Moreover, would we not be justified in distinguishing ontology, that is, the theory of being as such, from the theory of concreteness, since the system of all
the basic types of entity must exhibit some commonality among those types, however formal and empty it may be?
Not exact matches
It is that, while Laszlo centers upon patterns
of structure and relationship which are reiterated throughout the hierarchy
of entities of the world, Whitehead focuses on a primordial
type of entity, the actual occasion, whose
basic processes are found only in its kind and not reiterated in larger arrangements such as nexus and societies.
Ford's theory
of inclusive occasions places occasions within occasions; we, however, believe that there are two
types of occasions, occasions which constitute space - time and occasions which are the
basic constituents
of particles and, indirectly through particles,
of all
of the more complex
entities.