In any event, notice that even a run - of - the - mill
bear market decline wipes out more than half of the preceding bull market advance.
These were points that followed snap - back rallies that were actually good selling opportunities in what turned out to be
violent bear market declines.
To wit, one moving average method that I use is designed simply to keep the portfolio out of the stock market during some portion of an
extended bear market decline.
The Wall Street subprime loan crisis and bankruptcy of Lehman Bros., real estate crashes in Ireland and Spain, the solvency scare of Greece, and three separate
bear market declines in mainland China equities — repeat, three — all clawed at equity prices around the globe.
What's interesting about the graph is where the red line — the European Value Index — typically sits in relation to US stocks
during bear market declines, especially in more recent data.
They are 2007, 1987, 1972 and 1966 — all prior to
significant bear market declines, though the market drifted a few percent higher over a 6 - month period in the 1972 instance.
If you believe that stocks will continue to advance in the months and years ahead, with no
intervening bear market decline, those instances are the main points where «don't fight the trend» might outweigh negative return / risk considerations more generally.
The 2007 - 2009
bear market decline wiped out not only the bull market advance that followed the 2002 low, but the entire total return of the S&P 500, in excess of Treasury bills, all the way back to June 1995.
That combination of features has encouraged my adoption of a constructive or even leveraged investment stance after
every bear market decline in three decades as a professional investor.
At the bottom of
a bear market decline, the amount lost from peak - to - trough appears so devastating that investors are often induced to sell at what is actually an extraordinary buying opportunity.
That's the point that observers who consider me a «permabear» may become deeply confused, but again, I've done the same after
every bear market decline in over 30 years of investing.
Conversely, my adoption of a constructive or leveraged investment stance after
every bear market decline in the past three decades typically reflected the combination of a material retreat in valuations coupled with an early improvement in our measures of market action (though my early measures were rather crude).
Even if next year turns out to deliver a further bull market gain of 20 %, followed only then by a minimal 20 %
bear market decline, the return since late - 2002 would still be limited to 9 % annually.
The second bracket depicts a 39 %
bear market decline, which is the historical average for cyclical bear markets that take place within secular bear market periods.
Historically, that puts the typical bull market gain at about 152 % from trough - to - peak, followed by
a bear market decline about 34 % from peak - to - trough, for a cumulative full - cycle total return of about 67 % (roughly 10.7 % annualized).
The Dow continued
its bear market decline in 1969, as Vietnam protests and economic malaise persisted.
Next, calculate how much you'd lose if stocks tumbled 35 %, which is the average
bear market decline.
This is because the Fed often begins cutting rates only in the later portions of
bear market declines.
That also implies that stock investors will need to accept volatility that has also been consistent with stocks over the long - term including an average of three 5 % pullbacks per year, one 10 % correction per year and one
bear market decline of 15 - 30 % every 3 - 5 years.
At the bottom of
a bear market decline, the amount lost from peak - to - trough appears so devastating that investors are often induced to sell at what is actually an extraordinary buying opportunity.