caveat emptor also barred any claims by the Buyers, as the Buyers completed the transaction without obtaining the building permit at their own peril.