Sentences with phrase «by moral reasoning»

Any test of «fairness» must look to principles of distributive or retributive justice and must be supported by moral reasoning.

Not exact matches

There are some discreditable reasons: like Victorians offended by the suggestion that they were descended from apes, some humanists imagine that their dignity is threatened when human society is represented as the moral equivalent of a dish on a turntable.

By moving beyond legal reasoning to resolving questions of moral and political values, the Court loses the characteristics of impartiality and independence from politics that are fundamental to its legitimacy.

Just by hinting at the existence of moral knowledge, Dawkins gives us reason to doubt that we actually do live in a world ruled by gangster genes.

Wells begins by positing two kinds of spirituality present within evangelicalism, distinguished in his view not so much by different doctrinal starting - points as differing priorities assigned to moral reasoning.

This legislation, moreover, is not something Thomas allows the judge to overrule for moral reasons or by appeal to the natural law.

The classical response to nonmoral evil we have been discussing begins by affirming «C» omnipotence in relation to humans and then argues that there do exist good reasons to believe that such a moral world would include instances of genuine nonmoral evil and plausible reasons for assuming that such a world would have the types and amount of genuine nonmoral evil we presently experience.

The classic civil - rights movement was determined to reshape America through moral reason; distorted into a twisted parody of itself through the victim culture, it was followed by a moralism self - consciously detached from reason that would prove incapable of calling anyone, black or white, to the great cause of equal justice for all.

A politics of reason gave way to a politics of emotion and flirted with the politics of irrationality; the claims of moral reason were displaced by moralism; the notion that all men and women were called to live lives of responsibility was displaced by the notion that some people were, by reason of birth, victims; patriotism became suspect, to be replaced by a vague internationalism; democratic persuasion was displaced by judicial activism.

One may suggest, however, that the difference between violence and force is that the former is unrestrained by political and moral reason.

What is required by the criterion of human integrity is that occupations be so defined that manual work is also a rational pursuit and an opportunity for constructive imagination, that symbolic skills may be exercised in clear relation to material necessities and in the light of moral responsibilities, and that creative professional activities will be conducted with a vivid sense of the realities of nature and the canons of reason.

According to this understanding, the role of religion in political debate is not so much to supply these norms, as if they could not be known by non-believers — still less to propose concrete political solutions, which would lie altogether outside the competence of religion — but rather to help purify and shed light upon the application of reason to the discovery of objective moral principles.

What Holmes was fighting was not formalism but the natural law tradition, the philosophy that there is an objective moral order ascertainable by reason.

So, I sincerely and respectfully ask of individuals who back anti-choice campaigns by citing personal moral or religious reasons this question, which I ask out honest curiosity: how can you recognize the consequences, historically, of legally banning a certain choice a person makes, and maintain that your moral code has not been violated, or even argue that your moral or religious code has been upheld, or elevated?

The reason is not that a moral precept is binding even if it is not proclaimed by the Church with sufficient clarity, although the Church could and should do so.

Gregory makes a stunning point on the ambiguities of giving to those derelicts among the poor who are by consensus generally regarded as less worthy: One should give not just to the unworthy poor, but also to the worthy poor, regardless of their moral condition, and for a profound reason: because one «gives of his bread to an indigent sinner, not because he is a sinner, but because he is a man.

For that reason the Church teaches moral maxims with specific content to be observed by the faithful in every case where the inner structure of reality to which these principles apply is actually present and where this presence is recognized by the Christian.

By claiming, for example, that Arkes has incorrectly interpreted the reasons for the Civil War and the debate over abortion, and has neglected to provide a fuller picture of the Founders and their beliefs, Prof. Smolin is presupposing a moral notion that is logically prior to his analysis: historical texts and events should be interpreted accurately.

On the day the bomb was first tested in the New Mexico desert, he wrote in his journal that «machines are ahead of morals by some centuries, and when morals catch up perhaps there will be no reason for any of it.»

If I am morally required or permitted to act in a certain manner, and if that action has effects on you, then the moral validity of the prescription on which I act means that your acceptance of those effects is required by reason — and, in that sense, the prescription implies a common decision.

Moral reason and moral identity, they insist, are constituted exclusively by the traditions that shape us.

This was vividly brought home to me recently, reading the vast work of academic moral philosophy On What Matters, by Derek Parfit, in which problems concerning the switching of trolleys from one rail to another in order to prevent or cause the deaths of those further down the line are presented as showing the essence of moral reasoning and its place in the life of human beings.

Recognizing the inadequacy of an education that teaches facts and figures but ignores questions of morality and meaning, Harvard attempted to address the problem in the early 1980s by adding a «moral reasoning» course requirement to its core curriculum.

Jeremy thanks for your comments alot of this i never really thought about before until you provoked me to seek the truth in the word it is what we all should be doing finding the truth for ourselves God wants to reveal mysterys if we are open to hear.If we have been christians awhile we just take the word of whoevers preaching or whichever clip we see on god tube its knowledge but not revelation.Because the story sounds plausible we tag that on to our belief for example for many years i believed that the rich young rulers problem was money so the way to deal with that problem is to give it away and be a follower of Jesus sounds plausible.Till you realise every believers situation is different so the message has to be universal.So the reason its not about money because it excludes those that do nt have it and does nt make room for those that do have it but do nt worship it.The rich young ruler was not a bad person he lived by a good moral code but he made money his idol he put that before God.The word says we shall not have any idols thats a sin and a wicked one.In fact there wasnt any room in his heart for Jesus that is a tragedy.So when we see the message is about Idolatry we all have areas that we chose not to submit to God thats universal everyone of us whether we are rich or poor.I believe we are unaware that we have these idols what are some of them that was revealed to me our partners our children our work our church our family i can sense some of you are getting fidgetty.

For Solzhenitsyn, moral reasoning can be won back only by those forced through suffering to perceive the lie that forms and ideas, not people, are the ultimate reality.

While Sartre attempts to explain the mechanisms of dialectical reasoning in its social context, Solzhenitsyn's Gulag sets a limit to dialectical thought by demonstrating its ultimate moral failure.

Endowment with reason and conscience, and hence that a human person is a rational and moral being, is commonly accepted by all peoples, whatever their philosophy, ideology or religion.

There are no moral absolutes, but there are such things as empathy, sympathy, logic, reason, common sense, and science to give me a much more effective and intelligent set of morals to live by.

If any possible action to which reasonable moral conditions apply is, by reason of those conditions, an action against which there can be said to be a «presumption,» then there is a «presumption» against almost any imaginable action, including state action.

However, it is with good reason: morals are not defined by society.

There is in most of us a spark of reason, and much was achieved for universal human moral standing by the great Stoic philosophers who emphasized this logos in us all.

Arkes contends that moral reasoning not only illuminates the proper reach of existing constitutional principles but may properly be employed by judges to create new constitutional principles.

The second error is to suppose that there is no right (or rationally superior) answer to important moral questions on which people disagree, or that the right answer can only be known by blind faith, not by reason.

I have a host of reasons for this belief that draw upon scripture, enlightenment, reasoning, church history, and I believe by my own internal moral compass given to me by my creator.

Again and again Augustine shows that moral reasoning must be transformed by the deeper wisdom offered by Christ and the Scriptures.

Thus instead of trying to construct a philosophical system which accords with the rule of reason, as Hegel had done, Nietzsche begins by turning reason against itself, uncovering in the process its «irrational» origins in nature («On the Genealogy & Morals,» BWN; Sections 2 and 16; WP, Sections 480 and 481).

In fact, looking around the world today, the most hopeful sign I see is the human rights movement, which operates from the unprovable and, on its face, improbable moral conviction that all humans are equal and that no human should be abused by any other for any reason whatsoever.

But most importantly we are able to reason and develop morals by which we recognize right and wrong.

In this sense, true evil appears only in the very field where religion is produced, namely, in the field of contradictions and conflicts determined, on the one hand, by the demand for totalization which constitutes reason, both theoretical and practical, and, on the other hand, by the illusion which misleads thought, the subtle hedonism which vitiates moral motivation, and finally by the malice which corrupts the great human enterprises of totalization.

Justice is a moral concept that is used by reason to discriminate the needs due the neighbor.

For MacIntyre, the practices necessary for training in practical reason through which we acquire the ability to act intelligibly requires the systematic growth of human potential by acquired excellence that can not help but challenge the character of modern moral practice and theory.

It is also a reason that Christians can't trust their moral intuitions and moral imaginations, even though they are (allegedly) informed by the Spirit, because they — at the end of the day — believe the same thing and agree with you that you can't really tell the difference and if you were in Phelps» shoes that you would feel the Spirit told you to do what he's doing.

The leadership, by contrast, repudiated for theological and moral reasons much of the emerging mass culture, the economic system, and many of the works — particularly military adventures — of the system's political leaders.

There is the alternative that, to his credit, has been attempted by Governor Cuomo, namely, to make a reasoned public case for the compatibility of his moral convictions and his political position on abortion.

And because man lacked the ability to arrive at ethical and moral truths by reason, neither could philosophy become «the handmaiden of theology.»

For such a scientist, faith acts at best as a «moral compass,» but the direction it provides does not breach the wall of separation, and is neither aided by nor aids reason.

The natural law is a body of unchanging moral principles known not from revelation (though parallel to it) but by reason, principles regarded as a basis for all human conduct: to speak in this way of «the humanisation of sexuality» is simply the understanding of the natural law in particular human circumstances: there is no movement away from natural law - say, to revelation or ecclesial authority; we are stillwithin its ambit.

And while the history of America's wars is hardly a story of moral perfection, it is, by human standards, a mostly heroic story of doing the right thing and doing it for the right reasons.

They lead us to resist any reduction of moral action to volition guided by practical reason alone, for the same tendencies and needs also enter into the motivation of action.

In fact, all my anxieties run in the opposite direction: that, in order to affirm the uniqueness of humanity within organic nature, as well as the unique moral obligations it entails, we will reject all evidence of intentionality, reason, or affection in animals as something only apparently purposive, doing so by reference to the most egregiously vapid of philosophical naturalism's mystifications — «instinct» — and thereby opening the way to a mechanistic narrative that, as we have learned from an incessant torrent of biological and bioethical theory in recent decades, can be extended to human behavior as well.