Sentences with phrase «by subjective forms»

It is only as in the past of others, or «for others,» that an occasion is both a stubborn fact and an ambiguous entity, open to interpretation by subjective forms that future entities will assign to it.

Generally put, contrast occurs when two things not fitting together according to their own internal principles are fitted together by the special context of the experiencer, by the subjective form that experiences them together.

How this interaction takes place is determined by the subjective form, which is the particular mood or attitude by which the subject prehends a particular datum.

Not exact matches

This subjective form is determined by the subjective aim at further integration, so as to obtain the «satisfaction» of the completed subject.

«We form our beliefs for a variety of subjective, personal, emotional, and psychological reasons in the context of environments created by family, friends, colleagues, culture, and society at large; after forming our beliefs we then defend, justify, and rationalize them with a host of intellectual reasons, cogent arguments, and rational explanations.

But the prehensions of each phase must be different from those of the other phases by virtue of different subjective forms, just as on Whitehead's view the prehensions of each occasion differ from those of each other by virtue of the same reason.

There is also evidence that the subjective form or emotional tone of present experience is affected by the emotional tone of other people.

Whitehead himself describes the utterance of the phrase «United Fruit Company»; «The final occasion of his experience which drove his body to the utterance of the word «Company» is only explicable by his concern with the earlier occasions with their subjective forms of intention to procure the utterance of the complete phrase» (AI 234f).

Deleuze's idea of the «repetition» as «universality of the singular» may interpret Whitehead's idea of «repetition,» i.e., the apparent paradox that only the unrepeatable become present in other occasions by a «conformal transference of subjective form.

But to the extent that such data are experienced or prehended by later occasions, they are already immanent in them, and they are so even before there is any conformal reproduction of subjective forms.

By virtue of the becoming occasion's subjective form, prehensions 0 and M of the real object may be negatively prehended, and prehension N positively prehended.

That is, the subjective form is some form of the subject, for «by a «subject» in this context, he [Whitehead] usually means an event causally influenced by some other event in its past» (PW 127/136).

The physical prehension as conformal feeling, we have said, reproduces the object by assuming the subjective form of one of its prehensions, but as vector it is, and remains throughout the «life» of the subject, an essential relation to that individual object as other, as there and then.

There is secondary origination of conceptual feelings with data which are partially identical with, and partially diverse from, the eternal objects forming the data in the primary phase of the mental pole; the determination of identity and diversity depending on the subjective aim at attaining depth of intensity by reason of contrast.

I propose that we understand self - consciousness as the subjective form characterized by a vivid feeling of «mineness» as it unifies high - grade multiple contrasts.

A self - conscious occasion unifies the contrasts found in the conscious occasion — that is, of what is and what might be — by means of a subjective form characterized by the feeling of mineness, so that the occasion is aware that it is prehending these contrasts.

They may retain their subjective role of being a means of experiencing by becoming included within a larger subjective form.

The deeper we go, the more finite subjective forms are knit together by divine conceptual supplementation to become the subjective form of a wider portion of God's subjectivity, till at bottom it becomes coextensive with the whole.

«E.g., that the feelings which arise in various phases of a concrescence be compatible for integration; that no element in a concrescence can finally (in the «satisfaction») have two disjoined roles; that no two elements can finally have the same role; that every physical feeling gives rise to a corresponding conceptual feeling: that there is secondary origination of variant conceptual feeling; and that the subjective forms (valuations) of the conceptual feelings are mutually determined by their aptness for being joint elements in the satisfaction aimed at.

Yet by his principles God must prehend the entirety of the satisfaction, by means of a reenactment of its subjective form, its way of experiencing its world.

Two compatible subjective forms may be fused into a larger whole without altering the decision of either, by means of conceptual supplementation derived from God's infinite conceptual imagination.

On the other hand, B may prehend A in such a way that the fact that it is A which it is prehending is of paramount importance for the subjective form of B rather than the particular aspect of A by which A is objectified.

Unless we are to suppose that there is little or no correlation between the initial aim and the final form of the subjective aim — a very strange supposition — we must assume vast differences in the initial aims derived from God by a primitive man and by an Einstein, or for that matter, between myself as I drop off to sleep in the evening and as I write these words.

God's experience of the world is essentially determined by efficient causation, by the conformal repetition of finite emotional experiences in subjective form (PR 345/523).

The integration of this experience is essentially determined by God's all - embracing, permanent subjective aim (his aim for his ongoing self), which is to realize all possible forms of definiteness and thus to achieve an absolute intensity of experience (PR 345 / 523).

Whereupon Lucas concludes: «the inheritance of a common form in a living regnant society consists in the serial coordination of the successive subjective aims of the actual entities (i.e., the complete and peculiar «summation» of the series by each succeeding term) toward a final end or «satisfaction» of the society as a whole» (TVF 44).

The way she feels about what she is hearing, what Whitehead calls «the subjective form» of the prehension, is affected by her tiredness and the soreness of some of her muscles as well as by vague and half - conscious hopes and fears.

DE: I think he would say that a thing's subjective aim perishes with it, but that its character as subjective form can be conformed to by the next in the chain.

Second, it interprets the subjective aim of the actual occasion as arising more impartially out of hybrid feelings of aims (propositional feelings whose subjective form involves appetition) entertained for the new occasion by its predecessors.

The subjective aim of the new occasion must be formed by some synthesis or adaptation of these aims for which it is itself finally responsible.

The intensity of physical energy embodied by actual occasions is a function of the subjective species of eternal objects, while the peculiar form of the flux of energy refers to the objective species, the mathematical forms.

I question, however, whether every prehension obtained by genetic division has all the features of an actual entity» except its own completed subjective form.

In summary, extending Whitehead's doctrine of eternal objects to include the idea that they form a dense continuum seems to raise at least two problems: (1) it requires that God consciously prehend a nondenumerable multitude of propositions regarding every past actual occasion and (2) it requires either that a new concrescence choose its subjective aim from a nondenumerable multitude of alternatives or that this multitude somehow be restricted before all these alternatives are prehended by the occasion.

On Whitehead's view a concrescing occasion begins with definite novel forms provided by God and eventually selects one of them as its subjective aim.

They are serially ordered and are so by virtue of the continuation of a common «subjective form,» with, of course, tolerable variations.

First, we note that the reason these prehensions are not simply independent contemporaneous actual entities must be found in their subjective forms as determined by a common subjective aim (PR 28f).

Nor is the subject simply the mutual sensitivity of the subjective forms influenced by this aim.

But when it combines with another atom by virtue of its physical properties, a new entity is formed and this new entity has its appropriate subjective aim.

My judgment that I ought to act that way would be warranted by the correctness of my belief that the sense of obligation inescapably functions in the subjective form of that imaginative feeling.

They are warranted by statements about the inescapable inclusion of the sense of obligation in the subjective forms of their imaginative feelings of certain possible modes of behavior.

The fact that the «subjective form» assigned to a past entity by a present entity in prehension is variable testifies to this basic condition of ambiguity of past occasions with reference to present ones.

This unique perspective of subject upon object is its «subjective form» (PR 35), or particular affective tonality with reference only to this object as apprehended by this subject.

Once again we can see that this principle is warranted by the factual statement that in ethically developed men the sense of obligation is inescapably included in the subjective form of the imaginative feeling of that mode of behavior.

A prehension has several elements: an actual entity which is felt or prehended by another entity; the entity which prehends the first actual occasion; and the «subjective form» (PR 338), or unique way in which the second occasion prehends the first one.

or is it merely the objectified form in which the union of subjective and objective spirit is seen by people at a given stage, in which they imagine, feel, or understand this union?

Ethical assertions would be uniquely warranted by factual statements about the subjective form of the prehensions of imaginative propositions.

«actual occasions» are shaped not only by logical reasoning, but includes all aspects of one's subjective experiences, including the use of ones imagination, aesthetic feelings, and other forms of non-cognitive and unconscious influences.

That is, by matching itself with eternal objects (possibilities) a relationship is established (qualitative feelings) which constitutes an actual entity's subjective form.

The definiteness, however, depends upon the primordial satisfaction and is mediated through the mutuality of subjective form by which God feels every prehended occasion in light of all others and in light of the primordial vision.

By transition, in this earlier theory, the datum from whence the subjective process of appropriation begins (cf. PR 150/2270 is formed.