Sentences with phrase «because appellants»

In addition, the motion judge made a finding that there was no fraudulent concealment because the Appellants were aware of the essential facts giving rise to a claim against the Respondents.

As such, the Court of Appeal concluded the appellants» decision to expend money improving their living conditions was not, for the purpose of the appeal, incurred because the appellants had been given assurances the houses would be theirs.

The tribunal also held that the subsequent changes did not give rise to such unfairness as to permit the tribunal to disapply them because the appellants» interest in being treated fairly was outweighed by the public interest.

Because the appellant would not testify in the later investigation of the police, there appeared to be no other way of taking the fruits of their crime away from the police (paras 45 - 46).

No sir, the 6th Circuit held, because the appellant had agreed to undergo drug testing and

Instead, in what is apparently dictum, given its decision to reverse appellant's conviction on the basis of the first due process claim, the Court maintains that a separate due process challenge by appellant arising from the Ohio Supreme Court's addition of a scienter element is procedurally barred, because appellant failed to object at trial to the absence of a scienter instruction.

It does not arise because the appellant did not meet her existing obligations.

His application was dismissed, mainly because the Appellant had already filed her Factum and her counsel swore she had no recollection of the specifics of the alleged phone call, although she recalled speaking to a gentleman from Montana.

That is, the appellant took issue with the trial judge's finding that under the Employment Agreement the appellant was not entitled to compensation for the loss of the LTIP benefits he would have earned during a period of reasonable notice because the appellant was only entitled to severance pay, not the salary and other benefits which would have flowed to him during a period of reasonable notice.

First, it can be prohibitively expensive for tenants, because the appellant must arrange for a transcription of the oral RTDRS hearing to be prepared and filed.

The judge further held that the Appellant's conduct was oppressive or prejudicial to the Respondent, because the Appellant's efforts were directed at preventing the Respondent from putting forth a takeover bid.

Furthermore, the panel agreed with the application judge's alternate conclusion that the mark - up is not a tax because the appellant agreed to it in its contract.

Learned senior counsel submitted that the learned Single Judge was not justified in rejecting objection to the maintainability of the petitions filed by respondent No. 1 in the Delhi High Court merely because the appellant had earlier filed O.M.P. No. 179 of 2003 before the High Court.

Not exact matches

The appellant in IH (Eritrea)[2009] UKAIT 00012 was caught by s 72 because he had been convicted of an offence in a category deemed to be particularly serious irrespective of the sentence (sexual assault).

The Court stayed a robbery conviction because the police systematically beat up the appellant («good cop - bad cop» strategy, described at paras. 10, 15, 23, & 27).

Mike Cernovich comments that city defendants are the «frequent flyers» of verdicts in civil rights actions, in part because rulings like Kozinski's are rare: Cernovich can't recall a case where an appellant was assessed double costs for filing a civil appeal.

The Respondent argued that the Appellants» plan was not an income continuation plan because the payments were not identical to what Mr. Hammond's income would have been.

However in this case the judge at first instance was entitled to find that the Appellant's failure to act was a «serious derelict of his duty» because of the critical role the survey played in the Respondent's culture.

It is the appellant's position that the accused was denied his rights under section 2 (a) of the Charter because he was required to establish the honesty of his belief and according to the appellant, that is a breach of religious freedom.

The Appellants argued that the bylaws were passed in bad faith because they targeted the HDI specifically, and the Appellants had not received notice of the bylaws.

[1] In the lower court, the appellants advanced an argument that the by - laws are invalid because the City failed to adequately consult the Haudenosaunee prior to their passing.

At trial, she was acquitted of sexual interference and sexual assault because the trial judge found that the sexual activity had been consensual, that the appellant had honestly believed the complainant was legally able to consent, and that the Crown had not proven that the appellant failed to take all reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant's age.

Although the oath has an effect on the appellants» freedom of expression, constitutional disapprobation is not warranted... There is no violation of the appellants» right to freedom of religion and freedom of conscience because the oath is secular and is not an oath to the Queen in her personal capacity but to our form of government of which the Queen is a symbol... [emphasis added]

A consideration of this issue is required because I became aware that the Appellant and Appellant's counsel, together with its co-counsel... [more]

Finally, the court dismissed the appellant's argument that the covenants were linked to Payette's employment contract simply because they make specific reference to the termination of his employment.

They key sentence in that paragraph is as follows: We are of the opinion that the Judge was correct in so ruling because in these circumstances, having regard to the only defence presented, it was for the appellant's benefit that he did so.

In this case, it was appropriate for two nurses to be present with and handcuffed to the appellant, who was in detention in a high security psychiatric hospital, when he consulted with his lawyers because there was reason to think he would otherwise take that opportunity to harm himself or others.

[53] The appellant contends that the trial judge's failure to impute income to the respondent was an error justifying appellate intervention, because the respondent's evidence was that she made no attempts to find employment or training.

Is the Appellant's employment agreement unenforceable because she signed it after she started working and was not provided with fresh consideration?

The district court further concluded that because a $ 2.1 million lump sum payment that appellant received in July 1999 «represented» two years of salary, it qualified as cash compensation for 1999, 2000, and 2001.

Thirdly, appellants contend that this same statutory provision, Art. 27, § 509, violates the «Equal Protection» Clause because it permits only certain merchants within Anne Arundel County (operators of bathing beaches and amusement parks et cetera) to sell merchandise customarily sold at these places while forbidding its sale by other vendors of this merchandise, such as appellants» employer.

In his charge to the jury the trial judge told the jury to look especially carefully at the evidence of the defence witnesses, the appellant and the complainant because they were persons of unsavoury character.

Indeed, the Appellant submits that the fact that the victims in the case at bar were HIV positive constitutes an aggravating factor because Messrs. McGinn and Jewitt were psychologically more vulnerable by reason of their conditions.

We turn next to Appellants» assertion that the PROTECT Act's provision authorizing fast - track programs violates their due process and equal protection rights because similarly situated individuals in districts with fast - track programs could receive lower sentences.

Because the government has a legitimate interest in conserving prosecutorial and judicial resources in districts with large numbers of immigration cases, and fast - track programs are rationally related to that interest, we conclude that the PROTECT Act's authorization of these programs, and their implementation in some but not all districts, does not violate Appellants» equal protection and due process rights.

The Appellant attended the hearing and was represented by solicitors and counsel who acted pro bono because he had been refused funding by a decision of the Special Controls Review Panel of the Legal Aid Agency dated 7 October 2014 and sent on 14 October 2014 (six days before the hearing).

Appellants argue there is no discrimination because the amendment bans all religious laws from Oklahoma courts and Sharia law

2015), dismissed an appeal as untimely because it determined that the notice requirement to set the deadline to appeal began when the appellant received email notice that the order had been filed.

In Pintea v Johns, 2016 ABCA 99 (CanLII), the appellant missed service of notice of a hearing before a case management judge because he had moved and failed to provide his new address to the respondents or the court.

So the appellants» attempt to delay the motion to the hearing of the appeal was unsuccessful, because it didn't properly consider the applicable practice direction (regardless of the Rules of Civil Procedure).

The Appellant argues that the application Judge misapplied the pleadings rule and «wrongly assumed» the Respondents could not be occupiers (and so could avail themselves of the insurance policy) because the other family were also occupiers of the property.

I dissent from that holding because I believe that appellants» basic First Amendment complaint, transcending the particulars of the attack, retains its validity.

They say the appellant's s. 8 claim must fail because the accused is not entitled to rely on the federal Crown's theory in the voir dire, and «[t] here was no admission of [his] identity as the sender of the texts anywhere in the pre-trial motion record».

The appellants argued that both tiers of the tribunal had not only erred in failing to have regard to the triggers set out in the communication from the EU Commission to the Parliament and the Council (Com (2009) 313), but had also approached the burden of proof incorrectly because applying Papajorgji [2012] UKUT 38 the respondent had to produce evidence showing a reasonable suspicion.

The judgment was handed down in an appeal filed before it on the ground that a Decree issued by one of the Emirates which restricted the right of the appellant to file a civil claim before the court of competent jurisdiction was unconstitutional because, it was said, that it denied the appellant's constitutional right to have unfettered access to the civil courts of the country.

[10] The appellant also argued that the limitation clause should not apply in this case because it did not expressly name employees and officers of the corporation and was therefore ambiguous and subject to the application of the principle of contra proferentem.

The Appellants argued s. 185 applied in the circumstances; that a cyclist should be considered the same as a motorist where there is a breach of the TSA or the Use of Highway and Rules of the Road Regulation, Alta Reg 304/2002 («Road Regulation») because both statutes impose the same duties on cyclists and motorists.

In other words, there was no agreement to build the house in a «rustic» manner; (2) however, because the contract gave the Respondent a «free - hand» in designing and building the Appellants» house, it was open to him to build the house in a rustic manner if he so wished; (3) notwithstanding any such wide discretion, «the argument in relation to rusticity can not be used to whitewash every flaw in the Respondent's work»; (4) the Appellants did not act unreasonably in not signing the Respondent's daughter's defects list; (5) some of the DJ's critical comments about the Appellants» conduct (including accusations that they were «squeezing» the Respondent for more) appeared to be «rather excessive and unnecessary», and were «best avoided».

The DJ also found that the Appellants had failed to prove their claim for alleged rectification works because, amongst other reasons, their counterclaim was based on a quotation rather than actual invoices.

The Judge further held that the Appellants had refused to sign the Defects List because «they considered it to be incomplete and did not want to bind themselves to an incomplete list of defects.»