Sentences with phrase «biases.the cultural cognition»

In their February 2010 article entitled «Cultural Cognition of Scientific Consensus», Dan Kahan, Hank Jenkins - Smith and Donald Braman examine the tendency of individuals to perceive risk with biases congenial to their visions of how society should be organized.

Dan Kahan, professor of law and psychology at Yale Law School, sees public understanding of science through what he and other researchers call cultural cognition.

«Cultural cognition can influence everything from what people believe they have seen with their own eyes to how they perform a mathematical calculation,» he told me.

«The scientists should just tell us what they know and not worry too much about whether there's too much gloom and doom in it,» says Dan Kahan, a Yale law and psychology professor who leads the Cultural Cognition Project, studying public perceptions of risk.

Kahan studies cultural cognition — the idea that the way people process information is heavily determined by their deep - seated values and cultural identities.

The team became interested in curiosity because of its ongoing collaborative research project to improve public engagement with science documentaries involving the Cultural Cognition Project at Yale Law School, the Annenberg Public Policy Center of the University of Pennsylvania, and Tangled Bank Studios at the Howard Hughes Medical Institute.

The Cultural Cognition Project is a group of scholars interested in studying how cultural values shape public risk perceptions and related policy beliefs.

Last year the Cultural Cognition Lab at Yale Law school revealed similar conclusions to the recent Duke findings.

What you take as conscious «framing,» to me is much deeper than that (see Kahan et al's «cultural cognition» work; think about McKibben and Monbiot's reactions to Fukushima as another example).

(Around minute 13, I credit the «cultural cognition» work of Dan Kahan at Yale University.)

It's what Dan Kahan of the Cultural Cognition project at Yale calls identity - protective cognition.

The cultural cognition thesis says that many contested issues of risk — from climate change to nuclear power, from gun control to the HPV vaccine — involve this same dynamic.

As I stressed, what social scientists call «cultural cognition» is only one factor shaping perceptions of phenomena revealed by science.

Cheadle's observations align very well with the research findings of Dan Kahan at Yale and others examining what Kahan calls «cultural cognition.»

In considering his argument, the work of Kahan and others on cultural cognition, and the paralyzed polarization of environmental politics, the next step, of course, is to test fresh paths toward an energy menu that works for the long haul.

He was one of many speakers (see the video here) and was particularly engaging (see a glowing review by Dan Kahan of Yale's Cultural Cognition Project.)

Among many issues, «cultural cognition,» as Yale's Dan Kahan and others have shown, means your cultural identity matters more than an objective assessment of «facts.»

The research of Paul Slovic and Baruch Fischhoff and others has identified several psychological characteristics that make risks feel more or less scary, several of which explain, more than cultural cognition, why people can believe this immense threat looms, yet still not be all that concerned.

We know, though, that attitudes to climate change are strongly correlated with political and ideological worldviews (see for examplethe work of Dan Kahan and the Cultural Cognition Project).

The video, featuring the science writer Joe Hanson, explores a vital body of empirical studies on human risk misperception, showing how a rational view of long - term or diffuse threats is obscured by «status quo bias,» our «finite pool of worry,» our tendency to value tribal connections over reality through what researchers call «cultural cognition,» and other characteristics of what I call our «inconvenient mind.»

I agree that cultural cognition — the idea that we shape our views so they agree with those in the groups with which we most closely identify, in the name of acceptance by our group and thus of safety — powerfully explains the polarized passions over whether climate change is «real,» the «debate» that gets most of the attention about public opinion.

This all reinforces the importance of considering the power of cultural cognition when pondering American polarization on climate, stem cells and a host of other issues underpinned by science — and the longstanding tendency of candidates seeking the Republican presidential nomination to take unscientific positions.

(The Cultural Cognition Project site has a lot more background.)

His august title there is Elizabeth K. Dollard Professor of Law and Professor of Psychology at Yale Law School, but my favorite incarnation of Kahan is as the driving force behind the Cultural Cognition Project, which has shown empirically that powerful predispositions shape how we select and react to information.

I accept that humanity will always have this dynamic tension between individualists and communitarians, which is delineated so beautifully in «cultural cognition» research.

The piece spends quite a bit of time, appropriately on the fascinating work of Dan Kahan, the Yale law professor who is a leader of the ongoing «Cultural Cognition» research project and was the focus of my piece on how one can choose a Nobel Prize winner in physics to suit just about any view on human - driven climate change.

The paper, «Cultural Cognition of Scientific Consensus,» was written by Dan Kahan, a law professor at Yale, University of Oklahoma political science professor Hank Jenkins - Smith and Donald Braman, a law professor at George Washington University, and is scheduled for publication in the Journal of Risk Research.

My learning curve on cultural cognition has led me to mostly abandon my expectation that better information and communication could change the public debate.

While «consensus messaging» refers to something like an action, «cultural cognition» only posits something about cognition.

Public reactions to the case display the characteristic signature of cultural cognition — the tendency of people to fit the perception of legally consequential facts to their group commitments.

The influence of cultural cognition explains why people with different outlooks and identities are forming such strong and divergent understandings of what happened despite their having almost no clear evidence to go on.

How could they be when «cultural cognition» and «consensus messaging» are two orthogonal concepts?

On this view, cultural cognition can be seen as injecting a biasing form of endogeneity into a process roughly akin to Bayesian updating.

Not to deny by any means the importace of thinking about the US vs. UK differences — in public opinion & in how public opinion bears on political decisionmaking — but we did use our framework to test how cultural cognition, measured w / our scales, affects English (yes, English; not entire UK) public engagement with informaton on climate change.

When mechanisms of cultural cognition figure in her reasoning, a person processes information in a manner that is equivalent to one who is assigning new information probative weight based on its consistency with her prior estimation (Figure 9).

This is from Kahan, D.M., Jenkins - Smith, H. & Braman, D., Cultural Cognition of Scientific Consensus, J. Risk Res.

My point was that, if we accept this basic story (it's too simple, even as an account of how cultural cognition works; but that's in the nature of «models» & should give us pause only when the simplification detracts from rather than enhances our ability to predict and manage the dynamics of the phenomenon in question), then there's no reason to view the valences of the cultural meanings attached to crediting climate change risk as fixed or immutable.

Fox argues that cultural cognition dynamics are likely to influence not only public perceptions of risk but also market - related assessments and decisionmaking within groups one might expect to be more focused on money and data than on meaning.

Or do you think if someone (presumably someone who understands cultural cognition) develops a set of communication strategies or guides that skip ahead to the end of the story and just provide those «seeding guidelines» to someone without an understanding of why this has a positive effect on polarization, it would suffice?

* How is it, btw, that you have come to determine that Dan's orientation leads to a cultural cognition?

And I would offer a similar criticism of that as well, as IMO, you neither ground that form of analogizing in a scientific manner; as I have told you, I think that your inclusion and exclusion criteria selection process is quite arbitrary, and I don't think that it is coincidence that it confirms your distinction of a group you belong to («skeptics») from a group you criticize («realists») in ways that (1) reaffirm a superiority in the group you belong to and, (2) I consider to be superficial and not meaningful as compared to the vastly more important underlying similarities (e.g., the tendency toward identity protective behavior, motivated reasoning, cultural cognition, confirmation bias, emotively - influenced reasoning, etc.)...

But psychologically, the cultural cognition thesis predicts that which condition the subjects were assigned to could matter.

I will say this; I little no doubt that just as is true of everyone else, including you, Dan's work is influenced by cultural cognition, or other manifestations of motivated reasoning (I think I have seen evidence of confirmation bias, for example).

Consider our study of the impact of cultural cognition on people's perceptions of the behavior of political protestors.

Anyway, I'm psyched to learn that Fox sees our methods and framework as relevant to the market - related phenomena he writes on — not only because it's cool to think that cultural cognition can shed light on those things but also because I really loved his Myth of the Rational Market.

Wouldn't that be inconsistent with the premise of cultural cognition - that people will filter (or disregard) any evidence so as to maintain their polarized perspective?

So what we have is someone who is clearly identified with an in - group (in your case «skeptics») and who asserts an asymmetry in the climate change domain that qualitatively elevates his own identity group over the out - group («realists»), asserting a cultural cognition bias in someone that he feels is identified with that out - group (without even an attempt to explain the basis for such a determination *), even those that person isn't asserting such a qualitative elevation of his own in - group.

The cultural cognition thesis is that people conform their perceptions of risk & like facts to the positions that predominate in their group — not that they conform fact or risk perceptions to ones that maintain or maximize polarization.

I believe that the cultural cognition of present day climate change discussions can not be conducted without understanding of how these underlying philosophies affect modern attitudes.

That's true of «cultural cognition» and like forms of motivated reasoning that figure in the tendency of people to fit their assessments of information — from scientific «data» to expository arguments to the positions of putative experts to (again!)