Not exact matches
A provision in another Order which had the effect of denying a designated person the right to
judicial review was also
found to be ultra vires but there remains a conflict
between the fundamental rights guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights and the impact of executive Orders under the United Nations Act.
Greene has not cited — and the Court has not
found — a single statute, regulation, rule, or
judicial opinion holding that a litigant has a right of access (under the First Amendment, the common law, or anything else) to communications
between a judge and his or her law clerk, including draft opinions and orders.
Here I'm struck by the contrast
between the accounts of the prevalence of «whacking» and the
judicial response to it (e.g. that it is common and the courts / crowns rarely intervene) and accounts that I hear from practicing crowns (e.g. that it is uncommon and, when it occurs, the court's response vigorously and, further, that the court, crown and police are uncommonly solicitous to complainants in sexual assault cases — a claim that the Ghomeshi cases seems to confirm given the seemingly well -
founded criticism of the police in that case for failing to adequately probe the complainant's allegations, meaning that inconsistencies in their statements were discovered on cross-examination by the defense, fatally undermining their credibility).
And I can not
find any recent trend in
judicial preference
between the two.
The problem with this reconceptualization of the Apprendi rationale is that the reason we would want to make a distinction
between formal, overt and publicly - ascertainable judge -
found facts, on the one hand, and informal, under - the - radar
judicial fact -
finding, on the other, is far from obvious.
Judicial review seeks to address an underlying tension
between the rule of law and the foundational democratic principle, which
finds an expression in the initiatives of Parliament and legislatures to create various administrative bodies and endow them with broad powers.
Unsurprisingly, perhaps, they
found that neither the formalists nor the realists got it right with respect to
judicial decision - making, the truth lying somewhere
between intuition and deliberation; and they propose a way of helping judges move away from intuition where it leads to error.