Many modern Canadian lawyers and judges are likely more familiar with Sopinka J.'s admonition in Snell v. Farrell against «abstract metaphysical theory» — the claim that causation is «essentially a practical question of fact which can best be answered
by ordinary common sense rather than abstract metaphysical theory.»
Causation need not be determined by scientific precision; as Lord Salmon stated in Alphacell Ltd. v. Woodward, [1972] 2 All E.R. 475, at p. 490, and as was quoted by Sopinka J. at p. 328, it is «essentially a practical question of fact which can best be answered
by ordinary common sense».
Legal causation however need not be determined by scientific precision and is essentially a practical question of fact which can best be answered
by ordinary common sense rather than abstract theory.
Causation is essentially «a practical question of fact which can best be answered
by ordinary common sense»: Snell v. Farrell at 328, citing Alphacell Ltd. v. Woodward, [1972] 2 All E.R. 475 at 490 (per Lord Salmon).
A question of causation is «essentially a practical question of fact which can best be answered
by ordinary common sense».
Not exact matches
It «is no mere extension of
ordinary language,» but
by its specialized function in a subordinate role intends to be «illuminative of
common -
sense assertions as a whole.»
It was that message, the «word of the cross» preached
by Paul, that struck both Jews and Gentiles as scandalous foolishness, as an offense against both the wisdom of the educated and the
common sense of
ordinary people.
Ito: Like I mentioned earlier, the story is about an
ordinary people, and
by our
senses, firing around a gun is not very
common.
The landmark decision in Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 All ER 98, [1998] 1 WLR 896, signalled the simplicity of the test that in matters of construction the courts were concerned to ascertain the «meaning which the document would convey to a reasonable person» (ie an objective test)
by applying «the
common sense principles
by which any serious utterance would be interpreted in
ordinary life».
[33] The judge's outline of causation jurisprudence contains the mantra that causation is «essentially a practical question of fact which can best be answered
by application of
ordinary common sense»: see 2012 ONSC 320 at paras. 61 - 64.