Sentences with phrase «between finite»

In her practice, Lebek has been stiving to create images that sacramentally mediate between the finite and the infinite, the general and the particular, provoking the possibility of theological reflection and inhabiting the extremes of human experience which theology seeks to articulate.

AQA Chapter 10 (Sustainable Development) In this lesson students will learn: - the difference between finite and renewable - what sustainable development is Keywords: Finite Renewable Plastic Natural Resource Sustainable Objectives: Give examples of natural products replaced by synthetics Give examples of products replaced by agricultural products Distinguish between finite and renewable resources

There's a gaping hole between the finite numbers and the positive infinites, for example.

To me, we must solve the justice gap in our state and in our country, which is basically the gap between the finite legal resources and the dire need for legal representation and services by people of modest needs.

8:26) Because the eternal God himself is present in the soul of man as its secret ground, spirit, and spark, the soul creates a bridge between the finite and infinite by prayer and meditation.

It consists of the polar tension between finite and infinite which recurs repeatedly in the conundrums of philosophy and modern science.

Now the gap between the finite and the infinite is an infinite gap.

The balance of analogy between finite and infinite is delicate, yet essential for sanity as well as freedom.

Through an almost mathematical use of the concept of infinity this dissimilarity between finite and infinite was perceived to smother any positive affirmation.

The time periods involved have become magnified to the point where it is no longer possible to distinguish clearly between the finite and the infinite.

There is no question at all from the start of divine causality replacing finite causality or in some way or another inserting itself as an intermediary, between the finite cause and the increase of being effected.

The spiritual challenge of our time is to realize our sacred humanness, that there need not be a conflict between the natural and the supernatural, between the finite and the infinite, between time and eternity, between practicality and mysticism, between social justice and contemplation, between sexuality and spirituality, between our human fulfillment and our spiritual realization, between what is most human and what is most sacred.

But pantheistic naturalism makes God only a power within the world, ignoring «the decisive element in the experience of the holy, namely the distance between finite man, on the one hand, and the holy in its numerous manifestations, on the other».

The dipolar modal contrast between finite life and eternal life is not to be found in one actual entity who is an exception to the meaning of «actuality» by never dying satisfied (nor being born).

Plantinga does believe that God has the power to create or not create finite, self - determining entities, but he strongly denies that the relationship between finite, self - determining entities and God's control over them is, therefore, not a necessary one.

Not exact matches

Shifting reflections, quiet shadows, moving streams and passing clouds appear as timeless markers of a transient world caught between the infinite and finite, the personal and the universal....

But if there has always been a realm of finite actualities, and if the existence of such a realm (though not with any particular order) is as eternal and necessary as is the existence of God, then it also makes sense to think of eternally necessary principles descriptive of their possible relationships... [T] his correlation between freedom and intrinsic value is a necessary one, rather than a result of divine arbitrariness (PTE 711).

Anselm was clearly seeking to uphold the balance of analogy between Infinite and finite because he did not want to refer all human meaning to nothingness.

In short, what is at stake is the infinite or the finite, and there is no commensurability between the infinite and the finite.

Moreover, if ever we halt the regress of past events in order to specify O, then O functions in every way like a «future» or «potentially related» event of E, for: (i) there will always be events in the past of O, and (ii) there will be a finite number of intermediaries between O and E (and this satisfies the two formal criteria for O's being in a «potential, future relation» to E).

This conflict between a hard - core commonsense idea (about ultimate meaning) and a scientifically and philosophically based idea (that our world is temporally finite) is resolved by the speculative hypothesis that God, far from being impassible, is divinely relative, cherishing all events everlastingly, so that reality as a whole will never be as if we had not been.

Now finite groups abound also (the permutations of finite sets, for example) and a structural relationship that one might consider between two finite groups G and His the possibility that H can be embedded in G.

For the moment, I wish only to stress the relationship which exists between the divine reality and the finite creatures in the world, whether or not this relationship is always fully grasped and given the correct interpretation.

We represented this by picturing a solid rubber ball, the surface being the finite world, the whole being the realm of God, with no distinct dividing line between the natural and supernatural.

Furthermore, Ely's statement that «the very notion of «redemption through suffering» implies a divorce between suffering as a means and as an end» and his contention that the individuality of finite things does not count are both denied in Whitehead's system by the notion that the meaning of existence is «now — for God and man.

Moreover, the use of the word «absolute» is itself problematic because that usage introduces the distinction between absolute and finite, a distinction with strong Hellenistic overtones.

The difference between the two is that the living God becomes Incarnate afresh in each moment of the life of Jesus (or of ourselves), whereas the experiences of Jesus «prehended» by God into himself — Jesus» resurrection and ascension — form a finite sequence that terminated on Calvary.

Determinate divine phases (thereby insuring prehensibility) seems to blur the distinction between ideal realization and finite actualization.

Consequently there is a basic difference between this general notion in the tradition and the notion of agape in finite creativity.

The genuine causality of finite being would be endangered, and all the problems would arise regarding the correct understanding of the ontological relation between infinite being and finite beings which we have already indicated as the starting - point of all these reflections.

In that case it is hard to see why such a created entity, communicated to the faculty of the finite being, could not lastingly belong to it, and why, therefore, we may not consider as conceivable the very thing that defenders of physical premotion attack as metaphysically meaningless, namely, that a faculty or power, understood to be an active power, could bring itself from potency to act, of itself, of course on the basis of conservatio and concursus, which latter, however, would not create some intermediary between potency and act but simply posit potency and act.

But my guess is that he is here implicitly depending on a distinction he explicitly introduces elsewhere that invalidates this assumption — namely, the threefold distinction between «infinite,» «finite,» and «absolute» difference (see, e.g., 1957, 80f.).

God's operation in regard to the human soul loses its predicamental, intra-mundane appearance when it is recognized as exemplifying the concept which we have attempted to work out as appropriate to the relation between God and finite beings in their activities and change.

Thomistic and Augustinian traditions at their best have maintained the balance between transcendence and immanence, Infinite and finite, nature and grace, essence and existence, form and matter, universal and particular, human freedom and divine omnipotence.1

This excludes from his being all those distinctions, so familiar in the world of finite things, between potentiality and actuality, substance and accidents, being and activity, existence and attributes.

Maritain, like Thomas, sought to maintain the balance between the concept's finite intelligibility, without which no thought is possible, and the infinite reality transcending abstractions, whose recognition prevents reality from being reduced to necessary laws of rational thought.

Yet, given God's love of creation, there is an analogy between human knowing and God's knowing: despite all differences between infinite and finite, men can approximate God's mind and know something of God and creatures.

At least seven immense, interdependent threats to the quality of life on spaceship earth continue to escalate: the population explosion; the widening gulf between rich and poor nations; massive malnutrition (caused mainly by economic injustice, which produces maldistribution of available food); environmental pollution and degradation; the depletion of the irreplaceable resources of our finite planet; the growing threat of nuclear terrorism and eventual holocaust (with the equivalent of one and a half million Hiroshima - sized bombs in the arsenals of the world); and the worldwide tendency for the fruits of science and technology to be used without ethical responsibility.

Heidegger's radical link between — up to an identification of — Being and Time would have been unthinkable in a mediaeval and even a modern context: to talk about Being and Time would have been something like talking about God and the world, or about the (eternal) Infinite and the (temporal) finite.

present symbols to establish visually a relation between us and the unseen which does not reduce the transcendent to a finite form.

This «passage» is effected, not directly through the finite actual entity's objective prehension of the ongoing integration between the primordial and consequent natures within God, but indirectly through the transmission of feeling from God to that same actual entity about its social location within the cosmic process and its possibilities for self - constitution as a result.

As Hartshorne notes, the difference between the divine and the subdivine lies primarily in God's being whole or all - inclusive rather than fragmentary, not in God's being infinite rather than finite (NTT 7).

God is necessary to every finite being, but no particular finite being is necessary to God, Love in God must involve what is required for love among the creatures and between God and the creatures, yet God remains God, involved in the history of the creatures as the being upon whom they all depend.

The importance of this novel recommendation for ethics lies in its characteristic ability to moderate between extreme positions: although, against the pragmatists, values are held as eternal, they are not, against the Platonists, degraded by their relation with the finite world.

Revelation faith affirms that God is revealed through finite events in the finite world, but that any linkage between God and concrete historical events is never self - evident.

Or perhaps the latter: given the total qualitative difference between the active, directed mental «intentionality» exhibited in conscious cognition (that is to say, the «aboutness» of thought and perception, the «meaningfulness» of reality as apprehended under finite phenomenal, conceptual, and semiotic aspects) and the passive, undirected indeterminacy of any reality that might exist independent of mental acts.

Here reappears the tension between absolute and relative, infinite and finite.

The choice between non-dual and dual transcendence is rigorous: either God is (in diverse respects, to avoid formal contradiction) both absolute and relative, necessary and contingent, immutable and mutable, infinite and finite, or only absolute, necessary, immutable, or infinite.

For instance, defenders of the micrological view would presumably be ready to acknowledge the similarities between Bradley's nontemporally durational finite centers and Whitehead's epochal actual entities.11 The crucial difference would of course be that the latter are freed from the paradoxical entanglements of Bradley's nonrelational whole of feeling.

Nicolai Berdyaev felt profoundly the break between the personal reality of love in human life and the demands of finite historical existence.